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THESIS

MEDIA DIPLOMACY:
THE NEGOTIATOR'S DILEMMA
BY
ABIGAIL S. HOWELL
DECEMBER 1990

Thesis Advisor:

R. MITCHELL BROWN III

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Media Diplomacy:
The Negotiator's Dilemma

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

The media as an adjunct to diplomacy is not a contemporary phenomenon. The media as diplomacy has its historical origins in the telecommunications revolution. To communicate is to negotiate. The key element then becomes the ability to communicate in real-time and space. This new dimension of diplomacy was instantaneous communication of words and images over vast distances.

In news reporting, electronic newsgathering equipment - comprised of a small color camera, a video recorder, and mobile satellite transmitters - enables news reports to be "bounced back" to a satellite ground station from where they are then beamed to news organizations. Prior to this, television reporting had been based on film, a process which was both slow and costly. The rise of the mini cam permitted the one-man crew, or at most two-man crew, to replace the extended crew coverage of earlier years. Television news which had once been confined to summarizing events which had taken place earlier, now had the capability to interrupt the live broadcast with late-breaking stories. The development of the satellite enabled the reporter, print or broadcast variety, to send back the dispatch instantaneously, with a vastly increased quantity of copy, and speed of transmission.¹

The result of this simultaneity has been a diminishing of the absolute authority of the diplomat, a centralization of the decision-making process in the home capital,² and the introduction of a third player onto the scene, the journalist. This research effort will examine the influence of the media in the realm of international relations in general, and the

¹Yoel Cohen, Media Diplomacy (New Jersey: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1986), 159; Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber, The Power to Inform trans. Paris Research Associates, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974) 193-7.

²Livingston Merchant, "New Techniques in Diplomacy" in The Dimensions of Diplomacy ed. E. A. Johnson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964) 123.

military negotiator in particular. However, prior to examining this phenomenon, its historical context must be established. Initially, the reader will be reintroduced to man's unique capability to communicate the abstractions of thoughts and ideas through the spoken word. Communications theory will be reviewed, and selected, yet representative examples from the history of communications will be presented as illustrative of the interconnection between the human desire to exchange information, and the constant drive to improve the technology to do so.

Diplomacy is a specialized variant of communications, conducted by individuals but representative of a greater entity, the sovereign state. A brief examination of the history and the development of diplomacy will be explored. Media Diplomacy is a phrase coined by Yoel Cohen to explain the rise of yet another aspect of diplomacy as it has evolved over time. Three geo-political governments will be examined, the United States as representative of democratic government answerable to a free press, the Soviet Union as a state - controlled system in the midst of transition to a liberated press, various Latin American military regimes and their control of the press. Each study will examine the official and unofficial practitioners of media diplomacy. The power of the Latin American military will be contrasted with the all-volunteer Constitutional military of the United States and how the U.S. military has developed its own version of media diplomacy. Additionally, the tension between the free press in the U.S. and its ability to cover military operations will be examined by reviewing symposiums conducted in the wake of the Viet Nam War and the Grenada operation "Urgent Fury".

The final focus will be on the dilemmas posed by the onset of media diplomacy for the military negotiator in the realm of national security and intelligence issues. Constraints and benefits will be examined in terms of their ability to act as force multipliers or force dividers for the military negotiator. In an effort to alleviate the

natural tension which exists between freedom of the press and national security, four options will be examined. The purpose of this research effort is to draw attention to a topic which has not been fully addressed in the literature of diplomacy and only periodically addressed in regard to its impact on the U.S. military. Raising the level of interest and reinstituting the dialogue is its aim.

II. MEDIA DIPLOMACY- ORIGINS AND MEANINGS

A. HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS

Human beings are social animals constantly seeking out ways to interact with their own kind and their environment *writ large*. To that end, mankind congregates in groups whose interests embrace the whole of the human condition; mankind constructs a social order ranging from the nuclear family and its evolution into the twentieth century phenomenon of the progressive or serial family to the local neighborhood or city life and its values, then, exponentially multiplies this to form a nation with a distinct character and identity. Finally, mankind overcomes vast obstacles in terms of time, distance, and space in order to confront the international confraternity of self-like images, thoughts, and contradictions. International man is sought out, either for the waging of war, or for the negotiating and exchanging of peace, commerce, and ideas. The mainspring of all this human activity, the core upon which it is built, is man's ability to communicate.

Challenged by the aspiration to exceed limitations imposed upon earlier generations, the chronicle of man is replete with examples supporting Harold A. Innis' theory that the history of man is the history of communications. Thus every major change in the method of communications has been followed by a major change in the structure of society.³ He argues that the introduction of movable type by Gutenberg hastened the collapse of feudal institutions by dissolving the monopolistic control of the written word; the development of the popular press, the telegraph, and the telephone may be credited with the large-scale democratization of society. Marshal McLuhan pursues this line of reasoning and in an era of television, microwave relays, and satellite signals envisions the

³ Harold A. Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1951). See also his work Empire of Communications (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).

"global village".⁴ wherein man is as one, or very nearly so. To date this wonder has not occurred, however the world events in the waning hours of the 1980s from the massive student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square to the fall of the Berlin Wall does point to the pervasiveness of the media in the spread of ideas, and the simultaneity with which it is now graced to report on the outcome of that diffusion of visions.

1. The Language of Speech

The paradox of the modern age is that despite man's creative ability to conquer time, distance, and space through an illimitable network of communications in a diverse array of media, through the development of increasingly complex technology which simplifies the process; the ability to communicate, in the absolute sense of the word, with his fellows remains beyond his grasp to a certain degree. There is a classic line in the motion picture Cool Hand Luke when Boss Man tells Luke "What we have here is a failure to communicate."⁵ Or viewed through a different prism, a failure by one man to use language to exert social control over another. Language is doubtless, man's most powerful means to convey his thoughts, give form to his activity, formulate his hopes and plans for the future, and preserve his memory of the useful past. Basic principles which have emerged from various studies of the relationships among brain, mind, and speech are as follows:

- 1) Speech is universal among men.
- 2) Rate of internal change in all languages is about the same.
- 3) Intellectual capacity, set at a minimum of 750cc's by anthropologists for speech, is basic to the development and management of oral communication.

⁴ Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media : The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw Hill Book, Co., 1964).

⁵ Cool Hand Luke , a Warner Brothers , Jack Lemmon, Executive Producer, production, 1967.

- 4) Ability to speak is an inherited characteristic of man which is carried in his genetic pool, despite which each individual must develop this power for himself.
- 5) Growth of human culture is predicated upon five essentials: freedom in general from instinctive behavior, physiological adaptability for a larger brain for learning, a persistent drive for innovation, ability to think in terms of symbols, mastery of oral communications.
- 6) Talk of humans is translated whereas sounds of animals are interpreted.
- 7) The evolution of speech in man has followed the Darwinian theories by making changes through natural selection which met the test of survival for existence.
- 8) Some primitive tongues are much more complicated than modern languages.
- 9) Similarities among members of the Indo-Aryan-Germanic languages result from a common heritage derived from an extinct ancestral form of speech.
- 10) Three fourths of the average working day are spent listening or talking.
- 11) Two essentials for human speech are a brain and a suitable physiological apparatus for the production of the message. ⁶

To communicate through speech is to announce one's existence , to be interactive in relation with others, to pierce through to the outer world. Communication in the raw is essentially an interchange, an interrogative-response-rejoinder cycle, an action and its counterpart -- the not-so-scientific reaction between an individual and the environment in which he lives. As noted in the findings above, the process of oral communications and the society of man have evolved together ; mirror-imaging the complexity of their respective

⁶ A survey of the following works will substantiate these findings. Charles L. Barber, The Flux of Language (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964) Ch. 1-3; J. P. Firth, The Tongues of Men and Speech (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) Ch 1-5; Louis H. Gray, Foundations of Language (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1939) Ch 13; Stevan R. Harnad, Horst B. Steklis, Jane Lancaster, eds. Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech (New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1976). See specifically Hans Aarsleff "An Outline of Language-Origins Theory since the Renaissance" 4-13; Paul Kiparsky "Historical Linguistics and the Origin of Language" 97-103; Ernst von Glasserfeld "The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior" 212-26; Ashley Montague "Toolmaking, Hunting, and the Origin of Language" 266-74; Horst D. Steklis and S. R. Harnad "From Hand to Mouth: Some Critical Stages in the Evolution of Language" 445-55; David Premack "Mechanisms of Intelligence: Preconditions for Language" 544-61. Curtis W. Hayes, Jacob Ornstein and William W. Gage ABC's of Languages and Linguistics (Maryland: Institute of Modern Languages, Inc., 1977) Ch 2, 3; Herbert Landar Language and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) Ch. 1, 3, 5; Frank Smith and George A. Miller, eds. The Genesis of Language (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1966) see specifically Eric H. Lenneberg "The Natural History of Language" 219-52; Richard Allen Chase "Evolutionary Aspects of Language Development and Function" 253-68; Mario Pei, The Story of Language (New York: J. P. Lippincott, Co., 1949) Part I "The History of Language"; also his Voices of Man (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962) 1-26.

maturation. There is a certain logical symmetry to this development, for each entity is merely a different aspect of the same, larger concept. Language is a form of social behavior, a cultural indicator, simultaneously expressing and shaping the beliefs and attitudes of people in group settings -- whether it is the basic family unit, social classes or castes, villages or cities, tribes or nations -- man and his methods of communication are present.

2. The Written Word

In his quest for immortality, man developed signs, symbols, ideograms, pictographs, alphabets to ensure his intellectual legacy, to create a living memory of ages past. Written words extend far beyond the meaning on the page. Although lacking the nuances of speech, the immediacy and power of an orator, they are, nonetheless, a record of the process of man's thought. Effective writing demands that man engage his logic, his ability to discriminate, and thus, stylistically to impart his message for the ages. Longinus, an early Greek writing in the pre-Christian era, and W. Somerset Maugham are in accord when discussing "...the great stylist's ability to choose, not a good, but the inevitable word and place it appropriately in the composition."⁷ Histories of man best remembered are those which follow the elements of the best style:

- 1) The speaker or writer must be endowed with creative imagination of a high level of insight.
- 2) His creative drive must be sustained by strong emotion from beginning to end of his composition.
- 3) He must exhibit able command of metaphor and other figures of speech.
- 4) He must have good diction, an excellent vocabulary, and be able to use it.
- 5) The structuring of the piece should exhibit awareness of order.⁸

⁷ W. Somerset Maugham The Summing Up (New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1938) 22; H. J. Rose A Handbook of Greek Literature (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1942) 400-01.

⁸ Maugham, 33-36.

Without the ability to read and write, man returns to the pre-literate society, rudimentary in nature, and trapped in a time vacuum. Information exchange is dependent upon speech and audio-visual devices, but there are no historical guides to what man has accomplished before. Without writing, those skills, sciences, arts, philosophies, and bodies of laws and customs which man has perfected over the centuries would perish. Generations-in-being and those yet-to-come would be shorn of their "*vace mecum*", guidebook, and thereby forced to retrace those steps on the protracted, perilous road to civilization. Pre-literate societies are primitive in nature. The power of the written word, however, contributed to urbanization, highly developed forms of trade, government, law, religion, literature, and the systemized growth of knowledge, not merely information and yet, not quite that of wisdom. Man is still attempting to achieve the latter.

Writing surfaces and the development thereof, soon became the quest of man. A variety of elements and combinations were attempted, but it was not until the Egyptians' use of the papyrus plant in the third millennium B.C. that the essentials were achieved: lightweight, easily stored, not too bulky. Papyrus was soon followed by parchment, which had been perfected in the Asia Minor city of Pergamum in the second century B.C. Although libraries had been in existence as early as 2500 B.C. in Egypt, the production of this durable, velvet-smooth surface, suitable for writing on both sides, enhanced and thereby increased the copying of numerous manuscripts for the Hellenistic world. Under Julius Caesar, a system of public libraries was established but in actuality, access to books was, and would continue to be for centuries, the preserve of the wealthy. Whereas the West developed parchment, the East, specifically the Chinese, experimented with silk. Reducing silk to a pulp yielded a very high-grade, if expensive, paper. In 105 A.D., they succeeded in turning the husks of cheaper fibers, i.e. cotton, into paper pulp. When the Arabs conquered

Samarkand in 712 A.D., they inherited the craft of papermaking, eventually passing it to the West in the twelfth century.

Once the suitable surface issue had been resolved, the next challenge was to match supply to demand. Monastic orders laboriously copying and illuminating texts, house calligraphers, and private ateliers were, by definition answerable to the elite alone and yet, the audience of readership was ever-widening. Johann Gensfleisch, more commonly known as Gutenberg, resolved the problem in a revolutionary manner. By inventing movable type, developing casts of individual letter molds, and creating an ink which would adhere to metal type, Gutenberg took an impressive technological leap forward. Books, and thus information, could now be disseminated to the literate masses as never before. The Industrial Revolution would build on the Gutenberg legacy with the introduction of still cheaper paper manufactured from wood pulp, automatic typesetting, steam-operated and rotary presses, and lithography. Mass production of books in conjunction with the rise of mass education brought literature, science, philosophy, history, etc., into the "everyman's" western European and American homes.

Publication of news for public consumption had its origins in the Roman *Acta Diurna*, which were official announcements first posted for societal reading in 131 B.C. The *Acta Senatus*, ordered by Julius Caesar in 59 B.C., provided transcripts of the Senate debates. However, this was viewed as a mistake by the ruling elites, who promptly imposed censorship, thus implying that political matters and the control thereof, were better left in the hands of the few. Peking published the first printed newspaper in 748 A.D.⁹ however the West did not acknowledge the commercial possibilities of news until the first half of the

⁹ Robert W. Desmond The Information Process: World News Reporting to the Twentieth Century (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1978) 10-11; Anthony Smith The Newspaper: An International History (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979), 13-5.

sixteenth century. The Augsburg House of Fugger¹⁰, a private commercial firm, published handwritten "newsletters". These publications were written specifically for employees and select favored customers with the emphasis on financial transactions, shipping information, and government intrusion into the business world such that a knowledgeable grasp of political occurrences became essential. Semi-private newsletters gradually evolved into newspapers.

3. Newsbooks, Newspapers, and the Rise of Reporters

Printers, casting about for additional profitable enterprises, began to see the potential in publishing news for an unrestricted audience and so by the middle of the 16th century, journals in the form of pamphlets, christened "newsbooks" were born in Britain.¹¹ Newsbooks were not, however, true newspapers due to the reality that a newsbook was limited in its scope i.e. only one subject was addressed per issue. Approximately a century would pass before the general interest newspaper would appear with any regularity. The first was a German publication, *Avisa Relation oder Zeitung* dating from 1609; which was followed by *Nienne Tijdinghen* of Antwerp (1616), and the *Gazette de France* in Paris (1631).¹² Although dubbed the weekly press, publication dates were co-dependent on the mail system which was infamous for its unreliability consequently, these early press efforts were characterized by the spasmodicity of their arrivals. True "daily" newspapers first appeared in the London of 1702 with the publication of the *Daily Courrant* which was soon followed by published dailies in Switzerland and France.

Newspaper presses were not yet independent, as a diverse array of censorship regulations had been enacted to ensure that the press did not too effectively challenge the

¹⁰ Desmond, 23-6; Smith, 18-20, 26-7.

¹¹ Joseph Frank, *The Beginnings of the English Newspaper 1620-1660* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).

¹² Desmond, 31-4; Smith, 48-52.

government. Great Britain began with the Star Chamber Court as a device to cast rebellious Puritan printers into prison, however it was abolished in 1641 but reincarnated as the Parliament's own press control organism - a single licenser who thus controlled the printers. John Milton's speech before Parliament in 1644 attacked the control of the written word by such forceful eloquence as :

Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.¹³

It was not however, until 1695 that Parliament would rescind the Licensing Act. The new freedom was once again curtailed by the Stamp Tax of 1712, which artificially increased the price of newspapers, which effectively reduced as well as restricted circulation. Libel laws were the next weapon in the government's arsenal, the purpose of which was to prohibit attacks on members of parliament, whether justified or not. Subterfuge was then employed as journalists set parliamentary debates in mythical locations, eg. Gulliver and his travels to Lilliput. This practice continued with periodic challenges to its authority until the passage of the Libel Act of 1792, which empowered juries, instead of judges alone to determine if in fact, a libel had been committed. Hohenberg states "It was in England, however, that the hounding and persecution of nonconformist printers and vendors reached a depth that was not exceeded by even the cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition."¹⁴ Censorship has been an issue since the first negative statement was uttered against a government. The British example serves as one element of extremism when different worlds collide. America in

¹³ John Milton "For the Liberty of Printing" from the Argopagitica in A Library of the World's Best Literature Vol XXV ed. by Charles Dudley Warner (New York: The International Society, 1947) 10073-4.

¹⁴ John Hohenberg, Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) 19.

1734 challenged the idea of truth as libel when John Peter Zenger, a New York editor, was acquitted despite his critical comments about the colony's governor. The idea of a free press in America may be dated from that event.¹⁵ and the concept was enshrined in the First Constitutional Amendment, which specifically bars Congress from enacting any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."

As discussed earlier, the Industrial Revolution was a catalyst to the advancement of the information process. True, it was the cylindrical steam-powered press and inexpensive newsprint, in combination with the rotary press, linotype, and monotype machines which made the publication of truly mass-based newspapers a reality, but two additional inventions were to have incalculable effects on the press. Telegraphy and photography were to provide world news in a matter of hours, in contrast to days, weeks, or "spasms"; and to provide it "in the raw", in contrast to woodcuts, or steel engravings, which had been used in the past to illustrate the news. Technology's imprimatur had begun shaping the news. When man and machine met, yet another advance was possible, the creation of the international news agency. Hundreds of reporters stationed around the globe provided the necessary eyewitness accounts to subscribers thousands of miles distant. The first such operation was the French Agence Havas, founded by Charles Havas in 1835. Germany soon followed with the Wolff Agency in the later 1830s. The original two were then joined by Reuters of Great Britain in 1851 and the Associated Press of the United States in the 1890s.¹⁶

Progress in newsgathering, newsreporting, and newsprinting would have been both pointless and senseless without two vital elements: 1) a literate audience, 2) a co-equal desire for, and interest in, reading the news. The compulsory education laws of the

¹⁵ Ibid, 39-43.

¹⁶ For a more detailed account of these organizations see Desmond, Ch 9; Smith, 126-8,140; Oliver Gramling, AP: The Story of the News(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940); Jonathan Fenby, The International News Services(New York: Schocken Books, 1986); Joe Alex Morris, Deadline Every Minute: The Story of the United Press(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1957).

nineteenth century provided the former, while human nature in the form of curiosity and farsighted publishers provided the latter. Two examples of such effective entrepreneurship are illustrated by John Walter and his son in their design and development of the *Times* of London, and by James Gordon Bennett and his son in their design and development of the *New York Herald*.

First published in 1785 under the title *The Daily Universal Register*, (rechristened the *Times* in 1788) John Walter viewed the paper as a vehicle for commercial news and scandal. Interestingly enough, it was the latter, searching out scandal which led Walter to construct one of the most efficient reporting staffs then in existence.¹⁷ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, John Walter II assumed management of the paper, established a new perspective, and had the foresight to install Thomas Barnes as editor. Together, they transformed the *Times* into an organ ideally suited to the tastes and needs of Britain's rising middle class. Barnes is credited with being "...probably the first journalist to recognize the power of public opinion, when properly channeled through a newspaper."¹⁸ The *Times* became synonymous with the middle class, its strong right arm in its epic battles for political reform. By 1841, the *Times* no longer had to fear governmental disapproval, for it was the government that now warily eyed the power of the press wielded by this one entity. John T. Delane, who succeeded Barnes found himself editing a paper which had become the semi-(un)official spokesman for the government itself, irrespective of which party was in power. Two significant precedents were established by the *Times*: 1) the concept that a newspaper was a wholly independent body, accountable not to the government but rather, to public opinion; 2) the employment of the first war correspondent, William Howard Russell,

¹⁷ John C. Merrill, *The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the World* (New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1968) 170-7.

¹⁸ Maurice Fabre, *A History of Communications* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963) 63.

whose journalistic dispatches from the Crimean War contributed to the cabinet's downfall in 1855.¹⁹

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Bennetts blazed a journalistic trail in the United States. Originally from Scotland, James Gordon Bennett Sr. launched the *New York Herald* at only a penny a copy. Popular journalistic practices in 1835 recognized the value of the sensational, and it soon became a staple feature of the *Herald*. James Gordon Bennett Jr. assumed management duties in 1867 and may be credited with the rather notorious idea that not only should a newspaper report the news, but it should, in fact, make it.²⁰ This convention still exists even today. "Making the News" was exactly what Bennett Jr. was in pursuit of when he consigned Henry Stanley to the jungles of Africa in search of the legendary missionary, Dr. David Livingstone in the year 1869. Twenty-four thousand dollars poorer but immeasurably wealthier in terms of newspapers sold, subscriptions requested, and publicity garnered, Bennett created the story of the age.

What the Bennetts had begun, Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst brought to fruition. Following a ten year apprenticeship as a reporter, columnist, and owner of a failing newspaper, Pulitzer emerged in 1878 as the publisher-editor of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. His causes, and therefore the newspaper's crusades included revelations concerning municipal corruption and calls for its reform, advocacy of labor's rights, disclosure of tax evasion by prominent citizens, and the ongoing problem of crime. A Pulitzer-owned newspaper was distinguished by the following characteristics: 1) stress on the news rather than editorializing; 2) autonomy for the reporter and the use of by-lines; 3) professional,

¹⁹ Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty of War* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975).

²⁰ F. L. Mott, *American Journalism A History: 1690-1960* 3:d ed.(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962) 415-21; Don C. Seitz, *The James Gordon Bennetts* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928) chronicles the rise and fall of the *New York Herald*.

ethical, well-educated reporters.²¹ The *New York World* became his next project in 1883 and in the premier issue, he outlined his goals.

There is room in this great and growing city for a journal that is not only cheap but bright, not only bright but large, not only large but truly democratic - dedicated to the cause of people rather than that of the purse-potentates - devoted more to news of the New than the Old World - that will expose all fraud and sham, fight all public evils and abuses - that will serve and battle for the people with earnest sincerity.²²

His created World and its ensuing popularity answered the public's desire for an animated, attractive, crusading, and intelligently liberal journal.²³ Unfortunately, it was also tainted by the appearance of sensationalism.

William Randolph Hearst was Pulitzer's nearest rival. His newspaper career began as publisher-editor of the *San Francisco Examiner* in 1887. However it wasn't until 1894, with his purchase of the *Morning Journal* (later christened the *New York Journal*), that he posed a direct challenge to Pulitzer on his home turf. Both the *World* and the *Journal* specialized in sensationalism, but whereas Pulitzer insisted upon accuracy, Hearst focused on the competition and the clock. As the "father of yellow journalism", his journalistic ethics were questionable even as circulation was soaring. The classic example of Hearst's inclination to allegedly manufacture the news in the style of J.G. Bennett Jr. is his famous telegram to Frederic Remington in Cuba 1897. Remington, who was sent to investigate a war, found none and reported this fact to Hearst. According to Creelman, the following exchange of telegrams took place.

²¹ Two comprehensive biographies of Joseph Pulitzer and his journalistic innovations are James W. Barrett, *Joseph Pulitzer and His World* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1941); George Juergens, *Joseph Pulitzer and the New York World* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966); see also Julian S. Rammelkamp, *Pulitzer's Post-Dispatch* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966); Don Seitz, *Joseph Pulitzer: His Life and Letters* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1924); W. A. Swanberg, *Pulitzer* (New York: Scribner's, 1967).

²² *New York World* dtd May 11, 1883 quoted by Robert Sobel in *The Manipulators: America in the Media Age* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976) 21.

²³ Ibid, 21-23; Edwin Emery, *The Press and America 3rd ed.* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972) 314-21.

Hearst, Journal, New York: Everything is quiet. There is no trouble here. There will be no war. Wish to return. Remington

Remington, Havana: Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war. Hearst ²⁴

By the turn of the century popular journalism had come of age, and there has been little essential change since then.

Circulation continues to grow, however the actual number of newspapers available is steadily contracting. Escalating costs have forced hundreds of papers to cease publication during the post World War II era. Increasingly monopolistic chains such as Gannett, a result of leveraged buyouts and consolidations, and the technological competition from broadcast journalism have seen the rise of the single paper town, and the decline of the morning, afternoon, and evening editions. Without such competition, it becomes doubtful whether the press is, in reality, able to meet its obligations to its readers. Historically, the Cold War era placed an additional burden on the press, for the editor was periodically confronted with the delicate dilemma of balancing his obligation to inform the public against the government's need to suppress information in the interest of national security. Recent changes in the international world order have only served to intensify this conflict. It will be argued later that a free press is the foundation of America's liberties, and hence its national security. As Thomas Jefferson said, "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without government I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."²⁵

²⁴ James Creelman, On the Great Highway (Boston: Lothrop Publishing Co., 1901) 177-8 cited by F. L. Mott, 529; W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961) 107-08; John Tebbel, The Life and Good Times of William Randolph Hearst (New York: Dutton, 1952).

²⁵ A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh, ed. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Vol IV (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd, 1903-5), 25.

B. TECHNOLOGY OF COMMUNICATIONS

The daily newspaper delivered to one's door or purchased at the local convenience store enroute to work represents a blend of one of the older methods of communications with many newer forms, dating from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Local news may be telephoned into the city room via modem by a remote computer terminal. National and international news items, once available only via the telegraph or teletype, are now transmitted through satellite broadcast hook-ups, microwave relay stations, and their ilk. Graphic images may be the result of a human photographer's efforts or an "eye in the sky" transmitted through the medium of wirephoto, radiophoto, telephone facsimile. On the entertainment pages of the newspaper will appear reviews of movies, television programming, radio highlights, and media issues. Telecommunications, derived from the Greek "*tele*" meaning "at a distance, far off" and the Latin "*communicare*" meaning "to make common", has begun the McLuhan process of global correspondence through the mystery of electricity.

1. Telegraph, Telephone, Tell the World

Space Age communications actually existed long before Sputnik, "the space autograph of Socialism" ²⁶ was launched. Primitive methods such as Indian smoke signals, African drum beats, and Viking light beacons permitted communication to occur. Although Greeks, Romans, Carthaginians, et. al developed a variety of techniques to relay news, these were both insufficient as their empires expanded, and notoriously inefficient as well. Unreliability was to be their hallmark for the sheer numbers of human intermediaries between the original source and the final recipient virtually guaranteed that the message would be garbled in transit, lost in the translation, or worse, misinterpreted by mischance. In

²⁶Academician Vsevolod Avdeevsky "The Development of Space Rocketry and Technology in the USSR(1946-1957) in Yuri Gagarin History of the USSR: Now Research 5 (Moscow: "Social Sciences Today" Editorial Office, 1986) ed by "Social Sciences Today" editorial board, 93.

the waning hours of darkness before the dawn of the electric era, Claude Chappe, a French engineer, invented an optical telegraph in 1794. Widely used, its stations were equipped with a signaling system consisting of three movable pieces of wood operated by strings and pulleys. Erected atop high buildings or mountains at close intervals, manned by operators who would signal from one station to the next, this system had by 1844, connected twenty-nine French cities through five hundred stations encompassing more than three thousand miles. Cooperative weather patterns could permit the transmission of a message between Paris and Toulon, a distance of five hundred miles in only twenty minutes.²⁷

By the early 1800s man had gained some understanding of the properties of electricity, and preliminary attempts to harness it for service to mankind were occurring. The German physiologist S.T. von Sommering invented the water voltameter telegraph in 1809, followed by Karl Gauss and Wilhelm E. Weber, inventors of an electromagnetic telegraph, whose functional range was in excess of nine thousand feet. Patent rights were obtained in 1837 by Sir Charles Wheatstone and William F. Cooke for their electric telegraph. However, it was the American Samuel F.B. Morse whose invention of a code of dots and dashes made it both possible and practical to transmit messages over great distances in a matter of minutes. Americans, always anxious to embrace the latest technology, ensured that within the space of a few years telegraph lines had united the majority of the major American cities. Twenty-one years after the introduction of the telegraph, the transatlantic cable was laid, thus linking the Old World with the New, a harbinger of the end of the United States' self-contained, isolationist *Weltanschauung*. Although the corrosive elements of salt water would cause communications to be disrupted and ultimately fail, the capability had been proven. Resurrected in 1866, the transatlantic telegraph cable would experience the inauguration of transatlantic cable telephone service ninety years later.

²⁷ Raymond Williams, *Communications* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966).

Alexander Graham Bell's ability to synthesize the work of past experimenters in concert with innovations of his own, resulted in the development of the first practical telephone. His quest to "...make a current of electricity vary in intensity precisely as the air varies in density during the production of sound"²⁸ was realized on June 3, 1875 when he succeeded in transmitting speech electrically. Unveiled at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876, the public's curiosity was piqued and fellow inventors such as Thomas Edison intrigued. Transcontinental telephone service had been inaugurated in North America by 1915.

Telegraph and telephone share two intriguing commonalities: both employed wires in the past, fiber optics in the present, and both represent, essentially, a method of person-to-person communication. Defining the mass media at the close of the nineteenth century was an uncomplicated task, it consisted of the newspaper, the magazine, and the book. Monopolies eventually come to an end, and the printed word was no exception. Wireless telegraphy, which foreshadowed the invention of the radio was to be the root cause of the nineteenth century mass media's downfall.²⁹ James Clark Maxwell, a Scottish physicist, provided the theoretical base for experiments in transmitting sound through space without wires, postulating the idea that electromagnetic waves move through space at the speed of light.³⁰ The year was 1869. Heinrich Hertz, a German scientist, realized Maxwell's theories through a series of experiments conducted in 1887. By means of a spark discharge, he created electromagnetic waves, detected them on a somewhat primitive receiving antenna,

²⁸ A. Graham Bell, "Researches in Telephony", reprint of a paper read before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, May 10, 1876 in The Telephone: An Historical Anthology (New York: Arno Press, 1977) ed. by George Shiers; Thomas A. Watson, "How Bell Invented the Telephone" reprint of an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, New York May 18, 1915 in Shiers.

²⁹ Sidney H. Aronson, "Bell's Electrical Toy: What's the Use? The Sociology of Early Telephone Usage" in The Social Impact of the Telephone ed. by Ithiel de Sola Pool (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977) 15-36; John R. Pierce, "The Telephone and Society in the past 100 Years" 159-94; John Brooks, Telephone: The First 100 Years (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1976) Ch 1, 2.

³⁰ H. Poincare, Maxwell's Theory and Wireless Telegraphy Part One: Maxwell's Theory and Hertzian Oscillations trans by Frederick K. Freeland (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1904) Ch 1, 2.

and measured their velocity. "Hertizian Waves" which did, in fact, move at Maxwell's postulated speed of light formed the basis of radio.³¹ Guglielmo Marconi was the last link in the chain of wireless telegraphy and in an amazingly short time, he was transmitting signals over a nine mile distance in 1896, across the English Channel in 1899, and across the Atlantic Ocean in 1901.

2. Radio and TV: The Voice and Eyes of the World

Radio was the next logical step in man's desire to announce his existence by transmitting speech through the air. Reginald Aubrey Fessenden theorized that a continuous radio wave was similar to a sustained musical note which could be modulated to the shape of articulate speech. By 1900 he was broadcasting speech over a distance of one mile and five years later, the exponential improvement was 200 miles. However, it was the emerging science of electronics which would fashion radio into the first medium of instant mass communications. Devising the electronic vacuum tube in 1904, Sir John Ambrose Fleming had harnessed the electron's power to modulate, amplify, and detect electromagnetic waves. Improving upon this invention in 1906, Lee DeForest created the three-element tube or audio which would become the basis of modern radio, television, and radar as well as a multitude of other means of communication.

America's entry into World War I elevated the status of the radio from a mere entertainment toy for amateur ("ham") wireless operators to an operational asset for military communicators. The postwar boom of the 1920s and David Sarnoff's vision of radio as a means of entertainment, information, and education collided. As commercial manager of Radio Corporation of America in 1920, Sarnoff realized his dream articulated six years earlier to his superior at the American Marconi Company.

³¹ Ibid, Ch 4.

I have in mind a plan of development which would make radio a household utility. The idea is to bring music into the home by wireless. The receiver can be designed in the form of a simple "radio music box", and arranged for several different wavelengths which should be changeable with the throwing of a single switch or the pressing of a single button. The same principle can be extended to numerous other fields, eg. receiving lectures at home...events of national importance can be simultaneously announced and received...baseball scores...proposition would be especially interesting to farmers and others living in outlying districts.³²

Perhaps, only "the shadow knew" just how effective this device was to be.

While radio was making a reality of the instantaneous transmission of the voice and music through space, Thomas Edison's phonograph was undergoing a metamorphosis from a crude sound recording device to electronic phonographs which amplified the previously rather faint and scratchy sound. The cinema was also in its developmental stages. Edison's Kinetograph and Kenetoscope were soon joined by the Lumiere brothers Cinematograph. However, it was Georges Melies' creative imagination, technical innovation, and prolific output which set the standard ³³ for an industry which has entertained, informed, educated, infuriated, shocked, and at times, misled hundreds of millions of people for well over half a century.

Television experiments may be dated as early as 1873, when it was discovered that the element selenium, when exposed to different degrees of light, exhibited a variation in its electrical conductivity. Reactions of selenium were too slow for practical applications, but with the use of a mechanical scanning disk invented by the German Paul Niprow in 1884, projection of diffuse images over short spaces was achieved. Most early experiments took this mechanical approach, but with the invention of the cathode ray tube in 1895, the electronic method appeared to offer more promise. During the 1920s, the Russian-American scientist Vladimir K. Zworykin designed a electronic scanning device or "eye" which could

³² Carl Dreher, Sarnoff: An American Success (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1977) 39-40.

³³ See Kevin Brownlow, The Parade's Gone By (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969) for an in-depth analysis and history of the early days of motion picture making.

produce images of fine definition, the iconoscope or cathode-ray tube for transmitting, and the kinescope or tube with a fluorescent screen for receiving. The Radio Corporation of America invested in Zworykin's inventions and on April 30, 1939 at the World's Fair in New York, it inaugurated a regular semi-weekly television service.

America's entry into World War II signaled a governmental ban on all civilian television production, although continued military research was to yield a number of advances in television that would later be adapted to postwar use. Postwar television sets were characterized by small seven or ten inch screens and high cost, but these two factors did not deter the American public. Eventually mass-production techniques and refinements on existing processes enlarged the screen, reduced the cost, and provided stereophonic sound.

3. Mass Media Minus the Monopoly

No mass medium has a monopoly on the functions of communications in the present age, although television comes close. The various media interact in such a way that each new development has repercussions on them all. Radio, in its earliest incarnation, was considered by some editors as a direct threat to the very existence of the press. In reality it was not, as it could only provide a skeletal framework for the news, unlike the in-depth analysis and comprehensive coverage that newspapers and news magazines could supply. To some degree, radio whetted the appetite of the public who would then gorge themselves on a surfeit of riches provided by the print medium. Television's impact on radio, cinema, and the publishing world has resulted in the emergence of some interesting patterns. First, formats have to be altered. Television assumed the mantle of comedy shows, thrillers, dramas, and quiz programs. Radio reverted to music, news, talk shows, all enhanced by FM and the mobility of the automobile. Television plagiarized the subject matter of motion pictures but could not compete in terms of scale, spectacle, and in some instances quality. Videotape and audio cassettes have blurred the distinction among the various aspects of the mass medium.

A book may become a movie, reduced to videocassette, and later sold to television. A television movie may appear in book format at the local bookstore. A book may be recorded on audio cassettes to while away a driver's commuting time.

Each new advance stimulates others in a chain reaction that has accelerated so rapidly, especially in the field of communications, that new inventions, as well as refinements of old ones, seem to be announced almost daily. Mass communications are upon us resulting from such technologies as laser, computer, facsimile, television, tape, diode, silicon chip, satellites, etc. The history of communications is replete with examples of man's attempts to project his thoughts, his words, and ultimately himself farther, faster, and with greater fidelity to the original than was previously thought possible.

Persistence of vision is a scientific phenomenon in which an individual continues to see an image long after it has disappeared. The question of the persistence and pervasiveness of the media should also be addressed; What is being accomplished for mankind by the acceleration, voluminous reproduction and transmission of messages, both public and private, around the world? The scope of the question is too broad for this effort, however man's efforts at diplomacy and the media's effects upon this specialized area of interpersonal/interstate communications bears further examination.

C. HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY

1. Origins

Linguistically, the word diplomacy is derived from the Greek "*diplomata*", which means "folded documents". Actual usage in the English speaking world dates from the end of the eighteenth century. Prior to that time an emissary was appointed, entitled herald, messenger, orator, or negotiator, and dispatched to bargain over hunting territory, settle claim disputes, or arrange inter-tribal marriages. Contemporary diplomatic traditions have been

influenced primarily by the classical Greek experience.³⁴ Their multi-state system, characterized by fragmentation, pluralism, and formal equality of status permitted diplomacy to flourish within certain limitations, and defined a vocabulary of diplomatic terms for various aspects of conciliation including "arrangements", "truces", "conventions", "alliances", "commercial treaties" and "peace". Roman law was to formalize these contractual relationships and establish the model for later European treaties. Ambassadors were first used in twelfth century Byzantine courts as both supplicants and reporters, however, their practice of gathering information gave birth to the reputation of ambassadors as spies, a persistent impression which continues to the present day.

Fifteenth century Italian city-states introduced the concept of a permanent mission or legation to the European continent. No longer operating within the assumption of obedience to a supreme authority as embodied in the Roman Catholic Church and its canon law, these city-states secularized diplomacy and focused on the particular interests of the states. By systematizing the procedures and the service of diplomacy, a certain permanence and stability was now associated with the process. According to Holsti the functions of these diplomats included obtaining information, safeguarding political and military interests, and extending commerce,³⁵ roles little changed to the present. Although the Italian city-state system collapsed due to conquest and occupation in the late 1490s, the conquerors became heir to the methods, procedures, and atmosphere of Italian diplomacy. By 1626, Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal-Duke of Richelieu, functioning in his role as diplomatic advisor to Louis XIII, established a Ministry of External Affairs, thus centralizing the management of foreign relations. Duplicated throughout Europe, French diplomatic leadership was the *sine qua non*, and the French language became the vernacular of diplomacy. It may be said that when

³⁴ Michael Grant, The Rise of the Greeks (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987) 65-9.

³⁵ K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983) 165-6.

the Congress of Vienna convened in 1815, the rules and customs of diplomacy embodied in the Reglement were the endorsement of practices established by Richelieu almost two hundred years earlier.³⁶

2. The Congress System in Concert with Europe

Commencing with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and ending with the dissolution of the Concert of Europe in 1914, the Golden Age of Diplomacy was in existence for nearly a century. The Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia convened the Congress of Vienna in an effort to reorder the world following the Napoleonic period, to design a realistic framework ensuring the continued existence of the peace settlements, and to safeguard against the recurrence of war. Although not wholly successful, it did establish a number of precedents for the conduct of interstate relations. When France joined the alliance three years later, the pursuit of peace through negotiation, mediation, and pragmatism was considered the logical and preferable method for maintaining the status quo. Great Powers did not fight among themselves or against each other, they simply partitioned the lesser developed countries, added to their colonial coffers, and acknowledged the sovereignty of their privileged brethren above all others. Concert soon replaced Congress as the indicator of agreement and willingness to compromise. The fate of the world was now orchestrated by such players as Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey, Prussia, Great Britain, France, and Italy. With the exception of the Crimean War (1854-1856) Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy engaged in war with one another for a period totaling a mere eighteen months over the next century. Contrast that with the previous two centuries, which were characterized by an average of sixty to seventy years of significant warfighting, and this era appears even more impressive.

³⁶ Ibid.

A short digression is appropriate at this point. Policy makers are confronted by a fundamental choice when attempting to execute policy, option A - instruments of violence, or option B - instruments of nonviolence. Karl von Clausewitz summarized the inter-relationship of these alternatives in his now classic maxim, "War is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means."³⁷ War is the ultimate failure to communicate and as the horrors of war have multiplied, and man's inhumanity to man has assumed ever more grotesque forms, a solution has been sought in the realm of diplomacy. However, the inability of diplomacy to resolve conflicts of interest may lead to war. Conversely, the inability of war to prevail in terms of total capitulation or total annihilation may require diplomacy to negotiate a truce or face-saving settlement. Haas and Whiting mark the distinction between these two aspects of diplomacy.

In peace, diplomacy represents the accumulative political and economic pressures upon each side, formalized in the exchange of demands and concessions between negotiators.

In terminating a war, diplomacy represents the accumulative political, economic, and military pressures, formalized in ratification of a peace treaty between victor and vanquished.³⁸

In the heyday of the Concert of Europe, the concerns of the elites dominated all others, and it was not in their interest to engage in cost-consuming wars. This symphonic peace coincided, and probably contributed to, the economic, scientific, industrial, and technological revolution which was in its infancy, thus inspiring a pattern of multilateral diplomatic institutional approaches to occur.³⁹ Therefore, the diplomacy of peace aspect was assiduously practiced.

³⁷ Karl von Clausewitz, On War tran by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³⁸ Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1956), 153.

³⁹ Holsti, 164; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989) 143-5.

As a direct result of this era of peace, the Great Powers may be credited with elevating diplomacy to that of a distinguished vocation, requiring specialized professional skills, and exerting a particular appeal to social and intellectual elites. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 established the four diplomatic ranks in descending importance: ambassadors and papal nuncios, envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges d'affaires. With the exception of a brief period following the Russian Revolution of 1917, when the Soviet government made an abortive and self-defeating attempt to create its own diplomatic usage and procedures,⁴⁰ these titles remain in use today to determine the ranking of diplomatic officials at ceremonial and political functions. This bureaucratization process resulted in the codification of diplomatic communications and exchanges, standardization of diplomatic roles, and the fundamental alteration in the manner in which international agreements would be orchestrated. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 witnessed the agreement in principle for international consultation to occur on a regular basis as a means of ordering the world's affairs. The Congresses of Troppau and Laibach, 1820-1821 inaugurated the idea of collective intervention in an effort to delay the spread of nationalism, a goal in which they would succeed for almost one hundred years. The 1822 Congress of Verona marked the end of the first era of the Congress system in Europe. Unable to prevent intervention in Spain, and refusing to cooperate with the other powers, Great Britain's intransigence doomed the system itself. The 1856 Congress of Paris initiated the codification of international law in terms of naval warfare, admission of Turkey to the European concert, and the maintenance of the status quo. The 1871 London Conference, although not strictly a Congress, is significant in that it was convened to reaffirm the principle that international obligations could not be arbitrarily abrogated by one power, but

⁴⁰ Sensitive to the aristocratic or royal sound to the word "ambassador", it was banished from the Soviet vocabulary and replaced by "polpreds". The obscurity of the title prevented the Soviet envoys from asserting their precedence in the diplomatic corps so a return to the bourgeois conventions and titles was permitted.

only by obtaining the consent of all the signatory powers. Russia was the offending party in this instance, as it had attempted to annul the liabilities it had incurred as a result of the Treaty of Paris. The Congress of Berlin 1872 marked the end of the second era of the Congress system in Europe, and resulted in the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire.

Diplomacy began to shift from a focus on the resolution of wars and the restructuring of the world as determined by the Congress, to the problem of codifying international law by a series of conferences. These conferences considered such a diverse array of issues as agriculture, regulation and production of sugar, international standards of sanitation, tariffs, international telegraphy, navigation rights on the Danube, the prime meridian, traffic in alcohol, statistics, postal unions, maritime signaling, and weights and measures. The two most famous are the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. This concept of multi-lateral conference diplomacy would foreshadow the League of Nations, and come to realization with the creation of the United Nations.

3. The New World Foreign Policy

What was perhaps the most fateful innovation in the twentieth century was the ending of the European monopoly brought about by the entry of the United States into this small elite group of senior members in the diplomatic community. America's late entry may be attributed to an historical tradition articulated first by George Washington in his Farewell Address of 1793.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. - Here let us stop... our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course...why forego the advantage of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity?⁴¹

⁴¹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965) 109.

The Doctrine of Two Spheres ⁴² articulated by John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Monroe reinforced this idea. "Our policy in regard to Europe which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers..."⁴³ Foreign policy was essentially isolationist in nature, therefore a diplomatic corps was an unnecessary, costly, non-effective way to go about one's business. Europe, the Old World, represented all that had gone awry, what had compelled the establishment of the New World. This same rugged, almost idiosyncratic, individualism would turn inward and westward, focusing on the ideal of Manifest Destiny, carving a country out of nothing, and a community answering to no one. Until 1893 no single American diplomat serving abroad held a rank higher than minister. In 1906 the U.S. maintained only nine embassies abroad, the remainder simply legations. Foreign service employees at the end of World War II numbered less than eight hundred and fewer than half of those serving as heads of mission were career diplomats.

D. DIPLOMACY OF COMMUNICATIONS

Although entering the diplomatic arena somewhat later in time, America adapted quickly to the elements of protocol which had evolved since the time of Richelieu. The issue of determining rank and precedence has already been discussed, but the key to effective diplomacy, communication has not. French was considered the universal diplomatic language as early as the seventeenth century and retained this distinction until the Versailles Conference of 1919, when English was designated the co-official language with it. Mario Pei, a renowned linguist, argues that the French language is particularly well suited to be the

⁴² See Max Saville's The Origins of American Diplomacy (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967) 26-30, 210-15 for an interesting discussion of the historical European roots of this concept.

⁴³ J. D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1896), II, 218-9.

language of diplomacy due to its regular syntax, well-developed vocabulary, and precision. Conversely, Spanish and Italian are prolix and overelastic; English, German, and Russian are blunt and overdirect.⁴⁴ As of 1967, although there were five official languages at the United Nations, French and English were the most commonly used among delegates of countries to which none of the five languages represented their native tongue. Today the problem of finding a common vernacular is compounded by the use of simultaneous translations into the listener's native tongue.

1. Purposes of Diplomatic Communications

What exactly, are the purposes of diplomatic communications? At its root level diplomacy is negotiation by professionals, as if between actual governments in an effort to influence the government abroad to which the individual diplomat is accredited, while maintaining his own credibility and influence at home. The key however, is the process of negotiation, whose goal is either to change or sustain mutual objectives and policies, or so reach an accord over some disputed issue. Motivations underlying diplomatic communication may be said to occur on a tri-level basis.⁴⁵ At the first level are routine contacts whereby views are exchanged, intentions probed, actions proposed or support offered. This is negotiation "in good faith". Hard bargaining is not in evidence here. At the second level, either a bilateral or multilateral conference is arranged as a delaying tactic, or to create the illusion of governmental interest in negotiating, when, in fact, no such desire exists. This is negotiation to "buy time" in order to amass additional power elsewhere. At the third level, the negotiation arena becomes a platform for propaganda, to attempt an appeal to the public, as well as influence the public. This is negotiation to "embarrass", forcing the

⁴⁴Mario Pei, ed., Language Today: A Survey of Current Linguistic Thought (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967) Ch 3. Note: Pei had been a lecturer for the Foreign Policy Association, the Modern Language Association, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe prior to his passing.

⁴⁵Holsti, 226-8; Haas and Whiting, p 135-40.

other party into an ideologically unfavorable position. Diplomacy, at its core, is the effort to change the policies, actions, objectives, and attitudes of other governments and their diplomats by persuasion, offering rewards, exchanging concessions, or making veiled threats.

2. The Personnel of Diplomacy

Earlier it was stated that animal sounds are interpreted whereas language is translated. Who translates a country's foreign policy, the indicator of where the country wants to go in adjusting itself to its environment, its relationships to other governments and people? Traditionally, the diplomat did this in his office as ambassador with staff of career experts. These are the professionals characterized by such attributes as: experience, delegated authority, knowledge of local conditions, relative anonymity, and freedom from other duties. They should also possess what Harold Nicolson termed the "Seven Diplomatic Virtues" i.e. truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty."⁴⁶ The reality in U.S. diplomatic circles is that career diplomats are frequently shunted aside in favor of inexperienced political appointees. Additionally, individuals too long absent from their own country may experience the phenomenon of "going native", assuming the prejudices and opinions of the host country, and thereby destroying their utility as representatives of their own country and as an advocate of its policies. Finally, accreditation to one country by necessity, narrows the ambassador's field of vision such that his intensity of focus may become a drawback as well.

Secretaries of State and foreign ministers, when operating in the realm of diplomacy provide different advantages when negotiating on behalf of their country. By virtue of their rank, these individuals are accorded a substantial degree of authority, gain an intimate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign policy in all its aspects, and are given immediate access

⁴⁶ Sir Harold George Nicolson, Diplomacy 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1952).

to extensive briefings on the details of specific problems. Frequent contacts with their foreign counterparts permits greater ease of communication and more rapid clarification of misunderstandings. Disadvantages do arise with this form of diplomacy as well: personalization of policy may become a liability, foreign secretaries are responsible not simply for one country on any given day but a multitude, including issues which may arise in the United Nations. Policy decisions made in his absence will be the result of telephone conferences or the initiative of the second-in-command, both of which represent second-best options.

Heads of State negotiating foreign policy in face-to-face encounters has its origins in the Congress system. During this period specific conditions for negotiation were established: participants shared the same values in terms of a pragmatic outlook on the balance of power. Heads of state wielded absolute power and were the sole spokesman for the state; sovereigns were immune, and the needs of the sovereign and his state were the national interest. Twentieth century heads of state do not meet on such equal territory. The only advantage appears to be the opportunity to commit one's country to a greater extent than a foreign minister or an ambassador.⁴⁷ However, the disadvantages far outweigh the singular advantage. These include: lack of experience in diplomatic negotiations, inability to communicate aims, varied executive duties supersede diligent preparation and total concentration on the issue, as well as limiting the duration of the negotiations, risking of personalization of policy, and pressure to produce results in the glare of publicity. Failure on the part of a head of state to effectively negotiate a solution results in double jeopardy, maneuverability is destroyed.

⁴⁷ Even this advantage is questionable in terms of the U. S. which contains its own system of checks and balances on the executive branch.

Two other types of negotiators have been used with increasing frequency, particularly by the U.S., since World War II. These are the civilian special representatives or "amateur diplomats", and the military soldier-statesman. The former may be drawn from the worlds of politics, business, or academia, selected for his or her expert knowledge in a particular field of endeavor, an original outlook, or novel approach as opposed to the bureaucratized career diplomat. Unfortunately, these advantages may be outweighed by such human foibles as inexperience in the politics of negotiation, less of a personal stake in the negotiation's outcome or engendering professional jealousies on the part of career diplomats. Selection of a personal representative is essentially a judgement call based on personal knowledge of, and admiration for, an individual who though he may excel in his chosen field, has not undergone the test of time nor trial by fire of the career diplomat, whose livelihood depends on mastering the finer points of negotiating. To phrase it another way, diplomacy is not for dilettantes.

The latter negotiator, the military soldier-statesman continues to be part of an ongoing debate.⁴⁸ In this context, the military negotiator is considered apart from his traditional duties i.e. defining terms for the cessation of hostilities, mediation of formal surrenders, etc. Instead, military negotiators, particularly those assigned to military assistance missions, may find themselves in the midst of basing rights discussions, arms control initiatives, or overseas economic and social programs. A military mindset which combines politics with strategy, by viewing the world in terms of ally and enemy, may be disadvantageous when the value of a neutral entity is underrated or disregarded entirely. This brief survey of

⁴⁸ See Jerome Slater "Military Officers and Politics I", commentary by John P. Lovell, 749-60; John H. Garrison, "Military Officers and Politics II", 760-7; and John E. Ralph, "Military Officers and Politics III", 767-70 in American Defense Policy 5th ed. ed. by John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) for an interesting debate of the role of the U. S. military in the formulation of foreign policy; Donald F. Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U. S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) presents a convincing argument as to their unique qualities in the realm of foreign policy.

diplomats and the "men who would be" suffices to illustrate how the multiplication of personalities in the realm of formal negotiations has both contributed to and complicated the outcome of said negotiations. At the other end of the spectrum, one should consider the technology of diplomacy.

E. TECHNOLOGY OF DIPLOMACY

1. Rapid Speech Transmitted But Slowly

Previously, an examination of man's attempts at communication was conducted. Various technological advances contributed to man's ability to communicate ever more efficiently across three dimensions, time, distance, and space. What effect, if any, did this have on the fine art of diplomacy which, after all, is communication through the art of negotiation? To begin at the beginning, early exchanges were in the form of oral orders or directives to a messenger who would commit the terms, conditions, demands, etc. to memory. Dispatched on horseback or on foot, the messenger was invariably hampered by two deficiencies, relative slowness in transmittal time, unreliability in terms of failure to arrive at the intended destination due to a multitude of factors, both natural and man-made. Messengers, as trusted emissaries, could answer questions as well as interpret the meaning of the memorized information. Interpretation, however, can be a double-edged sword, for failure to ascertain exactly what the originator's intent was could lead to grave errors and dangerous misunderstandings.

The next two innovations were the development of an alphabet which permitted the creation of a written text, and a writing surface which could be made portable. Not only could information now be stored and recovered for later perusal, but it could also be transmitted with greater accuracy than was previously possible. Individual messengers could now be augmented by instituting a relay system of messengers, who by journeying day and

night could conceivably increase transmission time exponentially. As with most innovations, the relay system had its drawbacks as well. As the original messenger was not the final messenger, the latter was limited to conveying only what appeared on the written note. Incapable of answering questions or interpreting the originator's intent, the written missive had to stand on its own merits. The ruler was then left with a Hobson's Choice, he could either attempt to exercise more than the most general degree of control over political affairs by putting himself in the midst of the diplomatic effort, or he could remain within the boundaries of his kingdom, retain local leadership and presence, and entrust an emissary with the specific letters of instruction, or conversely with general directives and the understanding that once left to his own devices, the emissary's actions would be supported as if coming from the king himself. Both contained a element of risk.

2. The Middle Ages of Diplomatic Exchanges

Literacy during the early Middle Ages had a tendency to be confined almost entirely to ecclesiastical organizations. Therefore, not surprisingly, diplomatic communications were commonly between kings and Pope when attempting to resolve international disputes. The key difference between monarch-to-monarch diplomatic initiatives, and monarch-to-Pope was that a monarch could disregard, pretend to misunderstand, or wage war on his earthly equal, no such latitude was permissible with the Pope. The issuance of Papal Bulls merely confirmed the supernational authority of the Pope in international affairs, and confirmed his decisive authority, both as an arbiter of international disputes, and as the final authority in the disposition of non-Christian peoples and their territories.⁴⁹ By the sixteenth century the infallibility of this individual would be questioned and his control over monarchs in diplomatic issues as well.

⁴⁹ Savelle, 194-8.

Inexpensive paper in combination with the ongoing experiments with movable type and printing were finally successful in the mid 1400s. Between 1500 and 1850, despite the fact that printing techniques were not significantly altered, its productivity was noticeably increased with the appearance of the newspaper industry. Critical to the rise of the bureaucratic system and hence, the development of a diplomatic corps, was the spread of printing. Improved administrative techniques and portable printing presses lent a certain cachet but, more importantly, permitted an embryonic staff to form. Monarchs began to rely on the gradually evolving royal mail systems for communication with their minions in the field.

Technologically, the speed at which messages were transmitted was not significantly increased. Though there had been some improvement in road systems, carriages were still carriages, and horsepower was still measured in terms of the actual beast. Within a sixty to ninety kilometer radius, strict control could be maintained by means of detailed letters of instruction. Beyond that point, and certainly across an ocean's expanse, the diplomatic envoy set sail or rode off with a written or printed general set of guidelines, and was trusted thereafter, especially during the long silences, to rely on his intuition, resourcefulness, and sense of what was in the country's best interest.

3. The Industrial Revolution

Claude Chappe's telegraph, constructed in 1794 represented the first significant breakthrough in terms of speed of transmission. Limited by the weather, the terrain, the skill of the operators, and the length of the message itself, it was nonetheless, the first truly effective mechanical long-distance communications system to be established. Inventions have a tendency to breed more inventions, so it is not too surprising that the 1800s witnessed the creation of the electromagnetic telegraph. Although this latest incarnation of the telegraph owed its final existence to a number of creative geniuses, as previously noted, it

was Samuel Morse whose name became synonymous with it. Railway managers were one of the first groups to realize the potential. However, once the transatlantic cable was laid in the mid-1800s, embassies were soon recipients of this new technology. Home governments were now in a position to give their ambassadors increasingly precise and detailed instructions, while receiving more exact information within a matter of hours. However, monarchs, presidents, and foreign ministers continued to exercise only an indirect influence in terms of mechanically transmitting their views and attitudes. Personal contact was hampered by slow mass transportation systems, particularly when one contemplated a transoceanic voyage.

Telephones, computers, and satellite communications have permitted the rise of instantaneous dialogue, the advent of secure conversations resulting in fewer records, and diplomatic offices inundated with information which they have neither the time nor the personnel to effectively absorb, analyze, and disseminate. Air travel added a new dimension, and once the sound barrier was broken, the speed of commercial aircraft was limited only by the ingenuity of man. Suffice it to say that the long tortuous travel endured by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin during World War II is equally true today, but only because twice the amount of aeronautical miles are being logged, even if in roughly half the time. Heads of state meet with far greater frequency than in the past, thus altering the level at which government business is raised, such that the ambassador's role is relegated to a fundamentally ceremonial one, head of an information clearinghouse, and occasional country expert whose recommendations may or may not be taken under consideration. Vesting a diplomat with discretionary powers in negotiation has become almost an anachronism as the twenty-first century dawns.

Finally, radio and television, particularly the latter have "sped not only words, but pictures of events before considered diplomatic accounts of the happenings and their

significance could reach foreign ministries."⁵⁰ Technology, to some degree, has caused diplomacy to come full circle whereby present day "monarchs" rely increasingly upon themselves instead of intermediaries to ensure national interests are properly represented in the international arena.

F. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Thus far the historical development of communications and diplomacy have been explored with a specific focus on the changes wrought by various technologies in the world of diplomacy. At this juncture it is useful to establish a line of demarcation for these various terms, to establish operational definitions. The terms to be so defined are: mass media, diplomacy, and media diplomacy.

1. Mass Media

Mass Media is comprised of radio, television, newspapers, magazines, books, and motion pictures. These represent the technical apparatus for communicating with millions of people.⁵¹ On a national level it may be said to operate on four major communication grids, varying for different parts of a country, but its coverage is comprehensive in regard to every sector of the community.⁵² This is not to state that all countries have access to all forms of the mass media, but that some form does exist and is characterized by its pervasiveness. Mass media may either "hot" or "cool". A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in "high definition" i.e. well filled with data but low in audience participation. Radio is an

⁵⁰ David D. Newsom, "The New Diplomatic Agenda: Are Governments Ready?" International Affairs (Winter 1988/9) Vol 65, No. 1, 29-41.

⁵¹ Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary 4th ed. (Santa Barbara, California/Oxford, England: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1982) 80-81.

⁵² Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel, The Popular Arts: A Critical Guide to the Mass Media (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1964) 20.

example of a hot medium in contrast to television which is a cool one. The former requires the listener to create images in his mind while the latter accomplishes the task for him.⁵³

2. The Eight Faces of Diplomacy

Diplomacy has almost as many definitions as there are practitioners of it. Sir Ernest Satow who has written the definitive work which sets the standard for the practice of diplomacy, states that "Diplomacy is the application of intelligence, and tact to the official relationships between states."⁵⁴ Basically, it is the practice of conducting relations between states through official representatives, involving means and mechanisms and actual practices whereby foreign policy is made effective.⁵⁵ Plano and Olton in their dictionary distinguish among the following:⁵⁶

- Conference Diplomacy - Open and multilateral in nature
- Machiavellian - Conspiratorial, deceitful, and unscrupulous
- Parliamentary - Conference which emphasizes search for agreement by building majorities, within continuing international institutions. Attributed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
- Summit - Conducted by heads of state or government in contrast with that at the ambassadorial level. Historical roots are in the Congress system however, the phrase was coined by Winston Churchill.

Still more types of diplomacy, as gleaned from the various sources include:

- Public - Attributed to Woodrow Wilson in the first of his Fourteen Points published in 1919. "Open covenants openly arrived at, after which there should be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."⁵⁷ Through the passage of the time this has acquired a whole new interpretation, the idea of public opinion driving the negotiator's efforts.

⁵³ McLuhan, Ch 2 22-32.

⁵⁴ Lord Gore-Booth, ed., Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1979).

⁵⁵ Plano and Olton, 241.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 242-5.

⁵⁷ Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson The World Settlement: Written From His Unpublished and Personal Material, Vol. III "Original Documents Of The Peace Conference" (Mass: Peter Smith, 1960) 42-43.

Private or People-to-People - Quakers, church leaders, heads of peace research institutes, professors, senators, and journalists attempts at solving or alleviating conflicts. Examples include the Pugwash Conferences and the Dartmouth Conferences.

Although these "unofficial diplomats"⁵⁸ may contribute to the climate of confidence building, they do so without any visible authority.

Quiet - Descriptive of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold's style of negotiating with skill, tact, persistence, impartiality but minus the fanfare.⁵⁹

The reality is that in the waning days of the twentieth century, all of these forms of diplomacy function simultaneously but not synchronously, which further complicates what is, by its nature, a delicate operation, successful negotiation. Yoel Cohen, in his landmark study of the British Foreign Office and the effects of the mass communications age on it not only christened this latest form of diplomacy but defined it as well.

3. Media Diplomacy Defined at Last

Diplomacy and media are essentially two types of communication running on a parallel track. Periodically, a switch or overlap occurs whereby the two meet and dialogue is joined. Yoel Cohen succinctly summarizes both the patterns of this overlap and their relationship.

1. The media are a source of information and ideas at several stages in the foreign policy process; to diplomats abroad; to ministers and officials in London; and to the wider public, MPs, and interest groups.
2. The media link the public to policymakers in terms of acting as a forum of debate on foreign policy and in terms of reflecting this debate in public opinion to policymakers.
3. Media diplomacy is associated with the concept of influence; the media determine what areas and subjects are covered by the media; and the media change policy.
4. Media diplomacy concerns the way the media link policymakers to foreign governments and to the public by including British government and attitudes

⁵⁸ Maureen P. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

⁵⁹ A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations Principles and Issues 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988) 147.

in editorial matter and by disclosing information which has the political effect of changing policy.⁶⁰

The question then becomes: who are these official and unofficial practitioners of foreign policy? On a national level, a country such as the United States has the United States Information Agency ⁶¹ (USIA) . On the international level, official media diplomacy is usually found at the international organizational level under the auspices of the United Nations. This intergovernmental organization (IGO) has assigned the overall responsibility to the Office of Public Information. It was created in 1946 to promote an informed public understanding of the work and purposes of the United Nations among the peoples of the world. The UNOPI works closely with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This too, was established in 1946 and its early efforts were concentrated on the elimination of illiteracy and on basic skills training.⁶² This program has evolved to include such functions as: 1) holding conferences; 2) acting as an information clearinghouse; 3) gathering/publishing statistics; 4) issuing publications; 5) social science teaching and research; 6) preservation, presentation, and development of various countries' cultural heritages; 7) production of color slides and commentary on painting and sculpture.⁶²

Unofficial media diplomacy is defined for the purposes of this research effort as that practiced by the independent news media in an effort to influence the course of international events. It is advocacy journalism, but with a twist, i.e. independent reporting with or without consequence. The key to understanding this phenomenon is to examine the type of person reporting the news, the self-perception and public perception of the media, and international cooperation among these individuals. The next chapter will examine media diplomacy as it is practiced in a democratic society, the U.S..

⁶⁰ Cohen, 5-8; It should be noted that if one substitutes Congressmen for MPs, Washington, DC for London, and U. S. for British government attitudes, that the observations are still valid.

⁶¹ Chapter III will examine the U.S. in general, and this organization in particular in greater detail.

⁶² Bennett, 283.

⁶³ Ibid, 284-6.

III. MEDIA IN THE U.S. - LEVELS OF DIPLOMACY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

A. OFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF MEDIA DIPLOMACY

1. Embassy Information Officers

The diplomat and the journalist, be he foreign correspondent, international desk anchor, or war correspondent, deal with relations between states, i.e. gathering information, disseminating that information, and thereby influencing or attempting to influence public opinion about selected international issues. The concept of this public diplomacy or people-to-people dialogue has resulted in a change in the composition of ambassadorial staffs; the addition of the press/information attache and his staff. This individual's efforts, by extension, are considered to be part of the official diplomatic efforts. Press attaches are usually experienced journalists in their own right. Broadly speaking, their tasks are threefold: 1) to further the foreign policies of their governments; 2) to counter hostile propaganda; 3) to inform their own governments (in the person of the Ambassador) of foreign attitudes.⁶⁴

The information officer/press attache will be responsible for activities that directly concern the mass media - press, publications, radio, and television. Normally, this individual serves as the embassy press spokesperson on U.S. government policies, provides background information, and publicizes embassy activities. Additionally, the information officer coordinates the arrangements for visiting U.S. journalists, provides a point of contact for resident correspondents, and usually is busiest when visits by congressional delegations or senior officials require special briefings, interviews, or press conferences. On a routine basis, this individual works closely with local media

⁶⁴ John Lee, ed. *The Diplomatic Persuaders* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968) xi-xii; Gore-Booth, 220-1.

representatives and government officials in a continuous effort to ensure that the U.S. point of view is available to the people of the host country through their print and electronic media. The primary tool in this effort is the Wireless File, a compendium of news and features that is transmitted daily to posts around the world, where it is made available by information officers to the local media.⁶⁵

The definition of a press/information attache in fact, alters somewhat when the practitioner himself is asked to elaborate on the functional aspects of his job.

Laxon Fred Kaemba, Information Attache, Republic of Zambia

1. Publicize his country.
2. Establish contacts with representatives of all major media elements in the host country.
3. Be as helpful as possible.
4. Ill-informed press results in an ill-informed public so educate the host country press.
5. Keep abreast with home country developments.
6. Advise the head of the mission on all public relations matters.⁶⁶

Jaime de Urzaiz, Counselor of Information, Embassy of Spain

1. Public relations man.
2. Correct the "Black Legend", i.e. counter inaccuracies in the press.
3. Promote tourism.⁶⁷

Aqil Ahmad, Press Attache, Embassy of India

1. Give advice on policies and give words to explain the policies.
2. Disseminate suitable and timely information about a country and to be aware of the trends of public opinion in the country of assignment. The three operative words being "dissemination", "suitable", "timely".
3. Sell an image.
4. Alter the attitude of the news media from one of indifference to one of interest.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Andrew L. Steigman, The Foreign Service of the United States: First Line of Defense (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985) 160-1.

⁶⁶ L. F. Kaemba, "Building the Image of a New Nation" in Lee, 39-42.

⁶⁷ J. D. Urzaiz, "The Modern Age of Spain" in Lee, 55-9.

⁶⁸ A. Ahmad, "Instant Labels; Instant Trouble" in Lee, 74-5, 83.

The above comments were generated as part of a series of seminars conducted in the spring of 1967 by the Washington Journalism Center and the American University in Washington, D.C. in an effort to understand this emerging aspect of diplomacy. Fourteen countries were invited to participate. These three are a representative sampling of the perceptions of the relationship between the official diplomatic media and the unofficial diplomatic media.

As organized by the U.S. State Department, the typical information officer press attache post will be located within an embassy. Traditionally, such posts are headed by a public affairs officer (PAO), who is entitled "Counselor for Public Affairs" if the size of the mission and his/her overall personal rank warrant it. The PAO has overall responsibility for the management and supervision of the public affairs activities of the embassy, and also advises the ambassador and other members of the mission staff on the pulse of the host country's public opinion, and their implications for U.S. foreign policy.

2. United States Information Agency - "Public Diplomacy?"

The United States Information Agency (USIA) is another example of official media diplomacy. Originally established in 1953 as the U.S. International Communications Agency, it was a vehicle to explain American policies and actions to peoples of other nations⁶⁹ through the mass media. It has continued to evolve and assumed its present form in April 1978. USIA's Director reports to the President of the United States and receives policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The agency maintains 204 posts in 127 countries. Overseas, USIA is known as the United States Information Service (USIS). The USIA has set the following program criteria:

1. Programs and activities are designed to strengthen cross-cultural communication.

⁶⁹ Robert W. Akers, "An Indispensable Diplomacy" in Lee, 9.

2. Programs are balanced and non-partisan in character, shall meet high standards of quality, and shall represent the diversity of American political, academic, social, and cultural life.
3. The international exchange of people, information, and ideas is a long-term responsibility.
4. Activities should, where possible, complement public, private, and binational program events which fall within the priorities of the department.
5. Programs and activities should take into account host-country concerns, the views of our missions abroad, the role of binational commissions or institutions, and the wide-ranging concerns of all constituencies in the United States that are interested in the the programs.
6. Programs and activities should involve well-qualified Americans and potentially influential, in some cases highly motivated, self-selected individuals abroad - that is, those who seek out USIS programs and services.
7. Programs and activities should be designed to accomplish specific goals within the context of furthering U.S. national interests.⁷⁰

Additional objectives have been identified as follows: 1) promoting the flow of ideas about the U.S. to the world; 2) presenting U.S. policies and programs to the world; 3) supporting current U.S. foreign policy; 4) furthering goodwill and public understanding between the U.S. and other peoples; 5) providing counsel on public relations to the U.S. government on foreign policy; 6) advancing U.S. education and the arts and sciences of the U.S. to the world; 7) countering propaganda inimical to the U.S., wherever and whenever it appears.⁷¹

The USIA is actually composed of four media services. They are: 1) the broadcasting service (IBS) more commonly known as Voice of America (VOA) ⁷²;

⁷⁰ United States Information Agency. *The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, An Introduction*, 1-2.

⁷¹ See John W. Henderson *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969); Robert E. Elder, *The Information Machine: The USIA and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968); H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1963) Part 3, 241-60.

⁷² Offshoots of VOA include: Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), established in Berlin in 1946 with the target audience located in East Germany. Prior to the reunification of the two Germanies, West Germany co-funded the operation with the U. S. Its status is in limbo at the present, although through its radio and television service, it had been providing guidance in the area of establishing a government to the newly emerging Eastern Bloc countries; Radio Marti, a semi-autonomous branch of VOA, target audience Cuba since 1985. TV Marti began experimental broadcasts in 1990. Congress passed an authorization bill in 1989 tasking VOA with broadcasting at least twelve hours per

2) the Press and Publications Service (IPS); 3) the Motion Picture and Television Service (Worldnet) (IMV)⁷³; 4) the Information Center Service (ICS). The latter is composed of six divisions which support four types of programs abroad: 1) libraries/cultural centers for the study of U.S. political, economic, and cultural affairs, history or science, and technology; 2) a commercial book program to place more U.S. written books both in English and in translation in bookstores and classrooms; 3) teaching English overseas among the influential and the potentially so, i.e. students, in order to increase their ability to read U.S. publications or listen to/comprehend English language broadcasts; 4) exhibitions demonstrating U.S. achievements and know-how in such diverse fields as medicine and public health, transportation and industry, or the graphic arts.⁷⁴ The USIA utilizes the entire spectrum of the media in its official public diplomacy role. Due to its status as an official agency of the U.S. government, it has not been immune from criticism. In fact, it has engendered an ongoing debate which questions the idea of U.S.- sponsored propaganda, information imperialism, and journalist credibility and objectivity, to name just a few.⁷⁵

day to China. It should be noted that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. (RFE/RL) is not affiliated with the USIA, is not an agency of the U. S. government, and is not the official voice of the U. S. unlike VOA. It is, however a non-profit corporation funded by the U. S. government for the purpose of broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Congress assumed funding oversight for this organization in 1971 and established the Board for International Broadcasting to serve as liaison. (Prior to 1971 it was run by the Central Intelligence Agency as a covert operation, similar to some KGB operations as will be discussed in Chapter Three.) Radio Free Afghanistan commenced operations in 1985 and is operated by Radio Liberty. An overlap in target audiences does occur between VOA and RFE/RL.

⁷³ Launched in 1983, regular broadcasts of Worldnet were terminated by Congress in 1988 as a result of decreasing number of viewers. Currently, it is authorized to produce "interactives", i.e. foreign journalists interview U. S. government officials and other experts.

⁷⁴ Elder, 182-3, 214-5, 234-7, 254-5; Donald Hausrath, "USIA International Library Activities", *Special Libraries* (Winter 1990) Vol 81 No. 1, 10-20; Kim Andrew Elliott, "Too Many Voices of America", *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1989/90) No 77, 113-31.

⁷⁵ Robert F. Delaney, "Communications, Subversion, and Public Diplomacy: The View from NATO", *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1977) Vol XXIX No. 3, 73-8; Elliott, 123-6) Carnes Lord, "In Defense of Public Diplomacy", *Commentary* (April 1984) Vol 77 No. 4, 42-50; Thomas L. McPhail, *Electronic Colonialism* (California: Sage Publications, 1987); LTCOL John M Oseth, USA, "Repairing the Balance of Images: US Public Diplomacy for the Future", *Naval War College Review* Jul-Aug 1985) Vol XXXVIII No. 4, 52-66; G. Scott Sugden, "Public Diplomacy and the

3. Presidents, Press Secretaries, and the Power of Words

Television is a medium which emphasizes immediacy, brevity, and personality. In this respect it has proven itself to be an extremely useful forum for Heads of State in general, and U.S. Presidents in particular to address issues of both national and international importance.⁷⁶ The presidential press conference, the ability of the president to commandeer the airwaves for a special announcement, the Rose Garden ceremonies, etc., are just a few of the numerous examples whereby the president makes the news. What exactly is this presidential-press relationship? How does it function?

Grossman and Kumar⁷⁷ have identified three phases in the continuing relationship between White House officials and the representatives of news organizations, i.e. alliance, competition, and detachment. Alliance, sometimes termed the honeymoon phase, coincides with the early months of an administration and is based on two elements: 1) the common definition by both parties of what are newsworthy items; 2) reporter's willingness to provide an unfiltered conduit from the White House for messages that the administration wants conveyed to the public. Competition is usually apparent by the close of the first year

Missiles of October", *Naval War College Review* (Oct 1971) Vol XXIV No. 2, 28-41; The above are only a sampling of the ongoing debate during the last twenty years.

⁷⁶ Studies that emphasize the "television advantage" in terms of U. S. presidents include: Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, *Portraying the President* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Lynda Kaid and Joe Foote, "How Network TV Coverage of the President and Congress Compare", *Journalism Quarterly* Vol. 62, 59-65; Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986); George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: Mentor Books, 1970); Paul Duke, ed., *Beyond Reagan: The Politics of Upheaval* (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1986) 235-84 "TV Politics"; At the opposite, one might say opposing end of the spectrum, is news coverage of Congress in contrast to that of the White House. Findings indicate that Congress fares slightly better in the print media due to its organizational, bureaucratic personality. Individuals may periodically emerge to capture public interest and imagination but a corporate body is not as attractive nor as easy to assimilate. The U. S. military has the same media problem with the occasional exception, i.e. Douglas McArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Oliver North. See Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson, "Congress and the Presidency As News in the Nineteenth Century", *The Journal of Politics* (Nov 1987) Vol 49 No. 4, 1017-35; William L. Armstrong, "Television Coverage of the Senate: Public Scrutiny", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Nov 1, 1985) Vol LII No. 2, 37-9.

⁷⁷ M. B. Grossman and M. J. Kumar, "The White House and the News Media: The Phases of Their Relationship", *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1979) Vol 94 No.1, 37-53.

and is characterized by the president's attempts to manipulate his relations with the media by using such devices as news management, ingratiation, and attack. The final phase, detachment, is dependent upon a series of events that leads both the White House officials and reporters to cease attempts to mold the other's behavior, but is usually initiated by the White House. Media policy is characterized by efforts to secure maximum exposure with minimal risk, delegate presidential relations with the press to surrogates, i.e. his press secretary. Presidential press encounters are tightly controlled and structured, and there is a greater emphasis on contact with the regional press and interest groups. As is apparent from the preceding, this is a mutually advantageous but often frustrating relationship.

A president, as official media diplomat, has certain inherent advantages. By the nature of his office, he may present himself as the *vox populi*⁷⁸ thereby challenging the media to prove otherwise, set the news agenda, select which medium will be used and the ground rules to be enforced, and invoke the prerogative of executive secrecy in the national interest. Of course, the disadvantage is he may encourage more press coverage than is desirable or necessary to carry out the business of the nation. The presidential press secretary is an extension of the man himself, facing reporters in the president's absence, attempting to convey the president's thoughts, and to do so without jeopardizing the power of the communications effort through misunderstanding, miscalculation, or plain disbelief on the part of the recipient. Failure to use the power of words effectively is to forfeit one of the president's most potent weapons in the political world of rhetoric. As an extension of the man, the press secretary may assume four guises: 1) in the president's image - sharing his attitudes and qualities; 2) presidential confidant or the individual who is not constrained by the word "yes" but will argue and disagree with the man himself; 3) the delegate who

⁷⁸ Lyn Ragsdale, "Presidential Speechmaking and the Public Audience: Individual Presidents and Group Attitudes", *The Journal of Politics* Vol 49 No. 9, 1987, 704-36.

assumes all the self-promotion duties of the president; 4) personality in his own right, transcends the role of press advisor.⁷⁹ Presidential press secretaries cannot afford to be underrated, for some hold immense power in their dealings with the press as the president's alter-ego.

B. UNOFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF MEDIA DIPLOMACY

Unofficial media has been defined for the purposes of this research effort as that practiced by the independent news media in an effort to influence the course of international events. It is advocacy journalism. The key to understanding this phenomenon is to examine the type of person reporting the news, the self-perception of the media, and international cooperation among these individuals.

1. Styles of Journalism

In the beginning there was objective reporting, taught in journalism schools as the presentation of facts in order to answer the key questions "who? what? when? where? how?". The basic tenets of objective reporting included: 1) do not stray from the observable, verifiable fact; 2) include both sides in a controversy; 3) do not allow personal beliefs and biases to interfere with the narrative.⁸⁰ This assignment is achieved by the cub reporter or legman whose goal is to collect news and facts, usually by conducting solitary research, and then transform them into a newsworthy story. Known as the classic method⁸¹ of moving idea to print, the elements are: on-the-spot investigation, background research, writing, rewriting, and polishing. The editor hovers in the background to ensure the quality and the quantity of the product will fit both the column and the deadline.

⁷⁹ Colin Seymour-Ure, "Presidential Power, Press Secretaries, and Communication", *Political Studies*, Vol XXVIII No. 2, 253-70.

⁸⁰ Peter Hannaford, Talking Back to the Media (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986), 32.

⁸¹ Servan-Schreiber, 140.

Frederick Buchstein, Director of Research for Dix and Eaton, Inc., in a speech before the Internal revenue service on April 20, 1988 outlined the process of a typical news story.

JOB	WHAT HE DOES	WHAT CAN GO WRONG
Newsmaker	Makes news	Refuses to talk to the reporter in search of facts. Purposively misleads reporter or gives only part of the story. Doesn't know how to explain what happened so any dummy can understand it.
Reporter	Gathers facts. Writes the story. Forwards it to the editor.	Fails to understand what the story means, to get the facts right, to put the story into context for the reader. Writes a dull story that no one reads. Is too dumb, lazy, busy or facing too tight a deadline to overcome the above. Is anti-business, -military, -government, etc. Ignores the facts so he can tell a good yarn.
Topic Editor	Manages reporters to make sure the news is covered and features written. Fights with all other editors for page 1. Lives with managing editor's policy decisions. Tries to balance coverage.	All of the above. Ignores reporter's advice and over or underplays a story. Fails to differentiate between a good story or a bamboozle. Bows to policies and whims of the publisher's
Copy Editor	Edits the story for language, logic, and accuracy. Writes the headline.	He's in a hurry, misunderstands the story, fouls the headline or rewrite. Readers can't yell at him because they don't know who he is.
Makeup Editor	Oversees the printers who physically produce the paper.	Trims the meat out of the story to make it fit in the allotted space.
Paper Boy	Delivers the paper.	Tosses the paper into a bush or puddle. Never delivers it when you want it. Wants a tip for

		delivering bad news on your doorstep.
Reader	Selectively reads the news.	Avoids business news when its on the business page. Only reads the headlines. Is more interested in the sports page and the funnies.
Newsmaker	Reads the story about himself.	I didn't say that. That stupid reporter got his facts wrong. Why didn't I say more? Why wasn't my story on page one? Why didn't I get more space? I'll never talk to a reporter again. Where's my p. r. man, I want my name in the paper again. ⁸²

Although the humor is apparent, so is the contradictory nature of the newspaper game. The communications chain is long, and each link has the potential to disrupt the accurate flow of communications, as is so aptly illustrated by Mr. Buchstein.

Group journalism was devised by Henry Luce of Time magazine. He essentially divided the researching and writing between two employees with a third performing the function of foreign or on-scene correspondent. The end product was a collective work lacking a byline but full of facts, entertainment, ideas, and a distinctive style in a uniform package.

Changes in technology have produced an evolution from the solitary journalist on the street searching out the news to the newsroom communicator sitting at a desk receiving information via the wizardry of electronics, microchips, and fiber optics. This journalist-communicator assumes a new role in which he selects, condenses, simplifies, and synthesizes⁸³ the news based on what he believes the audience can absorb, understand, and wants to know. This has resulted in the rise of advocacy journalism or New Journalism.

⁸² Frederick D. Buchstein, "Public Relations: Contacts with Editors and Reporters", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (June 15, 1980) Vol LIV No. 17, 535-9.

⁸³ Servan-Schreiber, 145.

The characteristics include: 1) the author's own "voice" is heard; 2) first person is used; 3) the investigation is reconstructed in narrative form; 4) part of the story may be invented in order to make it more real.⁸⁴ Advocacy journalism has actually been common in Europe for years, but only since the late 1960s has it found a niche in the U.S. news marketplace. It began with underground newspapers, editorials, and point-counterpoint on 60 Minutes, but it would soon become part of the evening news, and the front page. "All the news that's fit to print" by implication means a selection process has occurred. So who is selecting, condensing, simplifying, and synthesizing?

2. The Media Elite

A landmark study of the media originally conducted in 1979 and 1980 by S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman presented a profile of this "media elite".⁸⁵ The statistical profile is as follows:

White	95%
Male	79%
College Graduate	93%
Postgraduate Study	55%
Liberal	54%
Religion "none"	50%
Annual Income over \$30,000	78%
Annual Income over \$50,000	46%

⁸⁴ See Servan-Schreiber, 149; Hannaford, 6-9; Robert Sobel, The Manipulators: America in the Media Age (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976) 324-35 for a complete discussion of this phenomenon.

⁸⁵ S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, Linda S. Lichter, The Media Elite (Maryland: Adler and Adler Publishers, Inc., 1986) contains the results of this study, in-depth content analysis of specific media coverage, results of the Thematic Apperception Test. Initial research was supplemented by follow-ups conducted in 1985; The Media Research Center published their report *"And That's the Way it Isn't"* in July 1990 which combines interviews, content analysis, and surveys. Their findings also indicate a liberal bias in the U. S. media, although Stephen Hess of the Brookings Institution indicated he did not agree with the findings according to the *San Jose Mercury News* of July 22, 1990, "Report Says Media have Liberal Bias"; Nick Thimmesch, ed. *A Liberal Media Elite?* report of a conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in 1985. Guest panelists included: Robert Lichter, Rupert Murdoch, Ben Bradlee, and Michael Massing. There was no consensus among the newsmen represented in identifying themselves as liberals or elites. The debate continues.

These statistics are based on hour-long interviews with approximately 240 journalists at: *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and the news organizations at CBS, NBC, ABC, and PBS. Random selection of participants included: Print-reporters, columnists, department heads, bureau chiefs, editors, executives; TV - correspondents, anchors, producers, film editors, news executives; men and women.⁸⁶ This initial profile has remained unchanged since the follow-up studies conducted in 1985 by Lichter's group.

"News" is being realized to a great extent by the individual profiled above. This is the same person who is conducting unofficial diplomacy. The problem occurs when the reality being reconstructed is determined by such decisions as: What story is worth covering? How much play should it receive? What angle should it be given? Which sources are both reliable and informative? Each question represents a value judgement of sorts. This judgement may represent the individual or corporate body organizational consensus or political party or that of a particular government.

According to Lichter and Rothman's studies and findings, the "media elite" view themselves as politically liberal, alienated from traditional norms and institutions, favored a strong welfare state within a capitalist framework, critical of America's world role, and lastly, would like to strip traditional powerbrokers, i.e. business, of their influence and empower black leaders, consumer groups, intellectuals, and the media.⁸⁷

3. The Fourth Estate

Theorists and philosophers have assigned the media the role of a fourth estate, a watchdog of democracy. The media have been eager to assume such a worthy function as will be noted in the later discussion concerning the freedoms of the press. It is difficult to

⁸⁶ Lichter, et. al., 21.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 294; Both Hannaford, 25 and Servan-Schreiber, 259-63 come to similar conclusions.

imagine current political events, or political life itself, without the presence of the media. Studies indicate that the media do have an independent impact on political life, ranging from something as minor as how a candidate packages himself to something as major as molding, influencing, and possibly changing public opinions and political behavior.⁸⁸ Alarms have been raised periodically, as to the media's ability to set agendas, and that they are becoming an "imperial media."⁸⁹

The above is not completely accurate, as the media themselves must still resolve some basic dilemmas in order to truly be the "watchdog". Reporters must answer to the needs or demands of their parent news enterprise, and since this is based on economic reality in a competitive market, patterns of cooperation among newsmen are not always apparent. If each reporter is relying on the White House party line, and the deadline is approaching, then there is little opportunity to take advantage of Grossman and Rourke's recommendations.⁹⁰ These include: 1) organization among the reporters themselves; 2) broaden their network of contacts; 3) engage in investigative reporting (which is rapidly becoming a lost art due to time constraints); 4) compel the president to release information;⁹¹ 5) attempt to negotiate changes in the manner in which information is made available to them. The fourth estate is neither as free nor as constrained as appearances would indicate, however they are increasingly influential as indicated earlier and it is this

⁸⁸ McPhail, Electronic Colonialism; Mark Hollingsworth, The Press and Political Dissent: A Question of Censorship (London: Pluto Press, 1986); Jeremy Hawthorn, ed., Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic (London, Arnold, 1987); Jean Seaton and Ben Pimlott, eds., The Media in British Politics (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987); Servan-Schreiber, Hannaford; Sobel..

⁸⁹ Michael Baruch Grossman and Francis E. Rourke, "The Media and the Presidency: An Exchange Analysis", *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1976) Vol 91 No. 3, 455-70.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 461-7.

⁹¹ Grossman and Rourke examine three methods for achieving this: embarrass the president at a televised news conference by asking him why he has not released a particular document (I term this technique "outerviewing"), and their newspapers publish editorials raising the same question; seek congressional help in obtaining the information they seek; go to the courts and use the process of legal compulsion to acquire it.

influence that is of concern in the realm of international relations and to the practitioners of official media diplomacy.

C. MEDIA DIPLOMACY METHODS

1. Official: Sanctioned Manipulation of the Press

a. News Conferences and Rebuttals

The embassy press attache may, on behalf of the ambassador, schedule a news conference in order to: a) make an announcement, or b) rebut a negative story. News conferences typically last twenty minutes and are considered to be formal. A "news availability" may be scheduled in lieu of a conference. This has an informal tone, lasts ten to fifteen minutes, and gives the impression that "we've-got-to-get-back-to-work".⁹²

Oftentimes a press attache is tasked with responding to negative and/or erroneous coverage in the press. Six possible avenues are open to the embassy in this instance: 1) no response; 2) a letter to the writer of the story; 3) a letter to the editor, not for publication;

⁹² Hannaford, 96; Douglass Cater in The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1959), 58-9, cites the classic disquisition on the publicity requirements for an "investigation". It consists of seven points: 1) Decide what you want the newspapers to hit hardest and then shape each hearing so that the main point becomes the vortex of the testimony. Once that vortex is reached, *adjourn*; 2) In handling press releases, first put a release date on them, reading something like this: "For release at 10:00 A. M. EST July 6," etc. If you do this, you can give releases out as much as 24 hours in advance, thus enabling reporters to study them and write better stories; 3) Limit the number of people authorized to speak for the committee, to give out press releases or to provide the press with information to the *fewest number possible*. It plugs leaks and helps to preserve concentration of purpose; 4) Do not permit distractions to occur, such as extraneous fusses with would-be witnesses, which might provide news that would bury the testimony which you want featured; 5) Do not space hearings more than 24 or 48 hours apart when on a controversial subject. This gives the opposition too much opportunity to make all kind of counter-charges and replies by issuing statements to the newspapers; 6) Don't ever be afraid to recess a hearing even for five minutes, so that you keep the proceedings completely in control as far as creating news is concerned; 7) *And this is most important*: don't let the hearings or the evidence ever descend to the plane of a personal fight between the Committee Chairman and the head of the agency being investigated. The high plane of duly-authorized Committee of the House of Representatives *examining* the operations of an Agency of the Executive Branch for constructive purposes should be maintained at all costs. Although these recommendations were proposed with the Congress in mind, they are an excellent example of techniques used by official practitioners.

4) a letter to the editor, for publication; 5) a counter-interview with another journalist; 6) a formal demand for a published correction.⁹³

b. Leaks and Publications

"Leaks" to the press are another method of using the media to achieve certain political feats. These fall into four categories: 1) leaks by officials to attract the attention of specific government officials, in the hope that said official will order a brief on the subject or rethink a previously articulated position; 2) leaks that occur when a particular official favors a policy which lacks the support of other officials; 3) leaks that occur when individual officials disagree with a decision but cannot say so publicly because of the conventions of collective responsibility and secrecy; 4) leaks to create the impression that the government made a decision it, in fact, has not. This is the trial balloon to test public reaction.⁹⁴ The personality type of a "leaker" as characterized by Lloyd Norman may assume six different guises: 1) infighter (determined to win regardless of the means); 2) show-off (a braggart who likes to demonstrate how important he is); 3) whistle-blower (a zealot who is convinced that his agency...is being mismanaged and only he has the right answers); 4) the partisan (feels his organization is being zapped by the rival's more glamorous or impressive weapon system or military mission); 5) the true-blue good guy (truly believes an informed press is vital to a democracy); 6) compulsive talker (bubbly with the latest flash.⁹⁵ Finally, a look at the characteristics of "Leakology" as defined by LCDR Brent Baker:

Leaks in the context of this discussion are defined as both classified and unclassified. They include: politically sensitive government information that is provided in an

⁹³ See Lee's The Diplomatic Persuaders for an interesting assortment of such rebuttals, 25, 60-2, 79, 121-3.

⁹⁴ Cohen, 72.

⁹⁵ Lloyd Norman cited in The Pentagon Reporters by Robert B. Sims (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 155 note 7.

unauthorized manner to persons who do not have a current government authorization to have access and a "need to know."

It takes at least two people to spring a leak, an inside source and an outside receiver.

It takes a transmitter (usually a news outlet) to spread or publicize the leaked information.

Once a leak is put into the public domain, by such means as the news media, its future course cannot be controlled by anyone, including the source, receiver, or transmitter of the leak.

Leaks may have a "multiplier" effect, with one leak stimulating another counter measure leak championing the opposite position.

Leaks, by their nature and the nature of humans and mass media transmitters, highlight the more dramatic aspects of an issue and seldom attempt to present a balanced or detailed view of complex issues. In short, leaks oversimplify issues.

Leaks are almost impossible to track down, and an investigation of leaks, while it may be necessary, can itself be counterproductive adding more fuel...⁹⁶

Leakology would be better considered an art than a science, and as with most elements of art, it is imprecise and subject to not only the artist's interpretation but the beholder's as well.

The publication of official news magazines is another avenue pursued by embassies and the USIA. Various embassy publications include: Spain's eight page illustrated monthly bulletin *Spanish Newsletter*, and eight page *The Week in Spain*; India's weekly *India News* and daily "*Indiagram*"; Taiwan's *Free China Weekly* and monthly *Free China Review*; South Korea's biweekly magazine *News from Korea* and the quarterly "*Korean Report*". The USIA publishes *America Illustrated* in Russian and Polish, *Al Hayat* for Arabic-speaking countries, and French and English editions of *Topic* targeting the young, educated, potential leaders of Africa. At the international governmental organizational level, the United Nations publishes the *UN Monthly Chronicle* in English, French, and Spanish, as well as the UN Yearbook.

⁹⁶ Lcdr Brent Baker, USN, "LEAKOLOGY: The War of Words", *U.S.N.J. Proceedings* (July 1977) Vol 103 No. 7/893, 43-9.

The production, loan, or rental of embassy documentary films, television programs, and videotapes are made available to the public as part of the media diplomatic effort. The USIA produces films of "purpose without popcorn"⁹⁷ concerned with such themes as civil rights, development and modernization, living conditions under communism, speeches by U.S. political figures, nuclear progress, education, medicine, land reform, conservation, self-help, space programs, cultural events, etc.

c. Media Opportunity

The last official media diplomacy technique to be described is called the "media opportunity". It is defined as "a happening often of no real importance, which is staged for the media, in the hope it might appear on the evening news and on the front pages of the newspapers."⁹⁸ Four elements are required to ensure the success of such an operation: 1) notify the press corps well in advance; 2) ensure the television and still cameras are in place; 3) ensure the reporters and commentators are present; 4) ensure the official appears on time and either greets a visitor, cuts a ribbon, makes a statement, or performs some other ceremonial function. Media opportunities are manufactured by design.

2. Unofficial: Manipulation is a Two-Way Street

New Journalism has resulted in an interesting style which, by some media professional's standards, permits "reconstruction of dialogue (direct quotations verified only from second-or third-hand sources) and composites (combining characteristics of several different events or people into a single 'representative' scene or individual)."⁹⁹ Paul Weaver, media analyst, noted that television news adopts the more personal voice of the omniscient reporter-narrator; it imposes a more unified interpretation on the day's events;

⁹⁷ Elder, 235.

⁹⁸ Sobel, 358.

⁹⁹ Lichter, Rothman, Lichter, 145.

and it's attracted to the drama and spectacle that produce good film.¹⁰⁰ The camera does blink each time selective visuals are used or the process is flawed by an imbalance in accurately presenting both sides of an issue.

a. Recycled News and Unidentified Sources

Recycled news is the negative story that wouldn't die. Sometimes it reappears because reporters and editors "fail to read their own newspapers as carefully as they should."¹⁰¹ "Evergreen" are stories with extended time value comparable to the use of stock footage in television news programs. Both seem timely, both seem new, and occasionally both may appear to be an exclusive.

Unidentified sources are sometimes used by journalists to build a story. The use of such terms as "sources say" or "critics say", followed by an accusation of some type, poses a problem in terms of rebuttal. At times, this use of unidentified sources results from a planned news leak as discussed in the previous section. During an interview, all statements may be "on the record" i.e. attributable to a specific individual; or "on background" i.e. nothing is directly attributable to the interviewee, but will appear in the story as "company sources", "sources close to the matter", "a government official", "a senior ranking officer" or "our sources"; or "on deep background" i.e. the reporter must appear to be the authority for the information; or "off the record" i.e. a more well-informed reporter but one who cannot quote, attribute the information, or link it to the interviewee in any manner.¹⁰²

b. Interviewing and Outerviewing

Skillful interviewers will use verbal devices to steer the interview in a particular direction, or to make a particular point. These methods include: 1) the loaded preface;

¹⁰⁰ Paul Weaver, "Newspaper News and Television News" in Douglas Cater, ed. Television as a Social Force (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 92.

¹⁰¹ Lou Cannon, "Reporting", Sacramento, California Journal Press, 1977, 5 quoted in Hannaford, 31.

¹⁰² Ibid, 90-91.

2) the either/or question; 3) the pregnant pause.¹⁰³ The correct response in each situation is as follows:

- 1) "I don't agree with your statements but..."
Articulate some positive aspect here.
- 2) "Neither"
Move onto some positive statement.
- 3) The Pregnant Pause is used (mainly on television) to force the interviewee to extend his answer, overanswer the original question, etc. The interviewee should remain silent, focused on the interviewer, and smiling. The interviewer will start talking soon due to the economic realities of dead air time.

These examples depict just a few of the techniques used when attempting to practice unofficial media diplomacy during the interviewing phase.

Outerviewers may assume one of five different roles, which themselves are not mutually exclusive. A reporter may become 1) a friend of the court; 2) an adversary; 3) an historian-observer; 4) an institutional analyst; 5) a gatekeeper.¹⁰⁴ The first role, friend of the court, may be defined in several ways, i.e. one who writes supportive articles in return for preferred status in the information-dissemination loop, or one who writes articles that indicate an understanding of the point of view of the official, or one who ingratiate himself in order to be treated with special consideration. The second role, adversary, is the one most commonly assumed by the press when describing their role and function in the realm of government-press relations. This individual approaches most official encounters from the perspective that authorities may not be telling the truth or are withholding some aspect of it. The adversarial style is characterized by combativeness and accusations, and is readily apparent during briefings, press conferences, etc. Grossman and

¹⁰³ Ibid, 46; Richard M. Clurman addresses the news standards which are used in terms of conducting interviews in his book *Beyond Malice: The Media's Years of Reckoning* (New York: A Meridian Book, 1990), 61. Interviews which are not spontaneous and unrehearsed are prohibited. An interview is not spontaneous or unrehearsed if: 1) the questions are submitted to the interviewee in advance; 2) there is an agreement not to use a particular general area as a basis for a specific question; 3) there is an agreement not to ask specific questions; 4) the film, tape, or transcript of the interview is submitted to the interviewee for approval or for participation in the editing process.

¹⁰⁴ Grossman and Kumar, 47.

Kumar note the distinction between print and broadcast media in this regard. An accusatory style may be extremely useful for the cameras but does not necessarily translate well into print. The third role, historian-observer, has a distinctive style of reporting which chooses to interpret both the policies and the personalities who design policies, but will do so within the context of the mood of the times. His story is focused on the character of the organization rather than any "psuedo-events" or "media opportunities" which may have been staged for his consumption. The fourth role, institutional analyst, is the one who focuses not on one individual in the policy-making process, but rather the bureaucratic process which results in the selection, synthesis, and creation of the final product. The fifth and final role, gatekeeper,¹⁰⁵ is the reporter who talks to the "news source" via interview or outerview, decides which facts to pass along the chain, what to write, what shape, color, and importance to give the event. All of these roles may be used interchangeably by reporters depending upon personal style, angle of the story, and the employer's philosophy.

The International Press Institute (IPI), profiled in the International Sources section below, very carefully evaluates the background factors prior to convening either a climate-creating, or conflict-preventing meeting. These factors include:

Timing - Are the concerned policy-makers likely to be interested?
Is the mass media in one or both of the countries likely to be responsive?

Evaluation of Public Opinion - Will the results of these meetings "make news"?

Choice of Participants - Is the individual's personality and position likely to enable him to effectively transmit his views?

¹⁰⁵ Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries (Stanford, California/Paris: Stanford University Press/UNESCO, 1964), 84-9. Schramm cites Kurt Lewin's thesis regarding the existence of "gates" and "gatekeepers". This refers to points all along an information channels at which "in" or "out" decisions have to be made. The power to operate these gates and the rules or personalities that govern their operation becomes crucial in the flow of information. The previous section discussing styles of journalism by Frederick Buchstein outlines just such a series of "gates" and "gatekeepers".

Choices of a meeting place - Does the location indicate a certain orientation? Will this, in turn, affect participation?

The Agenda - Do the topics consider extremist positions on contentious issues in all countries? Does the agenda allow for the greatest possible chance for agreement on moderate conclusions?

Semantic problems - Have potential semantic difficulties been identified?

Detailed Special Knowledge - Has participant-selection included consideration of "experts" in specific problem areas?¹⁰⁶

The IPI meetings are both a media opportunity and a media event in and of themselves.

c. Twenty-Two Minute Laws

News is a business, and as such it generates income and outlay. One of the ways in which it produces income is by selling advertising- space in a newspaper, air time in a broadcast. The size of what is commonly referred to as the "news hole" in a newspaper is dictated by the amount of advertising sold for that particular day. The news hole is that portion of the paper dedicated to news, editorial comments, and letters. Size varies from as little as thirty percent to as great as forty or fifty percent. Obviously, the publisher would desire the larger news hole since he is not in the business to sell someone else's product at the expense of his own. The television or radio news director fills air time and in a thirty minute broadcast, this news hole is approximately twenty-two minutes.¹⁰⁷ When compared to the print media this twenty-two minutes becomes two, perhaps three columns of text plus visuals. How are those twenty-two minutes of air time used, and what are the laws, written or unwritten that govern its use?

Television is theatre in a small package, and the news is the most riveting type of theatre currently in existence for it is "real". There are techniques which are accepted

¹⁰⁶ Meyer in Unofficial Diplomats. 62-4.

¹⁰⁷ Buchstein, 535; Mario Pei, Weasel Words: The Art of Saying What You Don't Mean (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1978), 25-30; Frank Mankiewicz and Joel Swerdlow, Remote Control (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1978) 76-77.

throughout the television news community, and although they are not inherently bad, i.e. morally objectionable, they are subject to clever manipulation which is somewhat questionable in terms of journalistic ethics. These techniques include the following:

1. **Story Placement** - The first story on a network newscast is perceived by the audience as being the most important news of the day. (It is analogous to the front page piece in a newspaper.)
2. **The Hold Frame** - Used to "capture" something the audience might otherwise have missed. It interrupts the motion to hold on one still picture from the moving action so that particular frozen image can be examined by the viewer.
3. **Selective Segmentation** - The objective is to cut out portions of a speaker's comment and, by use of tied-together excerpts in false continuity, make the total effect different from his original in-context remarks. These are termed "cut-aways".
4. **Commentator Speculations that Appear to be Factual** - Factual information is provided, then a "comma", then the speculative part of the presentation is provided. It is difficult, at times, to discern this effect in an audio-visual form; it is readily apparent in the written form.
5. **The Truth But Not The Whole Truth** - Usually the whole truth is known to the reporter or commentator, but with the design of capturing viewer interest or attention, only a portion is told. This hook casts an invalid impression by intent. (Of course, it is also possible to inadvertently do this when air time is limited and only the highlights of a story are possible.)
6. **Catch Phrases** - Catch phrasing is a printed-word and audio technique that has been streamlined by television, e.g. Irangate, with its genesis in the term Watergate, which in turn was the reporter's shorthand for all the criminal activity and later charges levied against the Nixon administration.
7. **Using the Chemistry of Combined Audio and Visual** - Often a visual image gives one impression, the audio gives another, and the combination of the two creates a distortion.
8. **Visual Emphasis of Audio by Selection of Phrases for the Audience To Read.**
9. **Pretense Balancing** - Usually a combination of a "fresh" story with an "evergreen" implying that the two are somehow related.
10. **Selectivity of Interviewees** - Depending upon whom is interviewed, it has the potential of tilting the meaning of a news event.

11. **Treatment and Respect Given to an Interviewee** - The audience is given an impression about the person being interviewed by the questions he is/is not asked, by the manner in which he is/is not addressed by a reporter who may either be the adversary or the friend of the court.
12. **Prompting an Interviewee** - Words may be put into an interviewee's mouth by the interviewer. Interviewers may phrase questions in such a way so that the question may be edited out, while the answer is retained as a complete statement. The object is to coach the interviewee.
13. **Methods of Reading** - Reading slow or reading fast, or accenting a particular word are all techniques taught in Speech 101 in order to enliven an oral presentation. These, in combination with a faint smile, a shake of the head, or a raised eyebrow, are subtle ways of editorializing.
14. **Visual Authority** - The posture of the television anchor sitting behind a desk with papers in front of him or her gives immediate impression of authority. (The type of clothing is also significant, as are the colors, jewelry, etc.)¹⁰⁸
15. **Narration Rather than Visuals - When It Suits the Purpose** - At times, a news event will occur in which visuals will create a negative effect when the producer hopes to achieve a positive impression. Visuals would then defeat the purpose, and thus, only narrative is used.
16. **Crediting and Discrediting** - This newswriting technique is designed to give credit to an editorial factor of a writer's choosing.
17. **Creation of News** - If it is a slow news day but the network has been following a particular story, then the creation of a related event is sometimes deemed necessary. One ploy in the Washington, D.C. area is to send a minicam and a newsmen over to the Capitol to interview a senator or congressman about "the story". Another method is to give a relatively unimportant item an extended story length, to have reporters quote other reporters, or to emphasize the fact that there is no news regarding the "continuing story."
18. **The Inclusion or Omission of Crowd Reaction** - When reporting a speech of a public figure, the film editor is the deciding factor for inclusion or omission of the audience reaction to those witnessing the speech. Time limitations may be circumvented by retaining the flavor of the reaction by leaving in the applause (or catcalls as the case may be), fading it to a low level, and bringing the reporter's voice above the applause.
19. **Focal Length** - Different lenses give separate impressions of the size of the crowd.

¹⁰⁸ John T. Malloy, New Dress for Success (New York: Warner Books, 1988); See also The Women's Dress for Success Book (New York: Warner Books, 1977) by the same author.

20. **Tragedy and Comedy Reporting** - The news anchor as actor or actress, investing the news with passion.
21. **Ignoring Follow-Up Stories/Disregard of Stories** - This decision is usually the result of several factors, such as time, audience interest and attention span, editorial policy.
22. **Story Association and Grouping** - Detailing one story, and without pause going into another story can imply association between the two. This may be achieved either with or without narrative bridges by grouping stories in succession.¹⁰⁹

Twenty-two minutes of air time requires a great deal of creative endeavor, a careful selection process, and the responsibility of responding to a multitude of needs in order to fill the time appropriately. The result may be singularly impressive, or mediocre, or infuriating, but it is rarely dull.

Informal, unacknowledged laws of television news¹¹⁰ have evolved over the last fifty years of broadcasting: unattractive faces do not an effective broadcast make; a fire at night is more dramatic than the same fire in daylight; every news story must be complete within one minute, fifteen seconds, however if it is an in-depth treatment, then one minute, forty-five seconds is the norm; a story with film will take precedence over one that is read from the anchor desk or reported in a "stand-up" spot; an action film will take precedence over the conversation or discussion (denigrated in television circles as "talking heads"). Washington, D.C. is a standard source of news, as the president will always make good copy, plus the newsrooms are well-staffed. Time zones are taken into consideration as well. Repeatedly, it has been said that television sets the national agenda simply because it is in the position to select which news is covered, which isn't, and which isn't even considered because there was no "gatekeeper" on the scene to recognize it as such. The actual laws

¹⁰⁹ The techniques outlined above represent a compilation of the following: Bruce Herschesohn, The Gods of Antenna (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1976), 50-69; Pei, Weasel Words, 20-30; Grossman and Kumar, 47 and additional commentary by this author.

¹¹⁰ F. Mankiewicz and J. Swerdlow, 77.

governing the regulation of television will be discussed in the next section on the Freedom of the Press.

D. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

1. Constitutional Authority - The First Amendment

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT I to the Constitution

What, precisely, does the above extract from the Constitution mean in terms of the freedom of the press? There are probably as many interpretations as there are journalists and those who would oppose journalists. These differing views will be examined below, and although they are interesting and oftentimes insightful, they do not represent the legally acceptable standard as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court through the years. "Freedom of the Press" is predicated upon the earlier concept, "Freedom of Speech" which is a logical step in view of the history of communications. Man was, after all, transmitting his thoughts through the spoken word, long before the tools for the written word had been developed.

Legal arguments since the ratification of the Constitution, in general, and the First Amendment, in particular, have examined several angles when attempting to interpret the limits of this issue.¹¹¹ Sir William Blackstone interpreted the freedom of speech or press "as that which lays no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published." Alexander Hamilton is credited with supplying the formula, "the liberty of the press is the right to publish with impunity, truth,

¹¹¹ See Edward S. Corwin's The Constitution and What It Means Today rev. by Harold W. Chase and Craig R. Ducat (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 280-93 for a complete dissertation and analysis. The presentation which follows draws heavily from this source.

with good motives, for justifiable ends though reflecting on government, magistracy, or individuals."¹¹² This is the core upon which the "absence of malice" doctrine is built. By 1919, Justice Holmes, in reviewing a case based on the Espionage Act of 1917, ruled protection of free speech will not protect that individual, who speaks "...in such circumstances...[so] as to create a clear and present danger". Phrased differently, the character of the act may not be divorced from the circumstances in which the act was committed, i.e. proximity and degree. Judge Learned Hand in 1950, presented the court with a new approach by stressing the idea of "a clear and probable danger" rather than "a present danger". This reading provided the Supreme Court with what it termed "the balancing approach" as opposed to a formulaic, mechanical, or doctrinaire approach. The balance is achieved by examining each case on its individual merits, and determining the appropriate weight to be given to the competing private and public interests. The newsgatherer's privilege is the right not to reveal sources unless sufficient grounds exist to indicate the reporter may possess information relevant to a crime currently under grand jury investigation.

Freedom of the press, as stated earlier, has derived its definition from, and been a logical outgrowth of, the freedom of speech arguments. There do exist a number of rulings which pertain specifically to the press, and particularly to the electronic component of that media. Previously touched upon was the doctrine of no previous restraint, which basically forbids censorship of the press prior to publication.¹¹³ It should be noted at this juncture, that "forbidding prior censorship", granting freedom to the press in this instance does not excuse the press from the other freedom implicit in the privilege, i.e. the responsibility of

¹¹² *People v. Croswell*, N. Y. Common Law Reports 717 (1804) cited in Corwin, 282.

¹¹³ The Pentagon Papers is probably one of the more celebrated instances of this freedom. Cable News Network (CNN), in November 1990, was restrained from broadcasting the contents of audio tapes on the grounds that publishing the material could prejudice a criminal case currently under investigation. The final ruling in December 1990 lifted the prior restraint and cited the freedom of speech rulings.

the press. They are both parts of the same equation but periodically, the rallying cry of "responsibility of the press" is, a) articulated by its opponents in frustration, anger, and in an accusatory manner, or b) misinterpreted by the press as the responsibility to publish everything, factual or semi-factual, with or without malicious intent, etc. This is certainly not an attempt to indict the press, merely a reminder that freedom implies responsibility, otherwise it is simply anarchy. The other doctrines are those of libel and obscenity.¹¹⁴

Congressional control of the press derives from its controls of the U. S. mail system, however it may only revoke the "second class privilege" from those items which are obscene and/or fraudulent. Freedom of circulation is predicated on freedom to publish, and certain materials, by law, may not be published. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established twin doctrines of "equal time" and "fairness". These elements require radio and television broadcasters to air discussion of public issues, as well as opposing viewpoints which shall be permitted an equal amount of time for rebuttal. Failure to abide by these requirements may result in a station losing its broadcast license, and since licenses are in short supply (the reality of a limited spectrum of frequencies, channels) and must be renewed triennially, it behooves the station owner to comply with these restrictions.¹¹⁵ The next question to ask is how does the press itself interpret this freedom?

2. Definition One: The Press Defines Its Own Freedoms

Rod Serling, a renowned playwright and television dramatist, in commenting on the challenge posed by the mass media to the twentieth century writer, spoke of the rules which

¹¹⁴ Refer to Corwin, 255-7 for a complete discussion of libel and obscenity and their relation to the press.

¹¹⁵ For a less legalistic approach to this discussion of the restrictions imposed on the broadcast press, recommend: Mankiewicz and Swerdlow, 89-90; Michael A. Spitzer, Seven Dirty Words and Six Other Stories: Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 43-66; Theodore F. Koop, "Television: America's Star Reporter", ed. by Warren K. Agee ed., Mass Media in a Free Society, (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1969), 51-3.

a writer should embrace - social critic, protestor, commentator, satirist, etc. The key was to present a point of view , for "so long as men write what they think, then all the other freedoms may remain intact. It's then that writing becomes a weapon of truth, an act of conscience, an article of faith."¹¹⁶ What Serling was exhorting the guild of his fellow creative artists to do, Thomas Jefferson had so charged the press of his day to do - to engage in a free marketplace of ideas. At the 1968 William Allen White Centennial Seminar a group of journalists, print and broadcast variety, gathered to express their thoughts on the entire spectrum of journalism, its roles, duties, functions, and freedoms. Distilled below is the essence of those discussions.

Ben H. Bagdikian

The press is the natural vehicle for the expression of local needs; detecting the breakdowns in the social system. News should inform the public of reality, no matter how unpleasant. Look for the causes of public episodes and do so with competence and speed. Make recommendations in editorials when public attention is engaged. Journalism is an exercise in judgement. Judge what is important and describe it without bias. Growing cynicism about the press may be an outgrowth of invoking Freedom of the Press and the First Amendment for business reasons unaccompanied by inspiring editorial performance.

Bill D. Moyers

Journalists look at ideas and events through their own eyes. The mistake occurs when it is passed off as something other than the pursuit of truth by men less opinionated than their peers. The great myth of American journalism is objectivity. Journalists enjoy professional longevity, are beyond retaliation, have the last word due to durability, and do not operate at the end of an electorate's whim. The president was created by the Constitution and the press is protected by it - one's mandate is to conduct affairs of state, the other's privilege is trying to find out all he can about what is going on.

¹¹⁶ Rod Serling, "The Challenge of the Mass Media to the 20th Century Writer", *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress*, (April 1968), Vol 25 No. 2, 130-3.

Theodore F. Koop

A broadcast journalist has the duty of explaining events and putting them in perspective. The documentary is one method for doing so.¹¹⁷

The underlying theme remains the responsibility to transmit information to the public in such a way that they are better served by the knowledge which they now possess. Implicit in that gatekeeper role is free access to the sources of information, free exercise of personal judgement, and free, yet responsible speech. In his introductory remarks to a panel discussion on "Communications Media at the Naval War College in 1971,"¹¹⁸ Neil Sheehan spoke of the media's responsibility "to be a state unto itself." The journalist stands aside from the major institutions in society and subjects each one in its turn to close scrutiny and examination. Sheehan is in agreement with Moyers and Noss, and those before them, in accepting and announcing the fact that objectivity in the news does not exist. How can it exist when the journalist believes he has been charged with a greater duty than simply information relay? Judgements about "what it all means" are necessary and those judgements "should be communicated honestly and openly to the reader." That is what freedom of the press means on a daily basis, healthy criticism, openly aired of the government and the other major institutions of society.

Barry Zorthian, who has worked both sides of the journalistic/diplomatic beat, "officially" for USIA, and "unofficially" for Time, Inc., defines the media's role (read the press) within the context of the concept of an open society.¹¹⁹ This, in turn, implies a government that is responsive to the people as enshrined in the U. S. Declaration of Independence. Jefferson's "enlightened public", is only able to assume such a role, i.e.

¹¹⁷ B. H. Bagdikian, "The Press and Its Crisis of Identity", 3-14; B. D. Moyers, "The Press and the Government: Who's Telling the Truth?", 17-36; Koop in Agee.

¹¹⁸ Neil Sheehan, "The Role of the Press", *Naval War College Review* (Feb 1971) Vol XXIII No. 6, 4-7.

¹¹⁹ B. Zorthian, "The Role of the Communications Media in a Democratic Society", *Naval War College Review* (Feb 1972) Vol XXIV No. 6, 1-7.

passing judgement on the government in question, if it has the information to do so. The press, in this country, "is the channel to the ultimate goal we have set in our society." Philip L. Geyelin, foreign correspondent and Washington Post Special Editor, concurs with this idea of a "direct connection between the kind of press we have...the kind of government...and a free society. You cannot have one without the other." ¹²⁰ But he goes on to characterize the press as being "in the early warning business." Casting the press in such a role places the onus on the press to be neither a Cassandra, constantly prophesying doom and destruction which falls on deaf ears, nor a boy crying wolf whose credibility diminishes with each false alarm. The early warning system brings the discussion full circle to Justice Holmes and the declaration of fire: when no such emergency exists; warnings must be issued responsibly or they become an inadvertent weapon of destruction of the public trust.

Almost thirty years after Mr. Serling's remarks, Dan Rather, anchorman and managing editor of "CBS Evening News", states that "a public journal (newspaper, magazine, radio station, or television program), is a public trust...it's a journalist's duty to report the news and to raise hell...play no favorites, pull no punches...have no fear of the results."¹²¹ As honest brokers of information, journalists are supposed to pose the difficult and sometimes disturbing questions, not to "always make America feel good about itself." So Mr. Serling, purveyor of fiction and entertainment voices the same thoughts as that of Mr. Rather, purveyor of nonfiction and "infotainment". In fairness, it should be acknowledged that Mr. Rather also believes that rights of journalism additionally imply certain responsibilities, specifically leadership. Discernment is the objective here,

¹²⁰ Philip L. Geyelin, "The Role of the Press in An Open Society", *Naval War College Review* (Mar/Apr 1975), Vol XXVII No. 5, 3-7.

¹²¹ Dan Rather, "Journalism and the Public Trust", *The Humanist* (Nov/Dec 1990), Vol 50 No. 6, 5-7, 42.

characterization of what is merely interesting and what's vitally important, and the willingness to exercise that judgmental ability. Each journalist in this (admittedly random) survey returns to the same starting point, they are not merely free to pass judgement on that data as it is being passed to its public, they are expected to. The problem arises when the editorializing is not clearly delineated during the course of the broadcast or the length of the newspaper column.

3. Definition Two: Three Views Outside the Press of the Press

Vilifying the press has been in vogue since the first newspaper published an article or opinion which didn't coincide with the perception at large. "Media-Bashing" is the somewhat inelegant term in current use. This section has deliberately been limited to the presentation of three viewpoints: 1) a professor of political science; 2) a political thinker and social activist; 3) a politician.¹²² Neither vilifying nor "bashing" is the object here but rather the presentation of an alternate viewpoint. Doris Graber, in her cost-benefit analysis of press freedom,¹²³ identifies five functions which a free press should perform: 1) reflects the diversity of opinions throughout the country, thus provides forum for discussion, and adoption of the soundest ideas; 2) furnishes citizens with the information needed to perform duties of citizenship adequately; 3) articulates the public's interests to the government and gives voice to public opinion; 4) provides an outlet for public expression of unpopular minority views; 5) constitutes the citizens' eyes and ears to detect and report corruption, abuses of power, and other misconduct by government officials; acts as the watchdog. Graber examines each of these functions and concludes that, in fact, the media is able to only partially perform those functions attributed to them. Constraints identified in

¹²² I have deliberately excluded the general public's opinion as this issue will be addressed in Chapter VII.

¹²³ D. A. Graber, "Press Freedom and the General Welfare," *Political Science Quarterly*, (Centennial Year 1886-1986), Vol 101 No. 2, 257-75.

her study included: 1) concentrated ownership of the media through national and regional newspaper chains, three major networks and two newcomers (TBS, FOX), and the wire services of Associated Press and United Press International; 2) news selection criteria based on audience appeal instead of political significance or civic relevance; 3) the press seeks out political elites and their views consistently, the average American only rarely; 4) media has a mixed record in championing minority rights except when the "press freedom" appears to be the issue; 5) investigative journalism depends on two issues - neither manpower-intensive nor cost-prohibitive, and guaranteed to capture audience interest. The bottom line of the balance sheet is that while the press is unable to effectively perform all of these functions all of the time, it does work remarkably well in the public service. It should be noted that Graber does acknowledge the ability of the underground media to rise up when the democratic need for it to do so is tapped.

Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of government, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions...they have the power that comes from political liberty from access to information, and from freedom of expression.¹²⁴

These are the words of Noam Chomsky, Viet Nam War critic, written in the 1970s. As a man of the 1990s, Chomsky argues that the American media machine constitutes "the most awesome propaganda system in world history."¹²⁵ He debunks the notion of an adversarial press, except as it exists on the periphery of society. Characterizing the media as major corporations in a capitalistic world, they must increase profits and market shares. This task is only achievable if issues are shaped and modified such that they serve the interests of established power. Network TV news is the handmaiden to the front page of *The New York Times* or the *Washington Post*. Finally, the public's role is relegated to

¹²⁴ Noam Chomsky, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals", *New York Review of Books*, 1972.

¹²⁵ Rick Szykowny, "Bewildering the Herd: The Humanist Interview with Noam Chomsky", *The Humanist*, (Nov/Dec 90) Vol 50 No. 6, 8-17. See also N. Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent

passive observer since it is the political-economic-cultural elites or specialized class who is actually on the receiving end of this propaganda machine. The bottom line of his balance sheet is that the media is too subordinate to government despite all its rhetoric as a tireless seeker of the truth, and grass roots movements which spring up periodically because they're "mad as hell and they're not going to take it anymore" as Paddy Chayevsky's scathing indictment of television declared in the film *Network*.

The last piece of commentary is from Mario M. Cuomo¹²⁶ speaking before the New York Press Club. Not too surprisingly Cuomo applauds the press and tells them that recent cases brought before the Supreme Court appear to be attempts to curtail the freedom of the press which he views as dangerous. For "...the press' job is to find the whole truth...[that] which is forgotten, ignored, deliberately concealed or distorted by public officials." In his concluding remarks, Cuomo reminds the press of the "balanced approach" so beloved of the U.S. legal system:

I am making a case for the broadest possible freedom of the press.

Of course that great gift comes with great responsibility.

The press has: the power to inform -- the power to distort
the power to instruct -- the power to mislead
the power to uplift -- the power to demean

You can lead our society toward a more mature and discriminating understanding of the process by which we choose our leaders, make our rules, and construct our values or you can encourage people to despise our systems and avoid participating in them...

You can make us wiser, fuller, surer, sweeter than we are.

Or you can do less. And worse.

You are free to make all the choices.

¹²⁶ M. M. Cuomo, "A Brief on the Freedom of the Press: To Keep the Miracle Alive", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Feb 15, 1987), Vol LIII No. 9, 265-9; By no means the last word however. See Robert J. Manning, "The Free Press in a Democratic Society", *Naval War College Review* (Oct 1963) Vol XVI No. 2, 1-14 who characterizes the press as: 1) jealous of its rights and prerogatives; 2) fascinated with speed and exclusivity... interest in analysis and interpretation; 3) insistent on its economic viability...right to make profits; 4) convinced its primary enterprise is disclosure; 5) not unanimous as to its public responsibilities and obligations; Torbjorn Tannsjo, "Against Freedom of Expression", *Political Studies* (December 1985) XXXIII, 547-59; Sanford J. Ungar, "Pressing for a Free Press", *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1989-90) No. 77, 132-53 for yet more perspectives inside and outside of the press.

Cuomo's comments must be considered within the context in which they were given, however the bottom line of his balance sheet suggests that a free press has a specific function to perform, i.e. disclosure. Although it is a constitutionally mandated right, it does not diminish the responsibility of the grantee to use it wisely and well.

E. U. S. PRESS CONFRONTS THE WORLD

1. Sources of International News

What are the characteristics of the world-wide flow of news? Logically, the majority of a nation's news will be parochial in nature, thus the newspapers and newscasts will devote the bulk of the information to that which is local. The proportion of national news appearing on the wire ranges usually from sixty to ninety per cent. A very small minority of the news items focus on the international arena, and even then, it will tend to be either the "superpowers" or the countries immediately bordering the local area.¹²⁷ Additionally, the flow of information and its attendant materials between countries will be governed to a significant degree by certain basic verities. The avenues of exchange, i.e. the international sources of news, are basically owned by a few countries. It is a point of fact that the five major world news agencies are owned, publicly or privately, by only four nations. Not too surprisingly, the nations which own the five world news agencies are also the ones which house the five world news agencies. The Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI) originate in the United States; Reuters in the United Kingdom; Agence France Presse (AFP) in France; Tass in the Soviet Union. According to studies conducted by UNESCO, AP and UPI focus on the United States proportionally to the focus of Tass on the Soviet Union. Reuters' area of concentration is on the United Kingdom and the

¹²⁷ Schramm, 59.

United States, which is not surprising in view of the fact that they have a mutual economic arrangement for the exchange of photographic materials. AFP is the only one of the agencies which has a tendency to report slightly more about the geographic area from which it is receiving and transmitting information than it does about itself, i.e. France.

Fenby, in his studies of the four major international news services (he excludes Tass in his studies), shows that in the service provided to the large-circulation newspapers, foreign news will comprise twenty to thirty percent of the total amount of copy.¹²⁸ This foreign news appears on the "Interbureau" wire. State and local news will then be added to this. AP radio and television subscribers receive two services: a special news wire edited and written especially for broadcasters, and an audio service of voice reports and sound recordings. UPI also discriminates between large- and small-to-medium-circulation newspapers. Local news will be inserted as well as coverage of sports, business, stock markets, and special features. UPI pioneered the use of supplemental audio [read voice reports] *live from the correspondent in the field, complete with gunfire*. There is one drawback to this system of news gathering; newspaper and broadcast subscribers cannot choose what information they receive. News is categorized by region, thus, every subscriber will receive everything issued for its region in the same order and length as the others. The editing desk comes into its own under these circumstances, selecting, condensing, simplifying, synthesizing, and occasionally, deleting. Desk editors do not, however, originate the story; that is the correspondent's function. Each story is judged on its individual merits, i.e. it is unusual, evocative, covers a disaster, has special regional appeal, or it happens to be of worldwide interest, but the pattern declares that it will usually deal with power, where it is being exercised, who is exercising it, and how it affects the overall balance of power in the world. Thus the global superpowers appear to receive the

¹²⁸ Fenby, 84.

majority of the news coverage. The tone of this coverage is overwhelmingly serious. Politics and economics tend to dominate the headlines for this is the kind of power, most commonly exercised. (Military power is also significant but not routinely used by the global superpowers.)

From the foregoing, it would appear that these agencies are all-powerful, in fact, they have periodically been referred to as the "agenda setters to the world." In actuality, control ends the moment the product is delivered. The recipient determines which pieces of news will be transmitted further along the communications chain thus, a return to Kurt Lewin's concept of the gatekeeper is perhaps a more appropriate characterization. Finally, the agencies declare their commitment to accuracy but are reliant upon the foreign correspondent in the field. If this firsthand, verifiable information is unavailable, then the agency must, perforce, resort to secondhand news. Rather than taking direct responsibility for the information in a story, they state that some person or organization reported the facts. Accurate attribution to sources of information (a problem previously addressed in terms of backgrounders and unidentified sources) is both honest, and a definite protection against being held accountable for originating false news.

Embassies and diplomats, both U.S. and foreign, use the U.S. press extensively; the first to stay abreast of what is happening in the "home office", and the second to discover "signals" from the government, follow reports on developments in U.S. policy, and take the pulse of American public opinion. Rubin discusses the "symbiotic relationship"¹²⁹ between correspondents and diplomats in exchanging items of information, through the wire services and more recently, Cable News Network with its worldwide, twenty-four hour a day news coverage.

¹²⁹ Barry Rubin, International News And The American Media (Washington, D. C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sage Publications, 1977), 16.

At the international level the media to a significant degree, will represent the same liberal viewpoints outlined in The Media Elite. European journalists will tend to shape their views of the United States based on *The New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, *The Economist of London*, *Le Monde* of Paris, and incorporate those views into their national newspapers.¹³⁰ This gives rise to what has been termed "news imperialism" whereby AP, UPI, Reuters, and AFP provide the news to the world as previously discussed. Satellite communications have complicated this problem as well, due to cost, access, language, and national control or lack thereof, in an international environment.¹³¹

The International Press Institute (IPI) was established in 1951 in order to "achieve understanding among journalists of the world and thereby, among the peoples of the world. World peace depends upon this understanding."¹³² The IPI is an international non-governmental organization whose membership is limited to countries where the press is basically free. Meetings are conducted among editors representing various nationalities. The objectives of these meetings are: 1) climate creating; 2) conflict preventing. The meetings may be bilateral, focusing on a wide range of areas concerning two countries, or multilateral, focusing on specific issues and their press aspects, i.e. political, economic,

¹³⁰ Hannaford, 29; Servan-Schreiber, 160-1.

¹³¹ Peter Marshall, "Global TV by Satellite: Choice for Viewers, A Threat to National Broadcasters", *Space Communication and Broadcasting* (1989) Vol 6, 263-8; Johanna S. DeStefano, "The Growth of English as the Language of Global Satellite Telecommunications", *Space Communications and Broadcasting* (1989) Vol 6, 461-74; McPhail, Electronic Colonialism; William H. Meyer, "Global News Flow: Dependency and Neoimperialism", *Comparative Political Studies* (October 1989), Vol 22 No. 3, 243-64; Anthony Smith, "The Influence of Television", *Daedalus*, (Fall 1985) Vol 114 No. 4, 1-15; Michael Tracey, "The Poisoned Chalice? International Television and the Idea of Dominance", *Daedalus* (Fall 1985), Vol 114 No. 4, 17-56; Robert V. Williams, "The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in International Information Transfer and Policy", *Special Libraries Association* (Winter 1988), Vol 79 No. 1, 1-8; R. V. Williams, "Using the Information Resources of the Global Village: The Information Systems of International Intergovernmental Organizations", *Special Libraries Association* (Winter 1989), Vol 80 No. 1, 1-8; Philo C. Wasburn, "International Radio Broadcasting: Some Considerations for Political Sociology", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Spring 1985), Vol 13 No. 1, 33-51.

¹³² Ernest Meyer, "The Bilateral and Multilateral Meetings of the IPI" in Unofficial Diplomats, 56-7.

legal, communication. This latter is termed "the influence factor potentialities"¹³³ of the mass media. The influence factor is carefully evaluated prior to setting up an actual meeting. IPI does not view itself as a replacement policy-maker or as an antagonist to the government, but rather as an analyst and a publicist. However, the mere fact that the influence factor is even considered implies that, in fact, the IPI is hoping to effect some type of change through their focus on a particular country's problems.

2. Foreign Correspondent or Transposed Advocate?

American news reporters assigned overseas or in the southern hemisphere are expected to report the news of the locale in which they find themselves. To do this effectively, a working knowledge of the language is beneficial not only to understand what the translator is not telling him, but to gain an insight into the mindset, the culture in which he is now immersed. Two problems are readily apparent in this scenario, the average American aversion to any language except English, and the inability to view the world through another culture's eyes. Previously, the discussion of diplomacy raised the issue of the diplomat who "goes native", and then becomes of little use to his country due to the fact he is no longer able to discern what is in his nation's best interest. A journalist fulfilling the role of foreign correspondent is subject to the same personality alteration, with the result he will begin to question his country's foreign policy or its actions in another nation. Reporters may then become advocates, i.e. portraying the role of exciter, moderator, pacifier, or amateur diplomat.¹³⁴ What studies have actually shown ¹³⁵ is that the U.S. press uses an

¹³³ Ibid, 62.

¹³⁴ Manny Parashos, "News Coverage of Cyprus: A Case Study in Press Treatment of Foreign Policy Issues", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Fall 1988), Vol 16 No. 2, 201-13. For a complete history of this branch of reporting, see John Hohenberg, Foreign Correspondence: The Great Reporters and Their Times (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965); Knightley, First Casualty of War.

¹³⁵ Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); W. Phillips Davison, Donald R. Shanor, and Frederick T. C. Yu, News From Abroad and the Foreign Policy Public (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1980); William A.

"American lens" with which to view the world. This lens is the result of the American mindset, a tendency to view the world from one's own perceptions and experiences, especially in terms of societal interactions. It should be remembered also that this liberal media elite is viewing a world whose conflicts are not merely political or economic but multi-variate in nature, ranging from regional to historical to ethnic to ideological or any combination thereof. If a mirror is held up to those societies in an attempt to view the slightly distorted reflection of a little America, then the journalist has failed in his duty to report and comment on the news as it affects those who are living it. Paraschos speaks of the "parachutist" reporter who drops in, looks around, and reports his findings back to the news bureau while enroute to yet another "drop".¹³⁶ Is this truly a foreign correspondent? It would not appear to meet the definition outlined earlier.

3. War Correspondent

The Mexican War introduced the field correspondent system of journalism to the United States. Ernie Pyle, in his coverage of World War II and his death on Ie Shima in the Pacific from a sniper's bullet, brought home to the U.S. public the texture of war, the men who took an oath to defend their country, and the ultimate price extracted from them, life itself. Ernie Pyle was not a soldier, but he shared in the same risks in his efforts to bring the war home to the people, to report it as he saw it, and as his fellow "men at arms" lived it. War correspondents of yesteryear shared a commonality, the majority had served in the military at one time or another, were familiar with the language, and understood the gravity

Hachten, *The World News Prism* (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1987); James E. Larson, *Global Television and Foreign Policy* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1988); Rubin, *International News and the American Media*; Eduardo R. Ulibarri, "Covering Conflict in the Strategic Backyard: U. S. Media and Central America", *Strategic Review* (Fall 1988) Vol XVI No. 4, 55-64.

¹³⁶ Manny Paraschos, *Greece and the American Press* (New York: Krikos Publications, 1986).

of military operations, battle plans, and the importance of reporting just enough without saying too much.

War correspondents today may be free lance journalists, may be assigned to an area in which their expertise is limited but their body is available, may have the best intentions in the world but are not in fact, adequate to the job. Robert D. Kaplan writing in Soldiers of God discusses the war the west ignored, i.e. Afghanistan.¹³⁷ The question is posed: Why did the American press ignore the story? The answers provide an interesting insight into the ongoing evolution of the war correspondent. Robert Frost once wrote, "Something there is that doesn't love a wall."¹³⁸ Afghanistan was full of such obstacles for the American press. First, it was a perilous situation requiring journalists to walk fourteen hours a day through mountains littered with land mines in search of a story. Secondly, there was no jungle, no war torn cities, no visual relief from the unending monotony of rock hardened mountains and turbaned men to match them. Third, the mujahedin were not fanatics and in many ways, did not make good copy. Finally, Kaplan writes, there were two types of war correspondents who braved the danger, those who were deeply committed to the mujahedin cause, or those who were danger freaks.¹³⁹ The others remained in hotels, complete with satellite hook-ups, lap-top computers, and digital phones to call in a story they could only see from a distance, if at all. The dangers are real for a war correspondent, and as the New York Times reported in April 1990, fifty-three instances of "killing the messenger" were recorded by Amnesty International in the previous year.¹⁴⁰ The dangers are real.

¹³⁷ R. D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990).

¹³⁸ Robert Frost, "Mending Wall", in Early Poems (New York: Avenel Books, 1981), 80.

¹³⁹ See Michael Herr's masterful description of these "danger junkies" in Dispatches, the record of his time in Viet Nam as a war correspondent.

¹⁴⁰ "Killing the Messenger", *New York Times*, 16 April 1990, Sec. 1, A16.

What has not been adequately explored is the influence of the war correspondent on the war itself. Eduardo R. Ulibarri examined the U. S. press and its coverage of the conflict in Central America. His conclusions were remarkably similar to Kaplan's, 1) ill-trained "stringers" and free-lancers caught up in some sort of ideological commitment; 2) as late as mid-1985 there were no major U.S. news television networks, wire services, or news weeklies with a full-time correspondent in Nicaragua; 3) no U.S. combat reporter was ever assigned to travel with the insurgents; 4) the U.S. press, instilled with the idea of a government-press adversarial relationship, transferred this relationship to Central American players who held attitudes and positions paralleling those of the U.S. government.¹⁴¹ The list could go on from his examples, and his agenda is also quite obvious, but it is difficult to counter the bare fact of an ill-trained journalist, purporting to be a war correspondent, and inadvertently dabbling in foreign policy because he provides a potential mouthpiece, instead of a clarion bell.

Concluding this brief examination of the many aspects of media diplomacy in a democratic society, the focus will now shift to the nuances of media diplomacy in a state-controlled system, and how that system is reacting to a media in transition.

¹⁴¹ Eduardo R. Ulibarri, 55-64. Walter Goodman writing for the *New York Times* comments on the problem when the journalist becomes the part of the news or helps to create the news in his piece "Jesse Jackson in Iraq: Reporter is the Story", 5 Sep 90, B1-2.

VL MEDIA IN THE USSR - A STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA IN TRANSITION

This chapter will examine the influence of the media in the realm of international relations, specifically the decline of the state-controlled system and transition to Glasnost during Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure to date in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Attention will be focused on Asia as a geographic testing zone for this new brand of diplomacy.

A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DIPLOMACY

A country's diplomacy may have several incarnations as a result of dominant personalities, its *Weltanschauung*, and the international environment. The Soviet Union has exhibited both continuities and discontinuities in this regard, and it may be said to have "...generational categories representing three schools of Soviet Diplomacy"¹⁴² dating from its inception following the revolution of 1917 to the current diplomatic initiatives launched by Gorbachev in the 1980s.

1. First Soviet School Of Diplomacy

The first Soviet School of diplomacy was exemplified by Chicherin and his successor Litvinov, who were noted for their learning, international sophistication, and diplomatic skill. These gentlemen would be the architects of Lenin's masterful bi-level diplomatic foreign policy. Officially, through the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Union re-established diplomatic relations with Germany by executing the Rapallo Treaty in 1922, thus ending both the Soviet Union's and Germany's diplomatic isolation as a

¹⁴² Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior 1979-1988: New Tests for US Diplomacy", Special Studies on Foreign Affairs Issues Vol II (Congressional Research Service, August 1988) 571.

result of World War I. Unofficially, the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) was convened in 1920 with the goal of exporting the revolution through adoption of the "twenty-one conditions" for membership.¹⁴³ The Comintern was an early attempt at global sovietization through a network of unofficial, supposedly non-governmental actors who were, in fact, practicing public diplomacy at an international level. Heller and Nekrich have noted the following phenomenon: "The lack of separation between diplomatic activity and the innovative moves of the Comintern was indicated by the fact that quite often Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad were at the same time officials of the Comintern."¹⁴⁴ This early blurring of the distinction between official and unofficial diplomacy would ultimately result in a loss of credibility for Soviet diplomatic efforts, and damaged diplomatic relations with Great Britain following the Zinoviev letter incident in 1924. However, the dual-track diplomacy was succeeding in both Germany and China, and so despite occasional reversals, it was considered a viable method of executing foreign policy. The Soviet Union's foreign policy during the Lenin years was essentially driven by three core maxims:

1. The Soviet Union was the most important factor of world revolution and thus its strengthening, combined with an equivalent strengthening of the world revolutionary movement for the sake of Soviet interests, was the revolutionary task of Communist parties in other countries.
2. Conflict between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries was inevitable, and the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries was a reserve force that could help Moscow.
3. The nature of capitalist countries was such that subversive revolutionary activity conducted against them did not exclude

¹⁴³ See Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *Utopia in Power* trans Phyllis B. Carlos (New York: Summit Books, 1986) 123-5 for a complete discussion of this subject.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 210-11.

the possibility of carrying on normal diplomatic and trade relations with them.¹⁴⁵

National, not international, priorities were the dominant factor. These precepts would be put in a temporary holding pattern once the Soviet Union became involved in the Great Patriotic War.

2. Second Soviet School Of Diplomacy

The second Soviet School of diplomacy may be dated from the replacement of Foreign Minister Litvinov by Vyacheslav Molotov in May 1939. Prior to Litvinov's dismissal, Stalin was, to a significant degree, a shadow player in the realm of Soviet foreign policy. Infrequently granting interviews and never meeting foreign diplomats, Stalin entrusted those aspects to Litvinov. As a result of the East Pact or Litvinov Protocol signed in 1929, Litvinov was seen as representative of the public line of Soviet policy; a policy based on collective security and resistance to aggression. His dismissal and subsequent replacement by Molotov, a staunch Stalin crony and collaborator, signaled that Stalin was firmly in charge of Soviet foreign policy, and without a Jewish Foreign Minister, was ready to deal with the Germans. This was the first of several Litvinov/Molotov switches Stalin would make as his foreign policy goals and needs shifted.¹⁴⁶ During the latter part of the 1930s, Stalin ordered a purge which included the Chicherin generation of diplomats; these learned, creative, sophisticated, and skillful men were to be replaced by parochial, orthodox Stalinists who could either support Stalin's version of foreign policy or become victims of "the meat grinder" as Khrushchev would term the terror.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 213; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II 3rd ed.(Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989) 34.

¹⁴⁶ I am indebted to Professor Claude A. Buss, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School for this observation.

¹⁴⁷ Heller and Nekrich, 309-11; Rubinstein, 43-5; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 572-3.

Ever since the rise of Hitler, the world-wide Communist movement was relegated to the periphery of Stalin's foreign policy. Stalin found himself executing an intricate dance of alternating cooperation and confrontation in dealing with his foes. The issue was survival of the Soviet Union, and the solution lay not in secret treaties with Germany or Japan, but with the allied powers. A gesture was necessary to confirm Stalin's common purpose with the allies and so, the dissolution of the Comintern was announced effective May 22, 1943, basically as a sop to Roosevelt. This multifaceted tool, characterized by the establishment and manipulation of political front organizations; support for revolutionary movements abroad; use of mass media and propaganda; use of cultural and commercial organizations for espionage, was to exist no more. In actuality, the Comintern was not dissolved. Instead the headquarters was relocated to an undisclosed part of Moscow and it continued to function in secret. When World War II was over, Stalin resurrected it as the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1946 as a response to the war-altered world power relationships. Cominform goals bore a strong similarity to its predecessor: consolidate the forces of the international Communist movement, coordinate the efforts of the Communist parties in their struggle for power with the capitalist system, and achieve this through the same dual-track foreign policy which appeared to have been so successful in the past. Litvinov had survived the purges of the 1930s, but presented a pessimistic viewpoint of the new Soviet diplomatic directions. He stated.

...the differences between East and West have gone too far to be reconciled... there has been a return in Russia to the outmoded concept of security in terms of territory - the more you've got, the safer you are...the root cause is the ideological conception prevailing (in Moscow) that conflict between the Communist and capitalist world is inevitable.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War (New York: Stein and Day, 1974) 12-13; Vojtech Mastny, "The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War" Foreign Affairs Vol 54, No. 2 (January 1976) 366-76.

And so Litvinov was discarded, and Molotov recalled once again. Foreign policy was dictated not by Communist ideology, but by Stalinist ideology. As Lenin had learned in the Soviet Union's infancy, so Stalin would learn, that the art and practice of diplomacy had many schools.

3. Third Soviet School Of Diplomacy

The third Soviet School of Diplomacy, epitomized by Gorbachev, had its evolutionary beginnings during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. The "thaw" engineered by Khrushchev as part of his de-Stalinization efforts had a profound effect on the Soviet diplomatic community. Former ministers were sent as ambassadors to different countries, which meant that career diplomats had lost their monopoly on ambassadorial posts. The role of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stalin's stooge Molotov, became increasingly less important. Khrushchev's Twentieth Party Congress secret speech of 1956 was the harbinger of *glasnost*. The intelligentsia became a reliable base of support for Khrushchev.¹⁴⁹ All aspects of the media were used by Khrushchev to reinforce the de-Stalinization campaign by publishing such works as "The Heirs of Stalin" in *Pravda*; "Terror in the Outer World", a satire of contemporary Soviet society in *Izvetsia*; Silence and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in *Novy Mir*.¹⁵⁰ This pattern of media manipulation was to be extended on the international front as well. Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law, was named editor-in-chief of *Izvetsia* and a member of the Party's Central Committee. In control of the mass media and attempting to obtain control of foreign affairs¹⁵¹ in addition, he alienated both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the ministry's organization as a whole. The ranks of the anti-Khrushchev camp were swelling.

¹⁴⁹ Heller and Nekrich, 599.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 589.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 599.

Foreign policy during Khrushchev's tenure may be summed up by Adam Ulam when he wrote:

...thus between 1957 and 1962 Khrushchev's regime pursued two apparently contradictory policies; one of militant Communist expansionism designed to weaken the West's position or to push it out of Berlin, the Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America; and the other a strenuous search for accommodation (or more) with the United States.¹⁵²

This expansion and coexistence identified by Ulam was the key element in the post-Stalin era's foreign policy.

The Foreign Ministry during Brezhnev's tenure was characterized by organizational stability, bureaucratic conservatism, depolitization, and increasing professionalism.¹⁵³ However, it was hampered by a certain lack of creativity and its essentially negative approach.¹⁵⁴ The Brezhnev Doctrine, a term coined by Western journalists, was outlined in *Pravda* as a justification for the Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia in 1968. His basic premise was that the Soviet Union had not only a right, but an obligation to intervene in the affairs of a fellow Communist country when, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, the global interests of socialism were being threatened.¹⁵⁵ Using this one incident as illustrative of the media's importance and power in the Brezhnevian political machine, Heller and Nekrich write:

Twelve years later a significant part of the population accepted the invasion in Czechoslovakia as necessary and just. Soviet propaganda put forward as its main justification the alleged threat posed by West Germany...The Soviet propaganda machine succeeded in executing a masterwork of disinformation. The broad coalition government of Willy Brandt was portrayed as the direct successor to Hitler. The propaganda machine also availed itself of the feeling

¹⁵² Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973* 2nd ed (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1974) 606; Claude A. Buss offers an alternative explanation in that Khrushchev was attempting to counter the United States, and therefore only cooperated when he viewed the situation as lacking any viable alternative.

¹⁵³ Committee on Foreign Affairs, 573.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 263-7.

¹⁵⁵ Ulam, 738-45; Heller and Nekrich, 623-9; Rubinstein 118-23.

diligently nurtured in the Soviet people that the world should be grateful to the Soviet Union for the sacrifices it had suffered...during the war with Nazi Germany, and for the assistance it had rendered, was now providing and would continue to give to the "fraternal countries". The press harped incessantly on the "ingratitude of the Czechs and Slovaks"... and this argument struck a chord in many Soviet citizens.¹⁵⁶

Although this effort did not entirely silence the dissident voices in the Soviet Union, it did manage to prevent complete world ostracism by employing the media to present their action in terms of a national and internal problem. The borders of socialism were involved and these extended as far as the Iron Curtain.

Perestroika, the hallmark of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy, intimated a comprehensive overhaul of the Soviet system of diplomacy. The subtitle of his book *Perestroika* "New Thinking for Our Country and the World" emphasized the international flavor of Gorbachev's initiatives. The 27th Party Congress speech in 1986 outlined his requirements for admission to the Gorbachev school of diplomacy.

1. Domestic and foreign affairs must be perceived as intertwined;
2. New concepts *perestroika* and *glasnost*, must be adopted and archaic stereotypes eliminated;
3. A realistic, creative approach was essential in diplomacy and negotiations to overcome the "Mr. Nyet" image of yesteryear.
4. The foreign ministry and embassies abroad must expose their problems to the cleansing effects of *glasnost*, thus generating a spiritual renewal.
5. Modesty, understanding, and mutual respect were necessary in relations with the socialist countries.
6. New initiatives were required in achieving Soviet goals in the Asian-Pacific region and an active promotion of good relations with China.
7. Improvement in diplomatic relations with the European community was essential.
8. Soviet policy in the Third World had to be more carefully rationalized and the Soviet presence more efficiently structured.

¹⁵⁶ Hiller and Nekrich, 627. It may be questioned whether this is actually an example of disinformation or merely an alternative interpretation. The point is that the media was effectively used to influence attitudes. Although it should be noted that in an instance such as this, a predisposition to the message would make it easier to accept psychologically, thus resulting in an attitude change.

9. Soviet diplomats had to confront the West directly on the human rights issue, emphasizing the "truly impressive" gains made in the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁷

His concept of "a contradictory but interconnected, interdependent, and essentially, integral world"¹⁵⁸ is the foundation upon which the Soviet Union is building its latest version of foreign policy. The key difference, however, appears to be Gorbachev's view of the media and its role in diplomacy and negotiations. Gorbachev and *glasnost* are the new coin of the realm, for in a world experiencing the Information Revolution and interconnectivity via live satellite transmissions, the illusion of a western-style creation of, and catering to , public opinion is, for all practical purposes, mandatory. The media is charged with increasing its effectiveness for "no radical change is possible without it (*glasnost*, criticism, and self-criticism). There is no democracy, nor can there be, without *glasnost*. And there is no present-day socialism, nor can there be, without democracy."¹⁵⁹ The media is then co-opted to become a significant player in the government's diplomatic effort.

B. OFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF SOVIET MEDIA DIPLOMACY

As presented in Chapter I, media diplomacy has, in the past, been primarily a Western phenomenon. With the advent of *glasnost* in the Soviet Union, its influence is spreading. A truly state-controlled system determines what the media will and will not report, and when. With the *glasnost* imperative, this is beginning to change. The question in regard to the Soviet Union is: Who are these practitioners of foreign policy?

¹⁵⁷ Report on basic theses of Speech by Gorbachev at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 23, 1986 "Time for Restructuring" Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannyka del SSSR in Russian, No. 1, August 5, 1987, trans in FBIS: Daily Report: Soviet Union, August 18, 1987, 1-3; FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union Sep 2, 1987 23-5; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 577.

¹⁵⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987) 139.

¹⁵⁹ Gorbachev, 79.

1. Embassy Information Officer

Similarities between diplomats and journalists, and the general tasks of a press attache were explored in the previous chapter. As noted before, the definition of a press or information attache will, in fact, alter somewhat when the practitioner himself is asked to elaborate on the functional aspects of his job.

Miloslav Chrobok, Second Secretary (Press and Political Affairs), Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

1. Determine how to reach the American press - the information is made available to them but how to ensure that it is actually published. The problem is that:
 - a) US readers are interested in the pragmatic and the practical. Czechs are interested in the political, i.e. foreign policy.
 - b) US press is essentially local and not national.¹⁶⁰
 - c) US press is expensive, i.e. advertising.
 - d) US press is self-reliant, i.e. staff reporters are used with greater frequency than are free lance.
2. Supply the press and others with information brochures.
3. Assist US journalists traveling to Czechoslovakia.
4. Engage in public relations or propaganda.¹⁶¹

Yuri Ivanovitch Bobrakov, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Union of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. Diplomatic official dealing with the press.
2. Speaker at press receptions, civic gatherings, university functions, etc.
3. Aid American correspondents assigned to Moscow in terms of filing appropriate paperwork.
4. Avid reader who pays special attention to material in the local press that is related to his country and its policy, economy, culture, history, and current events - the life of its people.
5. Rebut inaccuracies in the local press.
6. Promulgate the aims of Soviet foreign policy i.e. providing for peaceful conditions for the construction of socialism and

¹⁶⁰ These comments are twenty years prior to the establishment of *USA Today*, national editions of the *New York Times*, etc. However, UPI, AP, the *International Herald Tribune* as well as some newspapers with international bureaus were functioning in the Washington, DC area at the time.

¹⁶¹ M. Chrobok, "Promoting Czechoslovakia in the United States" in Lee, 111-15.

communism, of strengthening the principles of peaceful coexistence and promote peace in the world.¹⁶²

These two examples serve as representative of the post-Khrushchev/pre-Gorbachev perceptions of the relationship between the official diplomatic media and the unofficial diplomatic media.

2. TASS and Novosti

The mass media usually includes newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and film. The Soviet term is "media of mass information and propaganda (SMIP)", with an expanded definition to include the theatre and book publishing. Mickiewicz notes that "increasingly, in the Gorbachev era, SMI is used, dropping 'propaganda' from the term."¹⁶³ The two key players in the State news agencies are: TASS, the telegraphic agency of the Soviet Union; and Novosti which may be considered analogous to the USIA. Of the two however, TASS remains the "acknowledged authoritative spokesman for the Soviet political bureaucracy in affairs of State."¹⁶⁴ TASS was established as the central organ of information in the USSR in 1935, which gave it a virtual monopoly in terms of information distribution about the USSR in foreign countries; in the distribution of foreign or All-Union information within the USSR, and of all domestic information from one Union republic to another. This situation would remain unchanged until the arrival of Novosti in 1961. Novosti's functions include: 1) distribute feature material abroad and at home;¹⁶⁵ 2) work with the foreign mass media to gain a "good press" for the Soviet

¹⁶² Y. Bobrakov, "Red Square to Pennsylvania Avenue" in Lee, 119-20, 127.

¹⁶³ Ellen Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work: Soviet Society and Communications" in Soviet Society Under Gorbachev ed. by M. Friedberg and H. Isham (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987) 133.

¹⁶⁴ Robert Conquest, ed., The Politics of Ideas in the USSR (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1976) 75; M. W. Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Westview Publishing Co., Inc., 1970) 265; Jeffrey T. Richelson, Sword and Shield (Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1986) 24.

¹⁶⁵ Unlike USIA which is prohibited from distributing its product within the United States.

government; 3) prepare written and photographic material concerning domestic and foreign affairs of the Soviet Union for the foreign mass media; 4) supply the Soviet mass media with materials on political, economic, scientific, and cultural developments in foreign countries; 5) publish magazines, newspapers, and brochures designed to acquaint foreign readers with the Soviet Union. Novosti established a television section in 1964, created its own book publishing organization, and became one of the sponsors of Radio Station Peace and Progress. Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law, sat on Novosti's original board of directors. Conquest noted that Novosti functioned almost as Khrushchev's personal public relations agency during his tenure.¹⁶⁶

3. KGB and Disinformation

The *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* or Committee for State Security's role in media diplomacy derives from its First Chief Directorate or Foreign Directorate with Service A or Active Measures Service. Originally created in 1958 as the Department of Disinformation, Service A mans an entire section of the Novosti Press Agency, works closely with the International Department, the Department of Socialist Countries, and the Propaganda and Information Department of the Central Committee Secretariat.¹⁶⁷ These active measures include an impressive range of practices such as written and oral "disinformation" (forgeries, false rumors), "gray" and "black" propaganda, manipulation or control of foreign media assets, political action and "agent of influence" operations, clandestine radio stations, semi-clandestine use of foreign communist parties and international front and special action organizations, staged or manipulated demonstrations

¹⁶⁶ Conquest, 79.

¹⁶⁷ John Barrow, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983) 444-50; Brian Freemantle, *KGB: Inside the World's Largest Intelligence Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982); Richelson, 24; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disinformation", *Strategic Review* (Winter 1981) Vol IX, No. 1, 16-26.

and even in the past, blackmail and kidnapping.¹⁶⁸ The support of the KGB for Soviet foreign propaganda is almost completely at the covert, or "black" end of the operational spectrum. "White" operations are conducted by the International Information Department and the Foreign Ministry through the embassy information/press attaches. "Grey" operations are the responsibility of the fronts, parties, and various movements under the nominal auspices of the International Information Department.¹⁶⁹ The International Department is credited with the creation and operation of clandestine radio stations, located either within the Soviet Union proper or in the Bloc Countries as of 1986. There are two such stations whose target audience is in Turkey - "Our Radio" and "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party", which used to transmit from Magdeburg, East Germany,¹⁷⁰ as well as the "National Voice of Iran" which commenced operations from the Baku area in 1959, and of course, the original "Radio Moscow". Disinformation, and the definition thereof, is a slippery sort of character. It is not simply falsified information or incorrect data, as it may include a judicious blend of false data with material and images containing elements of truth. The difference is the information has been manipulated in a number of ways, i.e. grossly exaggerated, deliberately misleading, and passed to a pre-selected target audience in order to fall in line with some given Soviet objective or policy line.

Propaganda is the handmaiden to disinformation, but it "it lacks the precision and bite of disinformation."¹⁷¹ The term propaganda is of religious origin. In 1622, the Roman

¹⁶⁸ Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda, February 6, 1980, reprinted with editing as Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980) II-4; See Alain Jaubert's Making People Disappear (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1986), 7-38, 77-96, 145-56, 165-74 which traces the Soviet tradition of altering official photographs in order to substantiate historical revisionism.

¹⁶⁹ Paul A. Smith, Jr. "Propaganda: A Modernized Soviet Weapons System" *Strategic Review* (Summer 1983) Vol XI No. 3, 65-70.

¹⁷⁰ Richelson, 153.

¹⁷¹ "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign", *Congressional Record-House*, September 28, 1965, 25391.

Catholic Church created a commission of cardinals charged with supervising the activities of Catholic missions and it was entitled the *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* or Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, or even more literally, "concerning the faith to be spread." Although its first appearance in English was in 1718, it was not until 1842 that the term propaganda was expanded to include any concerted movement (not strictly a religious-oriented activity) for the spreading of any and all ideas. Propaganda is neither good nor bad, it is simply a method to preserve an ideology, its unity, and possibly expand its scope. Internal propaganda may consist of addresses, writings, or conversations. Externally, there is the propagation.¹⁷² In the Soviet case, propaganda is media diplomacy both officially, and clandestinely.

C. UNOFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF SOVIET MEDIA DIPLOMACY

1. Samizdat

The Soviet Union does not have a mechanism in place which could be defined as unofficial media diplomacy, although if Gorbachev's initiatives are carried out in the spirit and intent in which they were first proposed, such elements may soon come into being. The media to a large degree was the state and vice versa. The dissident movement with its creation of *samizdat* - self-published or underground literature - was since 1966, the Soviet Union's only unofficial advocacy journalism. Focused on human rights issue, the dissident movement in the Soviet Union found itself in the quandary of having no viable means of putting its message across within the country, while being somewhat more successful on the international front through the use of petitions, letters, etc. A method had to be found to circulate information internally. Natalia Gorbanevskaya, a poet and translator, solved the dilemma by founding the unofficial journal *A Chronicle of Current*

¹⁷² Professor T. K. Noss, "Logic and Propaganda" a lecture delivered at the Naval War College September 1, 1961, published in *Naval War College Review* (December 1961) Vol XIV No. 4, 1-16 ; Hans Graf Huyn, "Webs of Soviet Disinformation" *Strategic Review* (Fall 1984) Vol XII No. 4, 51-58.

Events in 1968. Finally suppressed in the mid-1980s, the *Chronicle* had been the sole source of information regarding arrests made, results of court proceedings, and labor camp conditions.¹⁷³

2. Standards and Styles of Journalism

Everette E. Dennis describes four different standards and styles of journalism which in turn reflect different values and appeal to different outlooks and views. These are:

1. Public Affairs Reporting - which assumes coverage of politics and government is preeminent, deserving of surveillance, and consistent monitoring. The result tends to accentuate the negative.
2. Problem-Solution Journalism - looks at the world as a series of problems - public or private - which can be corrected with alternative solutions. Tends to be slightly negative.
3. Descriptive-Analytic Journalism - delivers long stories that include description, detailed explanation, and exploration with a human interest angle and a link to large humanistic problems.
4. Marketing Approach Journalism - special sections in the newspaper or local news segments linked to market research and public tastes.¹⁷⁴

In a state-controlled system, all of the official media was advocacy journalism, the government's viewpoint only. Public Affairs reporting accentuated the negativism of the capitalist world while extolling the virtues of the Communist. Problem-solution journalism always offered the same solution --- greater adherence to the latest Five Year Plan. Descriptive-Analytic journalism glorified the latest party *apparatchik* or tireless toiler for the socialist cause.

¹⁷³ Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972); Joshua Rubenstein, "Dissent" in The Soviet Union Today 2nd ed. ed. by James Cracraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) 64-76; Richelson, 250.

¹⁷⁴ E. E. Dennis, "American Media and American Values" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LIV No. 11, (March 15, 1988) 351.

3. Soviet Media Elite

What is the profile of the Soviet "media elite"? Professional journalists receive their training at one of the following universities: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov, and Sverdlovsk, each of which has a faculty of Journalism. About fifty percent will obtain their degree from Moscow State University.¹⁷⁵ Foreign correspondents are required to know at least two foreign languages. The most interesting aspects of the Soviet Union's "media elite" are that there is only one professional union, journalists achieve their positions based on the *Nomenklatura* system of personnel selection, a strict division exists between national and international correspondents, and since it is or was a mass press, "non-professional writers" are also given an opportunity to contribute.¹⁷⁶ It should be noted that these non-professionals are usually party, governmental employees, and the occasional man in the street, all of whose efforts, in the past, would have been scrutinized closely by *Gavlit* (the Chief Administration on Matters of the Press and Literature) and duly censored. The effect of *glasnost* on journalists will be discussed in the next section. It should be noted here, however, that journalism had created an "information vacuum"¹⁷⁷ and a journalistic style unique to the Soviet Union, i. e. extremely dry, tailored to express the Marxist-Leninist view (party line), reflected long-term national interests rather than the public mood, two-dimensional or shallow in nature, didactic. Journalistic efforts in the USSR did not have to meet deadlines, consequently speed of service to the subscriber was not an imperative, adherence to *Gavlit's* standards was.

¹⁷⁵ Terry Heyns, *American and Soviet Relations Since Detente* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987) 35; See Eleanor Blau, "Soviet TV Journalist at Work in U. S." *New York Times*, (19 Apr 90), B4 profiling one of the soviet media elite gaining experience with the American free press as a member of the WWOR-TV team in New Jersey.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 73; Mickiewicz, 294; Conquest, 73.

¹⁷⁷ Hedrick Smith, *The Russians rev ed.* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976) 459-501.

D. GLASNOST

Cultural liberalization by Gorbachev has had its greatest impact on the mass media, altering both the content and the style. *Glasnost* appears to serve two functions: 1) to reveal failures in many aspects of government, the economy, and society, thus building a support base for reform measures; 2) to expose officials who are incompetent or who abuse their power and to apply pressure for their removal.¹⁷⁸ Public criticism directed by the state is not a new phenomenon, but linkage of said criticism to explicit reform objectives with its attendant publicity is a new wrinkle.¹⁷⁹ The key political appointee is Alexander Yakolev, who in the summer of 1985 became Head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee - a position he had forfeited in 1973 for criticizing nationalist tendencies in Soviet journalism. His star has been in the ascendancy, as evidenced by his rapid rise in the party apparatus: Central Committee Secretary for Propaganda and Agitation at the 27th Congress (early 1986), candidate member of the Politburo (January 1987), full member of the Politburo (June 1987). He is considered to be "a key Gorbachev foreign policy advisor...whose role in propaganda includes an international aspect."¹⁸⁰

1. New Journalistic Imperatives

Soviet journalists are now charged by Gorbachev to perform the following functions:

1. Channel for expressing the people's will, reflecting their views.
2. Initiate a dialogue rather than a monologue.
3. Its critical faculties should always be based on the truth, which in turn depends on the conscience of the author and the editor, or his sense of responsibility to the people.

¹⁷⁸ Herbert J. Ellison, "Gorbachev and Reform: An Introduction" in Gorbachev and the Soviet Future ed. by L. W. Lerner and D. W. Treadgold (Colorado: Westview Press, 1988) 9.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 13.

4. Unite and mobilize people rather than disuniting them and generating offense.
5. Discuss public and state issues.
6. Broaden control by the public.
7. Counter the efforts of Western information imperialism.
8. *Glasnost* and *Operativnost* (openness and timeliness) are the fundamentals.¹⁸¹

This represents Gorbachev's direct challenge to the traditional attitude of Soviet governments towards criticism of policy decisions, it was an invitation to open debate. Public participants in this foreign policy debate include: the International Department of the Central Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, the press and the intelligentsia.¹⁸²

2. Debate and Dissension in the Ranks

The advent of *glasnost* has itself, engendered debate, speculation, and criticism, not only in the Soviet press, but also in the Western press.¹⁸³ Krasnov views *glasnost* not as an abolition of censorship, but a greater opportunity for Soviet citizens to voice their opinion; not as a gift, but as an exchange for their support of economic perestroika and to narrow the credibility gap between propaganda and reality. Bukovsky accuses Gorbachev of "high-jacking" the 1960s dissident movement's slogans. *Glasnost* under Gorbachev is a sham because the "...Party still maintains a monopoly on the truth" and is once again,

¹⁸¹ Gorbachev, 76-9; Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work", 142-5.

¹⁸² J. E. Mroz, "Soviet Foreign Policy and New Thinking" *International Affairs Moscow ed.* (May 1990) 25.

¹⁸³ See C. Z. Wick, "Glasnost" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LIII No. 14 (May 1, 1988) 418-20; C. Z. Wick, "Global Interdependence and the War of Ideas" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LIX No. 11 (March 15, 1988) 327-30; V. Krasnov, "Beyond Gorbachev" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LIV No. 13 (April 15, 1988) 393-6; V. Krasnov, "The Soviet Union and the Asian-Pacific Region in the 1990s" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LV No. 6 (Jan 1, 1989) 164-6; N. Patterson "The Struggle of Memory Against Forgetting" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LV No. 4 (Dec 1, 1988) 101-7; M. Warder, "Is Glasnost Genuine?" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LV No. 11 (Mar 15, 1989) 341-4; V. Bukovsky, "Glasnost - Genuine Change or Illusion?" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LIII No. 19 (Jul 15, 1987) 596-600; A. Pankin, "Glasnost in Foreign Policy: Ultimate Goal and Intermediate Stages" *International Affairs Moscow ed.* (Mar 1989) 104-8; A. Pankin, "Diplomacy and International Journalism" *International Affairs Moscow ed.* (June 1989) 94-8; V. Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy to the Information Culture" *The Soviet Review* Vol 30 No. 5 (Sep/Oct 1989) 18-35; S. N. Kondrashov, "An Accurate Image of the World", *The Soviet Review* Vol XXIX No. 4 (Winter 1988/89) 87-99.

demonstrating its skill at manipulating world opinion in an attempt to obtain economic benefits. Michael Warder also views this top-down version of openness as suspect and states that *glasnost* is "...first of all, a political term currently used by the Party and its leadership." He questions equation of *glasnost* with a Western definition of free speech when he points out that criticism of Lenin is not permitted, no legal non-Government press or publishing activities are in existence, Soviet disinformation machine is still in place, etc. Patterson outlines the cycles of *glasnost* which have occurred in the Soviet Union since 1921 to the present, and concludes that "...most are reversed; many are outright deceptions, and others are just a lot of political blather."¹⁸⁴ Charles Wick, former Director of USIA, is probably the most pragmatic when he states,

Glasnost is a marketing strategy targeted to the peoples, to the world. The image is one of openness designed to present an image-with-appeal to the West, create Soviet-informed world public opinion, and pressure free world governments to act in a way favorable to Soviet interests.¹⁸⁵

Wick remains hopeful that it won't simply become "gloss-over-nost."

The most telling comments however, come from within the Soviet Union's ranks of journalists. Interestingly enough, a similar theme is sounded, perhaps most frequently by Alexei Pankin: "First, *glasnost* should be proclaimed indivisible; it should be equal in all regions and spheres. Second, the freedom of personal opinion should be ensured. And third, the right to receive and issue information should be placed solely on a legal basis."¹⁸⁶ The mere fact that these concerns have been articulated in the Soviet press indicates the transitional and ephemeral nature of Gorbachev's initiative to date. Pankin and Rubanov both come to the same conclusion, the lack of a specific concept of national security, and subsequent articulation of the national interest have continued to hamper journalistic efforts

¹⁸⁴ Patterson, 106.

¹⁸⁵ Wick, "Glasnost", 420.

¹⁸⁶ A. Pankin "Glasnost in Foreign Policy: Ultimate Goal and Intermediate Stages", 107-8.

in the foreign policy arena.¹⁸⁷ Areas still censored include: some facts of history, relations with allies, cases of rectifying mistakes in such a way so as not to lose face, and a vast amount of factual information concerned primarily with defense.¹⁸⁸ Kondrashov argues that with the advent of *glasnost*, international journalists have failed to keep pace with their domestic counterparts because despite all the rhetoric of global interdependence, reporting of Soviet life is more pertinent, important, and interesting to the average Soviet citizen than it was in the past. Foreign Soviet correspondents, additionally, have experienced difficulty in meshing two essentially antithetical approaches to news reporting: 1) the sober realistic viewpoint of foreign life and politics, as far as possible without filters or blinders; 2) the set viewpoint illustrative rather than investigatory, focused on dogma.¹⁸⁹

He is in agreement with Gorbachev that the journalist is the spokesman of public opinion, but in a society increasingly preoccupied with national issues, and still denied access to foreign policy information, this restructuring is not occurring. Unofficial media diplomacy appears to be an issue in the Soviet Union, not because hasn't evolved during the transitional phase of *glasnost* but because it has done so at a pace too slow for the Information Revolution.

E. GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

1. General Outlines

Historically, Soviet foreign policy rested on three basic maxims: 1) imperative to control territory; 2) imperative of amassing as much military force as possible; 3) practice

¹⁸⁷ Pankin, "Diplomacy and International Journalism", 94; Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy to the Information Culture", 34.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 95; Ibid, 26-8.

¹⁸⁹ Kondrashov, "An Accurate Image of the World", 92.

of economic autarky.¹⁹⁰ Gorbachev, in his book Perestroika and in numerous speeches since, has reassessed past foreign policy and concluded the following:

1. Common interest of all nations demands peaceful coexistence between the two systems of socialism and capitalism in order to ensure survival.
2. Ideological conflict between the two systems should not be extended to the sphere of peaceful coexistence.
3. Security is achievable not by military-technical means alone, but through political means as well.
4. Interdependence requires international or collective security.
5. Domestic and foreign policy must complement each other.¹⁹¹

In order to achieve these goals, Gorbachev has opened a dialogue with the world, one in which he espouses support for public or citizen diplomacy wherein the peoples of the world are addressed directly, and thereby, invited to share in the diplomatic process. In an effort to narrow this field of vision, a brief examination of Gorbachev's foreign policy goals in the Asia-Pacific region and the examples of the methods of media diplomacy used to date will be discussed in the next section.

2. Asia-Pacific Knot

The "Asia-Pacific"¹⁹² or "Strategic Quadrangle" has played an increasingly important role in Gorbachev's foreign policy rhetoric. His goals appear to be: 1) create a more benign strategic environment in Asia and the Pacific for Soviet strategic interests; 2) transform the USSR into a legitimate power player in the region; 3) stake a claim for Moscow in Asia's dynamic economy; 4) politically isolate the United States

¹⁹⁰ Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, The Global Rivals (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988) 175-7.

¹⁹¹ Gorbachev, Ch. 3; Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) 297-9; Viacheslav Dashivhev, "East-West Quest for New Relations: The Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy" in Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press ed. by Isacc J. Tarasulo (Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1990) 225-37; F. Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World (California: The RAND Corporation, 1989) 5-9.

¹⁹² Gorbachev, 180; Bialer, 141.

through denial rather than intimidation.¹⁹³ His task is to undo the Brezhnev legacy of military intimidation and virulent rhetoric. Specifically, he outlined his foreign policy goals at Vladivostok, beginning with the premise that "...the Soviet Union is ...an Asian and a Pacific country" thus identifying the USSR as much more than simply an Eastern European power. His proposals included the establishment of a cooperative framework in the Helsinki style; offered closer bilateral relations with China, Japan, individual members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); support for reduction of naval activity and anti-submarine capabilities in the Asian and Pacific waters; creation of nuclear-free zones and other confidence-building measures; and Soviet leadership in convening an Asian and Pacific conference as a step toward forging a regional security system.¹⁹⁴

Two years later, speaking at a meeting at Krasnoyarsk with representatives of the Krasnoyarsk Kray, his closing remarks would turn to the international front, more specifically the Asian-Pacific region. Seven new proposals for Pan-Asiatic security were advanced, ranging from reduction of naval forces, base closures, and the like, to establishment of a negotiating mechanism, flexibility and liberalization in economic enterprises, and transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.¹⁹⁵ These two speeches have been considered the keynotes in Gorbachev's overture to the Asian-Pacific region. Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk represent masterful examples of official media diplomacy. The question is, what constitutes official media diplomacy methods, and more specifically, what other examples may be gleaned from Gorbachev's activities?

¹⁹³ Lief Rosenberger and M. Leighton, "Gorbachev's New Strategic Designs for Asia" in Security, Strategy, and Policy Response in the Pacific Rim ed by Y. W. Kihl and L. E. Grinter (Colorado: Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989) 55, 69.

¹⁹⁴ M. S. Gorbachev, "International Affairs: Asia and the Pacific Region" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LII No. 23 (Sep 15, 1986) 706-11.

¹⁹⁵ Speech by M. S. Gorbachev to Krasnoyarsk workers 16 September 1988, trans in FBIS: Daily Report: Soviet Union 19 September 1988, 43-60.

F. MEDIA DIPLOMACY METHODS

1. Official Soviet Publications

The publication of official news magazines is an avenue pursued by the Soviet embassies through the offices of Novosti. Various publications include: *Soviet Land* in India in twelve different languages; *Soviet Weekly* in England; *Soviet Union Today* in Japan; and *Soviet Life* in the United States; Additionally, the production, loan, or rental of embassy documentary films, television program, and videotapes are made available to the public as part of the media diplomatic efforts.

2. Birth of New Age Soviet Media

The Birth of the new age Soviet media may be traced to Gorbachev's activities prior to, during, and after the 1985 Geneva Summit meeting.¹⁹⁶ Gorbachev's use of a post-summit press conference, scant minutes after the closing ceremony, was not only a masterful example of capitalizing on a media opportunity, but also a clear signal of his understanding of the linkage between the negotiation itself and the influential nature of the external environment. The media was his bridge between the two.

3. Asia-Pacific Media Events: A Test Case

In a speech in the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on November 27, 1985,¹⁹⁷ he debriefed the members on the events of Geneva and raised the issue of the importance of the Asian and Pacific regions. This theme would be expanded in 1986 in Vladivostok, in 1987 in his book *Perestroika*, and in 1988 in Krasnoyarsk. Two significant media events occurred with regard to China during this time frame as well: 1) Moscow ceased broadcasting from its clandestine Ba Yi radio station¹⁹⁸ which had been used to broadcast

¹⁹⁶ See Committee on Foreign Affairs p 310 for a succinct summary of this event and the Soviet media's part in it.

¹⁹⁷ M. Gorbachev, "The Geneva Meeting: Domestic and Foreign Policies" *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol LII No. 7 (January 15, 1986) 194-203.

¹⁹⁸ C. M. Ekedahl and M. A. Goodman, "Gorbachev's 'New Directions' in Asia" *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* Vol VIII No. 3 (Fall 1989) 6.

disinformation within the Chinese People's Liberation Army; 2) the Chinese published an interview with Gorbachev in their weekly paper *Liaowang*, the first time a Soviet General Secretary had been given access to the Chinese media in three decades.¹⁹⁹ Media diplomacy was beginning to display results.

Gorbachev's "charm offensive" and "smile diplomacy"²⁰⁰ has begun to make inroads with other Asian-Pacific nations as well. Although China has been the major beneficiary of Soviet attention and media blitz, Japan has hosted Shevardnadze, and is preparing for a future Gorbachev visit. The Soviet-Indian relationship has been touted as the premier example of good interstate relations and one worthy of emulation.²⁰¹ In 1986 Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi conducted a joint news conference at which time the New Delhi Declaration was announced. A cursory examination of the transcript from that press conference²⁰² reveals three interesting points: 1) Gorbachev's speech lasted three times as long as Gandhi's; 2) Gorbachev fielded twelve questions to Gandhi's five; 3) Vladivostok themes were reiterated and expanded upon. It was, most emphatically, a Soviet show. One final example of media diplomacy by Gorbachev concerns the interview granted to the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka* in July 1987²⁰³ in which regional collective security was addressed yet again. The key difference was that he used this country's media to announce his double zero option/proposal for the elimination of intermediate range ballistic missiles. Indonesia, as a professed member of the non-aligned

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 9; E. Wishnick, "Soviet Asian Collective Security Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev" *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol VII No. 3 (Fall 1988) 9.

²⁰⁰ J. Poden and S. Ansovin, eds., *The Soviet Union* (New York: The H. W. Wilson, Co., 1988) 94; Fukuyama, 38; D. S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning?", *Foreign Affairs : America and the World* (1988/89), 126.

²⁰¹ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 186; Fukuyama.

²⁰² "Joint News Conference" with Rajiv Gandhi 28 November 1986 in *M. S. Gorbachov Speeches and Writings Vol II* ed. by R. Maxwell (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), 84-94.

²⁰³ L. Buszynski, "International Linkages and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy", *Pacific Affairs* (Summer 1988), Vol 61 No. 2, 222; Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 181-2.

movement, saw its prestige increase when this story broke. Gorbachev achieved two goals with this media diplomatic effort: the Soviet Union publicized as not only a leader but an innovator in the realm of arms control, and Indonesia as a willing ASEAN partner. These examples represent a microcosm of the Gorbachev media diplomacy offensive in the Asia-Pacific region. What are the implications of this diplomacy for the Soviet Union in the futures?

G. IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MEDIA DIPLOMACY

Since diplomacy, both official and unofficial, is now in the process of being conducted through the media, what are the implications and ramifications of this method in the case of the Soviet Union?

The technological revolution altered both the form and the substance of international relations.²⁰⁴ Specifically, it 1) increased the influence of public opinion in world affairs; 205 2) added the cultivation of public opinion to the principal tasks of statecraft; 3) redirected some countries' energies and economies to compete on the "influence" level as well as on the military, economic, or cultural levels.²⁰⁶ The Soviet Union is one of those countries which is engaging in the public diplomacy that has so altered the classic style of foreign policy which used to be conducted in secret among elites. Johanna DeStefano, a sociolinguist and tele-educator, muses that "It is also possible that *glasnost* in the Soviet

²⁰⁴ Congress, House, Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, "The Future of United States Public Diplomacy" report submitted by Mr. Fascell, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 1969, rpt no. 91-30. Ch 1 traces the rise of this phenomenon.

²⁰⁵ The question of public opinion in the Soviet Union has been of long-standing interest to researchers for years. Since actual data on the state of Soviet public opinion were limited, Western scholars have tended to rely on historical interpretation. The Soviet Interview project was a study conducted in the late 1980s. See R. D. Grey, L. A. Jennisch, and A. Tyler, "Soviet Public Opinion and the Gorbachev Reforms", *Slavic Review*, (Summer 1990), Vol 49 No. 2, 261-71 for the results of this study.

²⁰⁶ James Cable, *Diplomacy at Sea* (Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 1985), 81-102.

Union is, in large part, a direct result of information exploding through the fingers of the bureaucrats whose sole job in the past has been to keep information from getting out."²⁰⁷

1. The Third Industrial Revolution

Gorbachev's biggest challenge and consequently, the greatest obstacle is the lack of an adequate infrastructure to support the Third Industrial Revolution - The Information Revolution. In the midst of "...the age of complex communication systems, the enormous and previously unimaginable expansion of information collection, retrieval, and exchange, in combination with the rapid change in durable consumer goods through electronics and miniaturization",²⁰⁸ the Soviet Union has found itself odd-man out. The Asian-Pacific region, with Japan considered one of the "Big Three" international information technology players, (the United States and the United Kingdom are the others.); Korea and Singapore with a significant share in the market, and the Peoples Republic of China representing a vast potential market,²⁰⁹ has resulted in a different type of strategic quadrangle powered by economics, electronics, and information, but ironically, one in which the USSR has no share. The USSR is far below the world standard in the implementation of advanced information technologies and the manufacture and use of modern computers.²¹⁰ "Information is power" is a maxim no less true in world diplomacy, however, the USSR finds itself lacking this currency.

2. The Language of Diplomacy

The world of diplomacy has seen a shift from French as the language of diplomacy to English. The rise of the United States as a superpower and the international spread of its

²⁰⁷ J. S. DeStefano, "The Growth of English as the Language of Global Satellite Telecommunications", *Space Communications and Broadcasting* (1989) Vol 6, 661-74

²⁰⁸ Bialer, 77.

²⁰⁹ D. H. Brandin and M. A. Harrison, *The Technology War* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987).

²¹⁰ W. P. Dizard and S. B. Swensrud, *Gorbachev's Information Revolution* (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1989); Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work", 132-3, 141-2.

influence through the media have resulted in another problem for the Soviets, as noted by DeStefano.

Most international news is gathered and disseminated by Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters -- headquartered in the United States and Britain, and written in English. As Wardhaugh has put it "English has become the lingua franca of the modern world." What is the effect of using English? Is it a mirror? a window? or a kaleidoscope, giving it a fractured, distorted image of the message? It is the language of wider communication (LWC), the link language.²¹¹

An editorial in *International Affairs* addresses this problem from the Soviet viewpoint and comes to the conclusion that a single information and political elite is emerging, and it is the West.²¹² If the Soviets do not have the capability to capitalize on this phenomenon then, their influence will continue to wane.

3. Media at the Crossroads

The art and practice of journalism is at a crossroads in the Soviet Union. Vadim Perfilyev, Deputy Head Information Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at a roundtable discussion sponsored by International Affairs ²¹³ raised several issues which have the potential to create more problems in the foreign policy area than they would solve. These included: introducing the practice of testing the soundness of diplomatic decisions with the aid of public opinion and democratic institutions, become accustomed to pluralism of views on foreign policy matters, realize that a publicly expressed opinion differing from the official point of view does not equal either a lack of patriotism or an attack on State interests. He cautions against lobbying and diversification of players in the journalistic foreign policy process but does not offer a solution to this

²¹¹ DeStefano, 461-74.

²¹² "Information Revolution: The Challenge", *International Affairs Moscow ed.* (April 1989), 60.

²¹³ International Affairs Guest Club, "Internationalizing the Dialogue and the Negotiating Process", *International Affairs Moscow ed.* (Feb 1989), 131-40.

dilemma. Public opinion is essential to the foreign policy process, but he has not resolved the issue of how to maintain some type of control over it, and still remain democratic, once *glasnost* is truly achieved.²¹⁴ At the same gathering, Victor Kremenyuk, Head of Sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada, in his discussion of negotiating style speaks of "...the imperative to merge all national negotiating styles, to form a culture in this respect."²¹⁵ However, he fails to realize that this culture is being developed, at least superficially, by the advent of the media connection.

The USSR is in a transitional phase in terms of media diplomacy. Gorbachev understands the persuasive and pervasive power of this tool but has yet to resolve basic infrastructure and educational problems to increase its viability in the international process. The information revolution in the USSR had several consequences for Gorbachev. These included: information boundaries became porous; regime had underestimated interest in, and ease of transmission of the new technology; activism of the West in penetration of national borders; and the demand for information which will continue to increase.²¹⁶ Pandora's box has once again been opened, Gorbachev's problems are just beginning. He is the key practitioner of Official Media Diplomacy, but he will not remain the only one.

This exploration of a state-controlled media in transition is completed. The next chapter will examine media diplomacy as it was practiced in a military-dominated society, i.e. the Brazil of the 1960s to the 1980s in Latin America.

²¹⁴ Neither has anyone else resolved this issue. It is the continuing challenge; the tension between freedom of the press and governmental control.

²¹⁵ International Affairs Guest Club, 135-6.

²¹⁶ Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work", 137-8.

V. MEDIA IN THE THIRD WORLD MILITARY ELITE MEDIA CONTROL

Several Third World countries in the last twenty years have experienced a militarily dominated government. To an American this would appear to be a reversal of the traditional role of the military to support the civilian dominated political process. Viewed through the international lens, military rule is seen as a practical alternative to the failures or inadequacies of a civilian dominated government. Certain patterns have emerged. Similarities have been noted between a military-run political process with that of a totalitarian structured organization such as the Soviet Union had in place since the Russian Revolution of 1917. This section will not attempt to examine all of these military governments but instead will use Brazil as an example of the media methods which were used to first, help establish the legitimacy of the army government, and second, to help topple that self-same army government. In direct contrast with this phenomenon in the Southern Hemisphere, is the U.S. military and its role in the political process of the United States, particularly in the realm of international relations and foreign policy, as will be outlined in the next chapter.

A. MILITARY-AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Military coups were not an infrequent nor a totally unexpected factor in the political arena of Latin America. What was unusual was that in the 1960s the military were willing to retain the power which they had seized, to continue in the business of governing, and to do so with no intention of holding elections to establish a sense of legitimacy.²¹⁷ Instead, that legitimacy was to be earned by the positive socioeconomic changes wrought.

²¹⁷ James Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970); George Philip, "Military-Authoritarianism in South America: Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina," *Political Studies* (Mar 1984), Vol XXXII No. 1, 1-20; Additional analyses of the role of the military in new and/or developing nations include: Morris Janowitz, The Military in

The question then arises, how to classify a government as either military or civilian? Hanneman examines the extent and form of military elite participation in the political executive selection and succession process, as well as the military role in executive participation.²¹⁸ Operationally defined as the "indirect role", is the distinction between a government installed by a coup and those installed by appointment, election, or inheritance. Obviously, the government installed by coup is the most extreme case of executive selection and succession by the military. Operationally defined as the "direct role" is that executive participation measured by three quantifiers. First, the government is characterized according to the affiliation of the chief executive, i.e. active military officer, or an individual who recently served as a military officer indicates a military executive if he was not freely elected. Second, presence or absence of military personnel on the executive councils. One or more is interpreted as having the power to exert a more direct, and stronger influence than a council without a military representative. Third, does the chief executive retain direct operational control over the military? If the answer is yes, and the executive is military or recently affiliated with the military, then the government is characterized as a military one with the military providing a personal power base for the chief. If the answer is yes, but the executive is a civilian (as in the United States), the military is seen as a potential power resource in the democratic sense of government and not the individual sense of personality. Brazil was characterized as a third cluster type, meaning that although the government was dominated by military elites, the participation

the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962); Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 192-263.

218 Robert A. Hanneman, "Military Elites and Political Executives", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Spring 1986), Vol 14 No. 1, 74-89.

was primarily corporate military interventions as opposed to military strongmen in the single party context.

1. Military as a Mirror of Society

Imaging the Latin American military in terms of its political behavior received a significant amount of study in the 1960s. Exploring the "Seven Old Ideas" ²¹⁹ as they pertain to the following areas: historical origins, foreign influence, superpower in politics, civilian attitudes, equipment and size, social class, and professionalism, Hyman concludes that both the favorable and unfavorable characterizations are in error due to incomplete information available at the time of the original studies. Only two will be examined in this section, the social class of the military and its self-perceived role in politics.

Military personnel are drawn from the middle or lower middle class segment of Brazilian society. Civilian executive elites have been dominated by the upper class in the past, although the trend in recent history indicates a shift to the middle class politician. Electing to serve in the military, particularly in the case of officers, tends to be driven by a family tradition of military service to the country.²²⁰ This is not the profile of an elitist

²¹⁹ Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights On Latin American Armed Forces", *Political Science Quarterly* (Sep 1972) LXXXVII No. 3, 401-418. The seven old ideas are characterized as either favorable (F) or unfavorable (U) and may be summarized as follows: 1) historical origins - unique nationbuilding role(F) or alien institution(U); 2) foreign influence - has been toward democratic practices (F) or strengthened the military's influence in such a way so as to harm democratic development(U); 3) superpower in politics - officer corps intervention provides needed stability (F) or self-interested military who repress democratic forces (U); 4) civilian attitudes - military role has wide civilian acceptance (F) or all civilians oppose the use of military force in politics (U); 5) equipment and size - military equipment and firepower promote "professionalism" and keep soldiers out of politics (F) or the same attributes have a direct correlation to military assertiveness and the use of force in politics (U); 6) social class - middle class social origins of the officers create military support of socioeconomic reform (F) or social origins cause them to defend the status quo(U); 7) professionalism - professional armed forces are politically neutral (F) or a large and professional military establishment is likely to become involved in politics (U). See Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988) for a reexamination of this issue in view of his previous work, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972) which Hyman cites as one of the proponents of the seven old ideas.

²²⁰ Stepan, The Military in Politics, Ch 3.

group concerned with maintaining some form of oligarchy strictly for the benefit of an all-powerful military clique. It does, however, indicate a group whose social roots are in that nebulous form of society labeled "the middle class." These individuals are usually educated, derive their income from employment not inheritance, and may have, only recently, been on the lowest rung of the middle class ladder. Middle class values and attitudes share a commonality amongst most countries, i.e. in the military sector, the officer corps has a strong identification with the nation, its image and philosophy, and a recognition of the direct correlation between effort and reward in terms of opportunities for personal and professional advancement. This may be considered a vivid contrast to what is occurring in the civilian sector.

Translating that belief system into a political role for the military in Latin America, in general, has manifested itself in three ways: 1) developmental; 2) nationalist; 3) populist.²²¹ Agrarian reform, redistribution policies, and industrial growth are examples of this developmental approach. Expropriation of foreign-owned entities, e.g. U. S.- based Columbian Broadcasting Company-owned Cadena de las Americas, and the National Broadcasting Company-owned Cadena Paramerica was a method to reaffirm national control over one's destiny. Major businesses and industries such as oil companies were the primary targets, but communications/media facilities were also viewed as important to the reestablishment of a national identity. Populist concerns were focused on socioeconomic improvement for the peasant while simultaneously ensuring effective mobilization did not occur. Imposition of a military dictatorship driven by these three goals resulted in forced, rapid national modernization , the growth of an urban industrial work-force, and Brazil's complete integration into the international economy. This

²²¹ James Petras and Nelson Rimensnyder, "The Military and the Modernization of Peru", in Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, 130-1.

bureaucratic authoritarian regime allied the military to civilian technocracy and big business, and contributed to the military's transition from the "Old Professionalism of External Defense" orientation to the "New Professionalism".²²²

2. Military and Civilians: An Uneasy Alliance

Military intervention in politics, and in some instances, the actual usurpation of the civilian role in government may occur as the result of varied factors. As mentioned earlier, the military regime attempts to gain its legitimacy through successful socioeconomic reform. If the previous civilian leadership has proven ineffectual and indecisive, then military seizure of the government may appear to be a viable alternative. The military may be viewed as a legitimate option when the populace is presented with the choice of a lax, self-indulgent, and possibly corrupt civilian-controlled government. Military organizations, specifically the Army may be viewed as a symbol of the nation and the protector thereof. Additionally, the professional military is characterized by organizational cohesiveness, discipline, and an ability to mobilize large portions of the population for modernization. If there is a low level of economic development, then the military usually has the technical skills lacking in the civilian component to achieve industrial growth and progress. Finally, if an attempt is being made to shift from a traditional agrarian to a modern society (a pattern repeatedly followed in Latin America),

²²² Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973). See specifically his article, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion" in which he outlines the contrasting paradigms of the "The Old Professionalism of External Defense (OPED)" with "The New Professionalism of Internal Security and National Development (NPISND)". The characteristics of the OPED are: function of the military is external security; civilian accept the legitimacy of the government, military possesses highly specialized skills which are incompatible with political skills, military professional action is restricted, the impact of professional socialization renders the military politically neutral, impact on civil-military relations contributes to an apolitical military and civilian control. The NPISND is characterized as follows: function of the military is internal security, some civilian segments of society will challenge the government legitimacy, highly interrelated political and military skills, unrestricted scope of military professional action, the impact of professional socialization politicizes the military, and the impact of the civil-military relations contributes to military-political managerialism and role expansion.

then the centralized command, hierarchy, and discipline found in the military may be what is needed to redistribute the power of the land-owning classes, institute land reforms, organize both organic and inorganic resources, and maintain control of the disaffected masses.

Actual boundaries between military and civilian within the political system may not be so clearly delineated as defined above.²²³ If the military is not performing a direct role, i.e. military presidency complete with military constituency, then it may perform a number of secondary or indirect roles, i.e. a shadow government, a veto group, or an arbiter between the government and some opposition force(s). Domestic policy will usually be the focus of military attention, as inward-looking policies are necessary for the successful resolution of the scenarios outlined above. Foreign policy decisions are not the direct concern of the military unless it is a matter of national security, and so specific foreign policy decisions are left to those agencies with greater international legitimacy.²²⁴ Consequently, the military's role in diplomacy is limited. Finally, when the military ultimately relinquishes power, the authoritarian tradition will have already been established, thus increasing the difficulty for a civilian government to succeed.

3. Two Track Rule

Two track rule in the Soviet Union was defined as the conduct of foreign policy on two levels. Officially, the Soviet government instituted legitimate relations with other nations and their leaders; unofficially, the Comintern-Cominform-KGB organizations were used to reach the mass public and establish a world-wide Communist movement. Dual track rule in Latin America presents a different image entirely. Due to its inward-looking focus and almost complete concentration on domestic issues, the military power

²²³ In the case of Brazil, see Stepan's works previously cited.

²²⁴ Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), 68-77.

elite will eventually disagree among themselves as to means and methods of achieving those developmental, nationalist, and populist goals embarked upon previously. Since legitimacy is interpreted as a direct derivation from socioeconomic progress, and since visible evidence of such progress is an imperative, the regime may find itself using increasingly repressive methods to mobilize the masses.²²⁵

Repression is a suspect means of control particularly in those instances when the goal was to improve the average individual's station in life. Philip outlines the leadership problem inherent in the decision to repress. Initially, the decision is to repress or not to repress, later, the questions are more difficult - What degree of repression is to be applied? How much power should be granted to the "repressive" officers? How will this affect the internal balance of power? Philip concludes that an increasingly oppressive approach will be necessary, will cause a split between the ranks of the military elite and those rigidly opposed to political liberalization, and increasingly involved in acts of repression.²²⁶ This latter group will assume the balance of power.

Political acceptability and legitimacy of the regime with the populace is suspect or non-existent at this point. One of the proven ways to recapture their "hearts and minds" is to establish a cult of personality, to personalize the ruler. Historical examples of this method abound, but two of the most successful attempts in the twentieth century were Adolph Hitler and Josef Stalin. Both held the key to achieving this status, carefully controlled mass media. As will be noted in the following section, the military leaders of Brazil chose this method as well.

²²⁵ A. Stepan, The Military in Politics; Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a 'Modernizing' Authoritarian Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil" in Authoritarian Brazil, 233-54; Philip, "Military-Authoritarianism in South America", 17.

²²⁶ Schneider in Brazil comes to the same conclusion, 69.

B. OFFICIAL MEDIA DIPLOMACY

Focused on domestic issues, the military in various Latin American regimes, used the mass media as an official adjunct to the government. In order to understand how a government could assume complete control over the communications apparatus of a country, a brief historical examination will be conducted. Specifically, the evolution of media policy in Brazil will be surveyed through its four phases as identified by Elizabeth Fox.²²⁷

1. Phase One: Public Policy of No Policy

A strong tradition of private newspapers was joined by radio in the 1920s as most of Latin America embraced the latest media technology. A privately owned Brazilian radio station was not simultaneously considered a commercial enterprise, but rather a club or association financed by subscriptions. Radio programs had a cultural, literary, or educational slant, and were designed with providing a public service in mind. The government's role lay in levying taxes, both on the broadcast stations and on the receivers owned by the individual. Actual content control was not yet an issue as the literary-cultural format did not appear to function as an information conduit of hard news, but simply entertainment. Fox notes that no actual media policy was established at this juncture.

2. Phase Two: Monopolistic Media Enterprises

Commercial advertising was finally permitted in Brazil by the mid-1930s. National artists in music, comedy, and soap operas began to use radio as their main venue. By shifting to a commercial medium, radio was able to fill three roles: 1) advertising vehicle to reach a developing mass market; 2) information source; 3) broad-based

²²⁷ Elizabeth Fox, ed., Media and Politics in Latin America: The Struggle for Democracy (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1988), 172-86.

entertainment.²²⁸ In contrast, government-subsidized highbrow educational-cultural radio stations found themselves unable to compete and either went out of business or were absorbed by the burgeoning private sector. Following the revolution of 1932, Brazilian radio experienced government control and censorship in the form of propaganda and selective news reporting in an effort to shape public opinion. Coupled with the increasing U.S. broadcasting company involvement and the daily news service provided by the U.S. Office of Coordination of Inter-American Affairs, the media in Latin America began to assume an increasingly monopolistic appearance as well as a striking resemblance to the form of the U.S. media.

Television arrived in Latin America in the mid-1950s. Diarios e Emissoras, a Brazilian firm, already in the newspaper and radio business, purchased a small, commercial television station in 1950. This monopoly remained unchallenged until the early 1960s, when the upstart TV Globo with an infusion of capital, technology, and professional skills from Time, Inc., seriously challenged Diarios Associados. Two years later TV Globo had become the official mouthpiece of the state, and Diarios Associados began a downward spiral. There was no other serious competition for TV Globo after their demise.

3. Phase Three: National Reform or Deform?

Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Che Guevara's abortive attempts to export the revolution to Bolivia in 1967, militant dissident groups began to form in an effort to defy the traditional political elites. Targeting the media for reform, intellectuals began to criticize the traditional commercial and politically conservative role of the media to date, i.e. subservient to: a) the government's message, or b) the transnational corporations' message. Four issues were identified as requiring remedial action: 1) re-establish cultural autonomy and national content to ownership and programming; 2) make the state

²²⁸ Ibid, 13.

responsible for formulating democratic national cultural and communication policies; 3) fracture the traditional monopolistic private control; 4) increase the representation of more diverse social groups in the media.²²⁹ In July 1976, representatives of twenty Latin American and Caribbean governments met at a UNESCO-sponsored meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, to discuss national communication policies.²³⁰ Proposals for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) were tabled at that time. Recurring themes in this conference included: 1) news media should be used to effect social change; 2) increased governmental control in terms of external or transnational news agencies; 3) establishment of a pool of Third World Press Agencies to counter the "Big Four". Did these proposed changes represent true media reform or simply another opportunity for the government to deform the media through imposition of increasingly strict controls? Fox identifies three additional subthemes: 1) rise of alternative communication; 2) the lack of basic freedoms of expression under the military dictatorships; 3) enormous impact of new communication technologies.²³¹ In the final analysis, former Vice Chairman of the U. S. Commission for UNESCO, William G. Harley's comments were the most prophetic.

Government control of regional or national news agencies may not in itself threaten freedom of the press. The threat arises when one of them acts as the *exclusive* disseminator of news for a country or region, and access to information is denied to foreign or other domestic media.²³²

By 1976, Brazil in company with seven other South American countries was dominated by military rule, and media deform.

²²⁹ Fox, 23; Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on Foreign Relations, "International Communications and Information", 95th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 9, 10, 1977, 10-31.

²³⁰ UNESCO, Conference Working Paper, Intergovernmental Conference on Communications Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, (Paris: UNESCO, 1976).

²³¹ Fox, 9.

²³² William G. Harley, prepared statement before the Subcommittee on International Operations, 28.

4. Phase Four: The Military's Media - TV Globo

Formulating a governmental communications policy and attempts at media reform received short shrift from the military regimes. Basically, communications policy became a "combination of free market commercial expansion, technological innovation, corruption, political censorship, repression, and government propaganda."²³³ Societal institutions such as educational facilities and journalistic organizations became conduits for a one-way flow of information, in effect it was a one-source town and the government was the source. Propaganda served the ideological goal of convincing the populace that the socioeconomic reforms were working, censorship ensured that dissent was kept to a minimum. This latter method was particularly effective when the censorship extended to the actual arrest, disappearance, and murder of journalists.

Sistema Globo was the parent organization of the newspaper *O Globo*, a large chain of radio stations, and ultimately, Sistema Globo de Television. EMBRATEL, the state-owned Brazilian telecommunications company in partnership with Time, Inc., funded this operation and established the infrastructure that made it possible for TV Globo to eventually reach an audience of nearly eighty million people. It was "born with the dictatorship"²³⁴ and it served it well through completely biased coverage of the regime's accomplishments, conducted patriotic campaigns to discourage overt criticism, exaggerated the existence of armed resistance in the country thereby justifying the regime's repressive methods, and lastly, encouraged dissidents to engage in "self-exile". General Medici, supposedly said that he was happy to tune in TV Globo at night because on television news Brazil was at peace while the newspapers reported strikes, protests, violence, and conflicts

²³³ Fox, 181.

²³⁴ Cesar Guimaraes and Roberto Amaral, "Brazilian Television: A Rapid Conversion to a New Order" in Media and Politics in Latin America, 125-37.

in various parts of the world. It was his own personal tranquilizer.²³⁵ Stepan reports a different viewpoint from his interviews with Medici's successors, Geisel and Golbery who believed that censorship and censors were basically inept and essentially, harmed the government in its inability to respond to extremist charges. Both believed a gradual liberalization of the press was in order.²³⁶

C. UNOFFICIAL MEDIA DIPLOMACY

"Alternative Media" were a variety of grassroots movements which sprung up in Latin America as a counter to the repressive censorship imposed by the various military regimes. Cultural and political resistance to the dictatorships became a worthy cause. Using community radio, local newspapers, neighborhood theater, and local video productions to provide information, entertainment, and opinions, the alternative media soon had a significant following. Unofficial media diplomacy was conducted by these organizations in an effort to 1) mobilize the populace; 2) inform the world-at-large as to the true state of affairs in the country; and 3) regain control of the information and communications apparatus. Although there were a number of these movements, this discussion will be limited to an examination of the influence of the educator Paulo Freire throughout Latin America in the development of these alternative media, the initiatives of the Catholic Church, and the transformation of TV Globo from a mouthpiece of the government to the voice of the people.

1. "Alternative Media" - The Influence of Paulo Freire

During the late sixties Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator, pioneered the concept of adult education and literacy works as "cultural acts of freedom". This was to be a means

²³⁵ Ibid, 128.

²³⁶ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 36-7. Of course, this was not an entirely altruistic move on the government's part since "courting of the press" was seen as yet another way to manipulate it officially to serve the interests of the political process.

of breaking down, and reforming oppressive social structures in order to expand the individual's capacity for social analysis, political action, and a commitment to the common good. In his Pedagogy of the Oppressed he outlines the basis for this *conscientization*.

The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation?...The starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present, existential, concrete situation, reflecting the aspirations of the people.²³⁷

Freire was particularly concerned with the untapped creative potential of human beings and the potential loss of their humanity, their essence, if they were deprived of the opportunity to communicate this self to the world.

"Reading the world in order to transform the world"²³⁸ was to be this conscious act of liberation. Implied within that philosophy was the idea of community, exploration of society's economic, political, and social forces, popular action, and ultimately, the transformation of society into one which served the many instead of the few. Freire wanted to institute a dialogue between two equal learners, not "A vertical relationship-the imposition of criteria foreign to the consciousness of the subject-is anti-dialogue; it signifies domination and consequently poisoning of the being."²³⁹ It is hardly surprising that the alternative media adopted both his concepts and his challenge to reform the military-dominated world in which they found themselves without a voice, without a soul.

2. "Alternative Media" - Initiatives of the Catholic Church

Historically, the Catholic Church in Latin America has had a cyclical influence on the population at large. Vallier discusses a five stage evolution, ranging from structural fusion or complete domination of its followers to an integrated, autonomous

²³⁷ Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1970).

²³⁸ Valerie Miller, Between Struggle and Hope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 9.

²³⁹ Freire, 135.

relationship.²⁴⁰ This discussion will focus on the latter stages, "Social Development", and "Cultural-Pastoral". Catholic Action was an early organizational approach used by the Church in an effort to connect with various portions of the laity, but specifically, the Catholic youth. By the late 1950s the focus had shifted to the creation of social, economic, and technical programs in an effort to reach those groups on the margins of society. New initiatives included: vocational training centers for rural youth, cooperatives for the poor, health clinics, agrarian reform projects, and literacy courses. In order to realize the latter program of education, the Church began operating radio schools, employing broadcasts as both an educational and developmental tool. It was this recognition of the power of the media to reach out to those economically, ethnically, politically, geographically, and culturally disenfranchised, that marked the beginnings of the Church's shift to a new mission.

The "Cultural-Pastoral" phenomenon may be dated from the decline of Catholic Action programs in the early 1960s to the rise of the Comunidade Eclesial de Base (CEB, or Basic Christian Community), ²⁴¹ wherein the Church exerts increasingly less influence but instead adopts the Freire "dialogue between equal learners". Bruneau's studies of these groups indicates both the influence and the adoption of Freire's principles in terms of

²⁴⁰ Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 72. The five stages are: Monopoly, Political, Missionary, Social Development, and Cultural-Pastoral. He examines ten areas: level of Church ambitions, Church-society relationship, major basis of influence, secondary basis of influence, target group, dominant ideology, religious action principle, priest's primary roles, organizational mode, layman's role. Social Development is characterized by public involvement, social action programs among marginal strata, and use of the mass media. Cultural-Pastoral is characterized by integrated autonomy, socio-ethical leadership, and the local church.

²⁴¹ See Thomas C. Bruneau, "The Church, State and Religion in Brazil" in The Catholic Church and Religions in Latin America (Canada: McGill University Centre for Developing-Area Studies, Monograph Series No. 18, 1984) ed. by Thomas C. Bruneau, Chester E. Gabriel, Mary Mooney, 13-40. Thomas C. Bruneau, "Brazil: The Catholic Church and Basic Christian Communities" in Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986) ed. by Daniel H. Levine, 106-23. Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: The Catholic Church and the Popular Movement in Nova Iguacu, 1974-1985" in Levine, 124-55 for a complete examination of this phenomenon.

establishing a community to explore solutions to economic, political, and social problems, and then to take action to resolve those problems.²⁴² The CEBs may be said to have arisen from two momentous events which occurred in the Catholic Church, Vatican II in 1962 and the papal encyclicals which followed, and the Medellin Conference in 1968. The former represented the response of the Catholic Church to the challenges of the modern world, its right to address political matters in the event of injustices, particularly among the powerless, and freedom of worship without state interference. The latter conference produced sixteen documents, ranging in subject matter from justice, peace, education, and youth to liturgy, lay movements, poverty of the Church, and the mass media. By 1969 increased violence against the religious by the military was the norm. "Moderates" among the bishops shifted from their previous apolitical stance and began to assume responsibility for all victims of repression. Summoning the global assets of the Roman Catholic Church, the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) mobilized their contacts abroad. The result was a series of protests appearing in the U.S. and European press. The Medici government attempted to counter "this international campaign, and planted anti-Church stories in the Brazilian press."²⁴³ The Church used both her national resources as well as her international resources to provide an authentic alternative to the government-controlled mass media, to create a forum for democratic and participatory communication, and to politicize the population through organization and education.²⁴⁴

Government censorship had begun in earnest in mid-December 1968 under the authority of Institutional Act 5, and extended to a period of self-censorship negotiated between the newspaper owners and the military authorities until 1972. Forbidden topics for news

²⁴² Bruneau, "Brazil: The Catholic Church", 110-11.

²⁴³ Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 137-8.

²⁴⁴ Fox, 27.

reporting included: student political activities, workers' movements, individuals stripped of their political rights, negative stories about the state of the economy, but especially anything derogatory or critical of the military. As TV Globo was cast in the government's image, the print media became the target of government censors. Specific weekly publications which raised the censor's ire, at various times, included: *Pasquim*, a satirical humor magazine which ridiculed the military in both cartoon and word; *Opinioao*, a publication of center-left views; *Movimento* a militant leftist offering; *O Estao de Sso Paulo*, a conservative daily renowned for its defense of civil liberties, the rule of law, and freedom of the press; *Sao Paulo*, a periodical of the archdiocese of Sao Paulo; and *Veja*, Brazil's leading weekly newsmagazine written from a centrist point of view.²⁴⁵ During the periods when these news organs experienced jailed staffs, padlocked doors, and silenced writers, the alternative media assumed the responsibility for "getting the news out."

3. TV Globo Reborn

Geisel and Golbery's efforts to partially liberalize the press had an unforeseen consequence, the transformation of TV Globo from the government's official spokesman to an independent voice no longer crying in the wilderness. The campaign for direct presidential elections, with its attendant rallies and demonstrations between February and June 1984 proved to be the turning point. According to Guimaraes and Amaral, TV Globo's news coverage underwent three phases: 1) total disregard; 2) uneven coverage; 3) enthusiastic and proficient coverage.²⁴⁶

TV Globo had a vast operational network in place composed of seven fully owned stations, six partially owned stations, thirty-six affiliates, thirty radio stations, the *O Globo* newspaper, a home video division, and a record company. For years these assets were the

²⁴⁵ Skidmore, 134-5; Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 37.

²⁴⁶ Guimaraes and Amaral, 128.

government's assets, but in the space of five months, the power had shifted, and the revolt of the journalists was complete. TV Globo used such tactics as refusing to give government censors office space, airing "moments of silence" protests, directly broadcasting the government party's defeat, and engaging in interpretive journalism.²⁴⁷ Finally, the mass media had become the "watchdog" of the people, however, it had also experienced the power of shaping public opinion.

Ultimately, the military dictatorships failed, repressive censorship failed, and the government-control of the media failed. The United States has never experienced this type of military-dominated government. However, the same tension which existed between the press and the military, as well as between the military's self-image and the public does exist. As Schneider so succinctly phrases it.

In the ultimate analysis, the influence of the Brazilian Armed Forces on foreign policy is derived from its political role as the president's essential constituency. It is this role, rather than the global defense function on which the U. S. military's influence on foreign policy rests, that determines the range and character of the military's international interests and policy impact.²⁴⁸

The next chapter will examine the U.S. military's role in the realm of official and unofficial media diplomacy.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, 129-35; Fox, 29; Oscar Landi, "Media, Cultural Processes and Political Systems" in Fox, 138, 147.

²⁴⁸ Schneider, Brazil, 76.

VI. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND MEDIA DIPLOMACY

A. CONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES

The Constitution has served as the basic frame for the government of the United States since its ratification in 1789. It is the alpha and the omega of political power, reflecting those early delegates' determination to create a genuinely national government with the power to promote the security, financial stability, commercial prosperity, and well-being of all the states and their inhabitants. The national interest is articulated first and foremost in the following lines.

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

This preamble implies the commitment to the ideals of a limited government, civil liberties, separation of church and state, confinement of military power, and the formation of an open society. It was meant not merely to guide, but to inspire. In Section 8, Congress has been empowered to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. In order to achieve that end, Congress is to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to provide for organizing, arming, disciplining and governing them. What, then, is to be the character of this armed force?

1. The Military Elite and National Character

As noted above the military had its genesis in the U.S. Constitution. The nature of the Constitution is a reflection of the political culture prevalent in America at that time.

Based on a faith in the essentially rational character of man and society, in combination with the belief in man's ability to define and solve social and political problems, it is a testament to the art of compromise. The Constitution is a reflection of the democratic orientation, i.e. to balance conflicting drives, to restrain contending interests, to place the law above men, to both divide and separate powers, to create a system of checks and balances, and finally, to permit the capability to amend. It provided for a republican government in the age of monarchy, a popularly based legislative House, a President, and a Senate, indirectly subject to the democratic process, limitations upon the power of the government, and a general concern for civil liberties.

It is a "living Constitution" in that it remains open-ended, ensuring its adaptability to the political growth and flexibility inherent in a democratic form of government. The parameters operate within freedom and order but neither so free nor so confined as to result in chaos or rigidity. The heart of the Constitution is limited government and individual liberty. It is parsimonious in the powers granted to the former and magnanimous in those granted to the latter.

The U.S. military establishment is the pre-eminent defender of the Constitution. Each member swears an oath to that effect, and yet, they are heirs to an antimilitarist political tradition. Samuel P. Huntington notes that "the Constitution does not envisage a separate class of persons exclusively devoted to military leadership."²⁴⁹ As a result, a military elite, in the sense of a German General Staff or Latin American Politico-Military presidential constituency does not exist in the U.S.. Military elites, in the sense of those who hold specific positions, and have the opportunity to influence foreign policy decisions, does exist. The classic example would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although these

²⁴⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 135.

individuals represent different branches of the military, they share certain common characteristics.²⁵⁰ This discussion will be limited to the concept of the military mind.

Various studies have been conducted in an effort to determine if there is a military mind, and if so, how may it be defined?²⁵¹ Both Bletz and Robinson conclude that a "military mind" in the positive sense does exist but that it should not be confused with a "militarist mindset" in the pejorative sense. It may be defined as "that mind which is conditioned by training, education, experience, and intellect to recognize and place in perspective the military implications inherent in a given national security problem."²⁵² It is this mind which is brought to bear on the military dimension of foreign policy questions, and

²⁵⁰ Huntington; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971); Nancy L. Goldman and David R. Segal, eds. The Social Psychology of Military Service (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976).

²⁵¹ Donald Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publications, Inc., 1972), 186-208, appendix. Focuses on survey results of the 1968 and 1970 classes of the National War College; CDR William H. Robinson, USN, "An Element of International Affairs -- The Military Mind", Naval War College Review, (Nov 1970), Vol XXIII No. 3, 5-15. Focuses on the survey results of the 1969-1970 classes of the Naval War College. Branches of service surveyed included predominantly the U. S. Navy, followed in descending order of participation by: U. S. Army, U. S. Air Force, U. S. Marine Corps, and the U. S. Coast Guard. Broad generalizations drawn from Bletz' study include: 1) The national security interests of the U. S. will be best served by an increasing emphasis on the thorough integration of political and military considerations; 2) Adequate governmental machinery does exist for the integration of the nation's foreign and military policies; 3) The average civilian official, who is involved in politico-military affairs, does not have an adequate appreciation of the military side of the politico-military equation.; 4) The average military officer, who is involved in politico-military affairs, does not have an adequate appreciation of the political side of the politico-military equation; 5) There has been a discernible trend in the past five years toward more mutual understanding between the military officer and the civilian governmental official in the area of politico-military affairs; 6) The military point of view is being heard at the highest decision-making levels in the country; 7) The military point of view is not only being heard but is being given adequate weight at the highest decision-making levels in the country; 8) Continued emphasis on politico-military factors will strengthen the professionalism of individual military officers; 9) There is not a place for a politico-military specialist in the military profession in somewhat the same sense that there are logistical specialists, etc. Robinson concluded from his studies that there is a marked similarity in the attitudes, work preferences, and values among the officers of the various services who attended the Naval War College in the years 1969-1970. Relative strengths found among the military officers were: self-confidence, goal orientation, concern for the welfare of others, trust and even temper, and a strong willingness to accept responsibility in directing others in the accomplishment of an important goal. Executives scored higher in the category of the desire to work in a group. He concludes that officers do not reflect the popular stereotype of the military mind in the negative sense.

²⁵² Bletz, 194.

specifically so at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was one attempt to cultivate a joint perspective by assignments, education, and incentives to those officers so selected to serve in a joint environment.²⁵³ How does this military mind interact with or complement the national character?

To define a nation's character is to place it within its cultural antecedents. Culture, in its turn, develops from three primary sources: 1) cultural heritage and tradition; 2) environment; 3) historical experiences. The U.S. is an island, a liberal democracy, and a nation that, for centuries, was free to choose involvement or non-involvement in international affairs. Miller notes that the essence of the American character may be broken down to two core values, "belief in the perfectibility of man with the fortuitous availability of a vast and rich geographical stage upon which to play out that promise virtually unopposed."²⁵⁴ Ultimately, the character of a nation is the composite of all that its people most value, and the Declaration of Independence is the distillation of those beliefs and values for the United States.

2. The Naval Officer as Diplomat

Due to its island character, the United States, when it chose to become involved in the affairs of other nations, used its naval fleet for that purpose. The naval officer in command of the vessel then found himself in the position of amateur diplomat. According to Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, USN, and Lieutenant Commander G.B.

²⁵³ See Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 42-6 and Mackubin Thomas Owens, "American Strategic Culture and Civil-Military Relations: The Case of JCS Reform", *Naval War College Review* (Mar/Apr 1986), Vol XXXIX No. 2, 434-59 for a complete appraisal of the different JCS reform viewpoints and the expectations thereof.

²⁵⁴ Jeanne M. Miller, "The Cultural Antecedents of U. S. Military Planning", (M. A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March, 1984) 16-7. See also Professor Clyde B. Sargent, "National Cultural Characteristics and National Power", *Naval War College Review*, (Jan 1971), Vol XXIII No. 5, 17-23, and Anthony Harrigan, "National Character is Decisive", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, (Jun 1, 1989), Vol LV No. 16, 507-11.

Vroom, USN writing in 1914 and 1921 respectively, a naval officer was uniquely suited for this role.²⁵⁵ By training, a U.S naval officer had to act on his own individual recognizance for the orders he received from the Navy Department would be of the most general nature. Selection for command of a ship or foreign duty ashore implied a recognized aptitude for public affairs, a complete knowledge of the protocol and courtesies expected to be practiced while in a foreign country, and the diplomatic skills of tact, firmness, and decisiveness in a potentially volatile or embarrassing situation.

Charles Paullin writing in Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers traces the history of the naval officer as diplomat from 1778 to 1883. John Paul Jones was the first of the infant navy's diplomats as the French rendered honors to the Ranger upon its arrival at Brest. Diplomatic treaties were negotiated by Commodore Decatur in 1815 with Algiers; five naval officers over the course of fifty years would attempt to negotiate with Turkey, Commodore William Bainbridge in 1800, Commodore John Rodgers in 1826, Commodore William M. Crane in 1828-9, Commodore James Biddle in 1830, and finally, Commodore David Porter in 1832 who would be successful. All these gentlemen shared a common bond, they had been empowered by their government to perform the functions of an accredited diplomat, to negotiate and exchange treaty ratifications. Shifting from its focus on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the U.S. Navy looked west to the Pacific. Commodore Perry's mission to Japan resulted in the opening of a window to the Orient in 1853. In Perry's case, the mission was carefully planned by the Navy and State departments with the commodore personally selecting the crew, as well as familiarizing himself with all aspects of Japanese culture, economy, and geography. His primary mission was to arrange for an agreement assuring the protection and relief of shipwrecked

²⁵⁵ RADM B. A. Fiske, USN, "The Diplomatic Responsibility of the United States Navy", *U. S. N. I. Proceedings*, (May/Jun 1914) Vol 40 No. 3, 799-802; LCDR G. B. Vroom, USN, "The Place of Naval Officers in International Affairs", *U.S.N.I. Proceedings* (May 1921), Vol 47 No. 219, 685-700.

mariners, or others in distress. His secondary mission, to negotiate a treaty was to prove highly successful based upon his careful preparation and immersion in the host country's history, culture, etc.²⁵⁶ Other examples abound, Rear Admiral Benham in Rio, 1894, and of course, Admiral Dewey in Manila, 1898. The difference between then and now is that the naval officer is no longer empowered to perform the duties of a diplomat, to negotiate treaties with foreign powers, to conclude alliances, nor to engage in a potential act of war or to negotiate a peace settlement. Communications technology has ensured that the commanding officer is only a satellite hookup away from his Commander-in-Chief. Warfare technology and the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war have stayed the hand of the naval shipborne diplomat. Transportation technology has inspired the creation of shuttle diplomacy but not in terms of naval officers, not even of career diplomats, but rather, heads of state or their designated government alter-egos. Finally, increased civilian control of the defense establishment has had an influence on the autonomy of the navy's actions, especially in the realm of international relations.

The last remaining official diplomatic post still open to the naval officer is that of naval attache. Under the supervision of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), this individual is in the information-collecting business, assigned to embassies and legations, and directed to report to the respective ambassador or minister. Although not directly involved in the diplomatic process, the naval officer assigned to a Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) may find himself dealing with his opposite number in the host nation's navy in such matters as military training, arms requests, etc. which borders on those areas which may fall under the diplomat's purview.

It is a truism that all naval personnel, whether assigned to a foreign command ashore, or paying a port visit are "unofficial diplomats", and it is this role, he or she is most likely

²⁵⁶ Paullin cited in Fiske, 691-5.

to play in the present age. What is the diplomatic contribution of the port visit by a U.S. Navy vessel of war? Sir James Cable suggests that these visits are designed to produce an impression on the government and public opinion of the host country of either power, smartness, or friendliness.²⁵⁷ The success of the visit will depend upon several variables: selection of the appropriate objective within the context of the relationship shared by the two countries, prior consultation between the naval side and the diplomatic side, naval appreciation for the host country's dignity, and prior planning. Impressions are images, the port visit is a media opportunity, and the unofficial diplomacy practiced at this juncture is as effective or noneffective as the personnel and the planning involved.

3. Gunboat Diplomacy

Unlike port visit diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy contains a coercive element. Such "persuasiveness" may be attempted in one of four modes: 1) definitive; 2) purposeful; 3) catalytic; 4) expressive.²⁵⁸ This is not merely a show of power but rather, power with a purpose. The Cable definition is:

Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Sir James Cable, "Showing the Flag", *U.S.N.J. Proceedings* (Apr 1984), Vol 110/4/974, 59-63. The purpose of smartness is to convey efficiency and civilization. The display of power is aimed at primarily naval officers, the defense establishment, and the government of the host country. Friendliness is demonstrated by doing something useful, i.e. disaster relief, medical aid, etc. or providing some type of entertainment to the local residents. See also J. K. Holloway, Jr. "The Role of the Services in Support of Foreign Policy", *U.S. N.J. Proceedings* (May 1976) Vol 102 No. 879, 67-81 in which he discusses the difficulty of gauging the real effect of "visit diplomacy".

²⁵⁸ Sir James Cable, *Diplomacy at Sea* (Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 1985), 18-9.

Definitive = the creation of a *fait accompli*, victim cannot resist, responds by acquiescence or escalation. Purposeful = threat of or actual damage inflicted. Catalytic = encourage the victim to compromise or comply. Expressive = emphasis on one's own attitude rather than an attempt to influence the adversary's.

²⁵⁹ Sir James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 39; Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future", *U.S.N.J. Proceedings* (Aug 1986), Vol 112/8/1002, 37-41.

Limited naval force has been used several times by the United States since Cable's last recorded entry of October 17, 1979. The pages of *Proceedings* magazine have continued to play host to the debate concerning the efficacy of such methods. What none of the critics or proponents have been able to argue away is the fact that a ship remains a "Great Communicator" of potential coercive diplomacy.²⁶⁰ Media coverage of such events, although addressed only obliquely by Cable, have the potential to rally international approbation or censure. Commentators providing an instant analysis of capabilities (the nation's material assets for exerting power), and intentions (the desires and will existing within the nation to exert that power) may contribute to the overall "communications diplomatic" effort. Gunboat diplomacy, by its nature, is a dramatic act and where there is drama, a camera will not be far behind.

B. OFFICIAL MILITARY MEDIA DIPLOMACY - PUBLIC RELATIONS

Public relations is the art of selling your company or organization to the public at large. The military finds itself in the same situation as many large corporations, fighting an image problem. Unfortunately for the military, ensuring that the accurate message is put across may be misinterpreted as a not-so-subtle form of propaganda. This section will examine the history of the military's media machine, as well as some of the key players.

1. History of Military Public Relations

Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and a journalist named George Creel were the prime movers in the creation of the Committee on Public Information (CPI). CPI was the brainstorm of Wilson and Creel with the objective of organizing the nation's opinionmakers and opinionmolders in an effort to help the war effort. It was to be a massive propaganda apparatus, relaying the official interpretation of events, and spreading

²⁶⁰ CDR Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., USN, "America's 'Great Communicators'", *U.S.N.J. Proceedings* (Dec 1988) Vol 114/12/1030, 80-6.

the "good word" to the world. Primarily, it was to counter the German propaganda effort. Prior to the creation of the CPI, the War Department had conducted an "educational service" known as the Bureau of Information which was in charge of public relations. Currently serving as its titular head was the young Major Douglas MacArthur. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels were in agreement that MacArthur's operation should be expanded so as to control the nation's press and propaganda machine during the war effort. Wilson disagreed, appointed Creel as the head of the CPI and assigned MacArthur as his aide. This established a presidential precedent that would be followed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt twenty-five years later.

Mobilizing public opinion in 1942 was the quest of Franklin D. Roosevelt but his approach was significantly different from Wilson's. According to Sobel, Roosevelt "often spoke and acted as though information, propaganda, psychological warfare, and espionage were of a piece."²⁶¹ The result was a distinction between "black" and "white" propanganda and psychological warfare activities. The former was to be created for use overseas, while "white" was for the domestic audience.²⁶² To add to the confusion, he delegated the same responsibilities to several different offices. The Army and the Navy each had intelligence, propaganda, education, and psychological warfare units. The Office of Facts and Figures, under the direction of Archibald MacLeish, was responsible for radio and the press, and the recruitment of intellectuals for government service. The Office of Coordinator of Information, under the direction of Colonel William J. Donovan, was nominally in charge of providing direction for all the informational units. Donovan interpreted his tasking a little differently, and set about building an espionage-propaganda

²⁶¹ Sobel, 200.

²⁶² See Chapter IV, Media in the USSR, specifically subsection B. 3. KGB and Disinformation for the Soviet view of the black, white, and gray shades of propaganda.

mechanism. Roosevelt resolved the issue by transferring Donovan to the newly created Office of Strategic Services, assigning the playwright Robert Sherwood to the OCI Foreign Information Service, and creating the Office of War Information(OWI) which was tasked with maintaining domestic morale and providing informational services to the newspaper, radio, and motion picture industries.²⁶³ OSS would be responsible for "black" propaganda while OWI would handle "white" propaganda.

The first indication of increased reliance on public relations by the military services was their postwar decision to raise the status of their public information offices. During the 1920s and 1930s, public information had been a staff function of the intelligence services of both the Army and the Navy. During the war, both services elevated public information programs to a separate staff status, however, it was not until the postwar years that public information or public relations were placed under the direct authority of the Army and Navy Secretaries, and service personnel were encouraged to pursue the public relations field as part of their service career. After its establishment as a separate service in 1947, the Air Force followed the example of the senior services, and established an office of public relations which reported directly to the Air Force Secretary. Writing in The Fourth Branch of Government, Douglass Cater quotes an anonymous Air Force officer on the importance of words as weapons.

Facts must be convincing, demonstrated, living salesmen of practical benefits. These are the only kind of facts that mold opinion and channel the vibrant tensions of public thinking always deciding issues in the end, altering military policy as surely as defeat in war - they make public opinion the most powerful tool of all, more powerful even than war itself.²⁶⁴

²⁶³ Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Book Division of Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1982), Ch. 15 The Noble Puppet; William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 108-48,250-4.

²⁶⁴ Cater, 166.

Among the more significant public relations developments of the immediate postwar era has been the proliferation of civilian support associations - organized to support the interests of a particular service. These will be discussed in the Unofficial Military Media Diplomacy section.

2. Military Public Relations Network

The Defense public affairs mechanism is guided and controlled from the top, by the Secretary of Defense and his civilian aides through the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Basically, the Assistant Secretary is assigned the responsibility for an integrated DOD public affairs program in order to provide the public with maximum information about the Department of Defense consistent with national security. This operation is required to initiate and support activities contributing to the good relations between the Department of Defense and all segments of the public at home and abroad, and to plan for censorship of the nation's communications media should a national emergency be declared. Twelve specific areas are under the Assistant Secretary's jurisdiction, including development of the over-all Pentagon public affairs policies and programs, security review for all Defense-oriented material proposed for publication, review of official speeches and press releases to ensure that they are in accordance with stated policy, and provision of news analysis and information for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His network of supporting facilities include: 1) the Directorate for Defense Information which generates all Defense Department news releases; 2) Audio Visual Division which is responsible for approval and release of all television and movie films, radio transcripts, etc. provided by the DOD or the individual armed services for public consumption. The AV division will also provide technical advice and assistance to producers of films and television programs; 3) Directorate for Community Relations is the focal point for the Pentagon's ties to the local communities

with responsibilities ranging from the scheduling of tours, bands, and speakers to furnishing of liaison to organized labor and the business community; 4) Veterans and Civic National Organizations Division is the point of contact for over five hundred national organizations including Kiwanis, Boy Scouts, etc.; 5) Business and Labor Division is the point of contact with business, industry, and labor groups; 6) Directorate for Security Review monitors Defense Department news releases for security, scans the press for possible security violations, and passes this information to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, who will initiate an investigation into news leaks.²⁶⁵

The individual service branches maintain numerous field information offices at major commands throughout the country and at the larger overseas bases. Every military base will assign either an officer, an enlisted, or frequently, civilian personnel to handle public relations for the base. Other informational activities conducted by the services or other agencies of the Defense Department are as follows. In terms of maintaining an informed military community, the Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS) specifically targets active duty military members, DOD civilian employees, military reserves, retirees, and families of service personnel. Printed material includes the magazine *Defense*, a monthly tabloid *SSAM* (*Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine*), *Background Notes* about potential foreign duty assignments, and a wide variety of posters, fact sheets, pamphlets, booklets, etc. The American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) (formerly the Armed Forces Radio Service)²⁶⁶ is the broadcast arm for the military community. Most AFRTS

²⁶⁵ C. W. Borkland, The Department of Defense, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), Ch. VIII The Defense Department Faces the Public and Congress; Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer, eds., The Pentagon Watchers: Students Report on the National Security State (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1970), see Derek Shearer's "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine", 99-144; COL James A. Donovan, USMC (Ret.), Militarism U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 29-32, 191-3; Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), Ch. 13 The Military Public Relations Network and Ch. 14 The Pentagon's Handling of the News.

²⁶⁶ Samuel Brylawski, "Armed Forces Radio Service: The Invisible Highway Abroad". *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* (Summer-Fall 1980), Vol 37 No. 3-4, 441-57. This

television news is produced locally by military personnel assigned to the station, although television news from U.S. commercial and public networks may be accessed by satellite hookup, i. e. Cable News Network or delayed tape transmission. It should be noted that although the target audience of AFRTS is the service member stationed overseas, members of the host nation's local community are also able to tune in as well. In this instance, an official media service aimed at one audience is transformed into another branch of "official media diplomacy" by default. Navy News This Week is a videotape program which highlights stories of particular interest to Navy personnel stationed both in the U.S. and abroad.

Press Trips or "junkets" may be arranged in an effort to create a media opportunity for the introduction of a new weapon system, aircraft, or other high profile item. Operation Desert Shield, a 1990 military operation in Saudi Arabia, arranged these daily for the reporters in the press pool in order to permit interviews with the troops, and tours of the base operations.

The Office of Armed Forces Information and education, the Defense Department's Public Affairs Office, and various other offices at the individual services' level provide a variety of films on military subjects which are then made available for public showing. The Hometown News Center reviews and distributes all hometown news releases from commands throughout the world. The Exhibits Program is designed with mobility in mind, and will provide a wide range of military-related subjects but usually with the emphasis on technology. Finally, the Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, is the journalism training center for personnel from all the services.

article traces the history of the AFRTS and provides an index of selected programs in the Library of Congress American Forces Radio and Television collection.

Topics include newswriting, radio and television broadcasting skill development, and designing internal information activities.

3. Public Affairs Officer

During the mid-1960s the U.S. Navy realized that it was necessary to keep Congress and the U.S. public informed in regard to the operational needs, missions, and functions of the U.S. Navy if funding levels were to be continued.²⁶⁷ At that time the *Public Affairs Manual* was drafted and published for use within the navy community. The second change which occurred at that time was the alteration in the chain of command whereby the Unified Command System was established. The Navy Chief of Information Officer (CHINFO) was assigned as a staff member to both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. His primary responsibility was, and is, to oversee the administration of the public affairs aspects of all naval forces, both ashore and afloat. Public Affairs policy responsibility follows the Unified Command System, e.g. the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Forces (CINCLANT) would communicate directly with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in regard to official statements concerning movement of forces, policy, and other aspects of command and control. By implication then, U.S. Navy public affairs issues and policy statements require coordination with the other services and the government agencies discussed earlier. Coordination is essential in order to ensure for example, that a disconnect does not occur in terms of the Air Force advocating one policy in the Middle East and the Navy something else entirely.²⁶⁸ This concern is also applicable in the foreign service arena in

²⁶⁷ For a brief history of the U. S. Navy's public affairs program and how it has evolved, see: Albert Eastman, "Public Affairs in an Instant World", *U.S. N. I. Proceedings* (March 1969), Vol 95 No. 793, 78-83 and RADM W. P. Mack, "Public Affairs and Command" *Naval War College Review* (May 1966), Vol XVIII No. 9, 1-12.

²⁶⁸ Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Chief is Dismissed for Remarks on Gulf Plan: Cheney Cites Bad Judgement", *New York Times*, 18 Sep 90, Sec. 1, A1, 8; R. W. Apple Jr., "The General's Error: Others Have Said as Much as Dugan But 'on Background', Not on Record", *New York Times*, 19 Sep

terms of what the State Department is advocating and officially broadcasting through the United States Information Agency and what the U.S. Navy is proposing.

Long range public affairs planning occurs on an annual cycle. The permanent aspects of the plan are found in the *Public Affairs Manual* which contains a description of long-range operations, the methodology to carry out those operations, and other standard operating procedures and information.²⁶⁹ At the beginning of each year, a plan is designed for the coming year and will be issued as a Secretary of the Navy Note (SECNAVNOTE). Each major component of the Navy Department submits those subjects it desires to emphasize for the coming year. The subjects are compiled, complete with the recommended emphasis and the proposed public relations methods to be used, presented to the Navy Policy Council, and a determination is made as to which ones will be included in the overall Navy Department plan.

The base commander, the commanding officer of a ship or squadron will set the public affairs policy. Public Relations work will be carried out on a daily basis by the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). Every unit should have someone who performs those duties, but since the ranks of the PAO officer corps are not unlimited in number, this position may be filled by someone with minimal journalistic experience, already overburdened by a variety of collateral duties. At times, an enlisted member who is a) a journalist, or b) a photographer's mate may be assigned to fill the billet. The question which arises is: what should the PAO's qualifications be in order to function effectively in this position? First, the individual will have to have some type of training in public relations, how to sell this commodity known as the U.S. Navy, how to learn the in's and out's of his market, and

90, Sec 1, A7. These two articles cite a recent example of military personnel failing to coordinate with the State Department in terms of information considered releasable to the media.

²⁶⁹ Department of the Navy Public Affairs Regulations SECNAVINST 5720.44 14 June 1974 with Change 2 inserted dtd 26 Nov 1976 (Washington, D. C.: Office of Information, Navy Department, 1976), Ch. 1 Purpose and Applicability, Ch. 2 Principles, Missions and Objectives, Ch. 3 Responsibility and Organization, Ch 4 Public Information, subsection 0405 Media Relations.

how to present what s/he is offering in a credible manner. This also implies that the PAO should have a strong grasp of the missions of the Navy in general, that command in particular, as well as an awareness of the technical aspects of the organization. The *Public Relations Manual* provides general guidance which then should be augmented by the resident experts at the command. Public affairs is not a business for amateurs, however, it appears to be just that when untrained ensigns or junior lieutenants are placed in the position of speaking not only for the commanding officer, but the U.S. Navy as well. 270 As a result of junior personnel placed in such a position, the PAO may not be privy to the more sensitive command issues, or the classified issues. The reality of public affairs is that these are precisely the areas which will require a prompt response to the media and by someone who presents an image of credibility.

C. UNOFFICIAL MILITARY MEDIA DIPLOMACY

Unofficial military media diplomacy may be the print or "broadcast" type, the latter actually being transmitted by various veterans groups or service related organizations. Of the print variety, the *Stars and Stripes* newspapers are not government publications. They are however, an authorized yet unofficial daily newspaper published under the authority of the Department of Defense. There are two newspapers, one serves the Pacific area, is edited and printed in Japan; the other serves Europe with offices in Darmstadt, Germany. In order to operate, the newspapers must be self-supporting. This goal is achieved by selling newspaper subscriptions, advertisement space, and other revenue-producing assets such as the Stars and Stripes Bookstores found on most U.S. military bases overseas. The Army Times publishing company is a commercial enterprise as well, offering the

²⁷⁰ Mack, 6; Colonel William v. Kennedy, USAR(Ret.), "Telling It Like It Isn't", *U.S.N.I. Proceedings* (Apr 1986), Vol 112/4/998, 45-53; Commander Joseph M. Palmer, Royal Navy(Ret), "P. R.- "...As Others See Us", *U.S.N.I. Proceedings* (Jul 1973), Vol 90 No. 7, 61-6.

Army, Navy or Air Force Times, via subscription to personnel in the U.S. or stationed overseas. These publications are not considered quasi-official newspapers.

1. Veterans' Groups

As noted earlier, many of the Pentagon's public relations programs are designed to reach the local community, and overall they have been successful in this endeavor. However, it should be noted that the support associations have also contributed to the military media diplomacy effort. The American Legion and the American Legion Auxiliary conduct a wide variety of community relations activities not directly related to the military: junior baseball, toys for needy children, hospital work, American Education Week, high school oratorical contests, etc. The stated aims of these two organizations are to: uphold and defend the Constitution, maintain law and order, foster and perpetuate a 100 per cent Americanism, and inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the community, state, and nation. The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) lists its objectives as fostering patriotism, and continuing to defend the United States from all her enemies. Both of these groups are considered to be powerful lobbyists on Capitol Hill.

2. Service Related Organizations

Service related organizations are private groups, which may or may not have active duty or retired military as members. There are six key organizations. The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) seeks to promote public understanding and support of the U. S. Army through advertising, their magazine *Army*, and a public relations program aimed at the industrial members of the association. The Air Force Association is interested in promoting not only the Air Force, but also the general goal of aerospace power, civilian as well as military. It publishes the monthly magazine, *Air Force and Space Digest*. The Aerospace Education Foundation provides educational materials to high schools and universities, and holds annual seminars. The Foundation is an affiliate of the Air Force

Association. On the Navy side is the Navy League of the United States, whose focus is not only on the U.S. Navy, but also the nation's commercial maritime posture.²⁷¹ The National Guard Association of the United States is designed to promote the interests of the Army and Air Force National Guard and does so usually by arranging open houses at the local Guard facility, and coordinating speakers and films at local civic events. The Reserve Officers Association of the United States has stated its objectives as "to support a military policy for the United States that will provide adequate national security." They also participate in lobbying actions on Capitol Hill.

D. THE MEDIA MEETS THE MILITARY

Antagonism between the press and the military centers around the fact that the military operates in a low profile manner, especially in the realm of sensitive national security matters. By its nature and function, the press views its responsibility as a watchdog that has a mandate from the people to provide information about all the inner workings of their government, including its military organizations and their operations. This tension has existed from the beginning. Two examples have been selected to illustrate attempts by the military in recent history to address this apparently adversarial relationship.

1. Naval War College Military Media Symposium 1974

"The Newsman in Viet Nam"

The Naval War College hosted a conference in November 1972 entitled "The Military and the Media: Toward An Understanding". Participants included national and regional media representatives, the Service chiefs of information, and other civilian attendees for an initial two day session. The second session, entitled "The Military and the Media: Mutual Responsibilities", was held in November 1973. The third phase occurred

²⁷¹ Morgan L. Fitch, Jr., "The U. S. Navy and the Public", *Naval War College Review* (Sep 1969), Vol XXII No. 1, 14-19.

over the next year as students had the opportunity to host two-to-three day visits by individual members of the press, both print and broadcast variety. The primary objective was achieved whereby a constructive dialogue was established between the military and their counterparts in the media.²⁷²

The catalyst for a seminar such as the one described above was, in fact, the Viet Nam War and the military's impression of slanted coverage of it. Five basic criticisms have surfaced in regard to the media's handling of that conflict. They include: 1) position reporting - the reporter assumes a position or bias thus, all the news reported by him will support that position and mindset; 2) crisis reporting - sensational events are overplayed such that adequate background information is not provided to the reader/viewer. The result is an ill-informed rather than a misinformed public; 3) uninformed reporting - this usually occurs as a result of inexperience in journalism, or ignorance of the military situation due to inadequate investigative background work. Occasionally, it is demonstrated by the individual, such as in Afghanistan, who did not leave the hotel room but relied on second and third hand accounts of the action; 4) factual reporting - a newsman is a professional who must rely on facts and accuracy to maintain both his reputation and his credibility. Errors do occur as a result of deadline pressures, or editorial decisions which may leave part of the story on the newsroom or the splicing room floor; 5) not-on-the-team - this is the attitude that reporting an unpleasant event, even if factual, is detrimental to morale and the victory momentum. The problem is that by eliminating constructive criticism, the press becomes a member of the military team at the expense of the mandate from the people. Numerous studies conducted of the news coverage of the Viet Nam War have in fact faulted the press for only one of these five criticisms, the

²⁷² Set and Drift, "Military-Media Symposium at the Naval War College", *Naval War College Review* (Jan-Feb 1973), Vol XXV No. 3, 49-51; Commander Jack M. White, USN, "The Military and the Media", *U.S. N. I. Proceedings* (Jul 1974), Vol 100 No. 7/857, 47-51.

tendency to engage in crisis reporting. One study, in fact, accuses the press of reporting the government's party line.²⁷³

2. The Military Media Relations Panel -Sidle Commission 1984

"The Newsman in Grenada"

The Military-Media Relations Panel met February 6-10, 1984 at the National War College in Washington, D.C. General John W. Vessey, Jr., then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tasked Major General Winant Sidle, USA with the project of convening a panel of experts from the media and the military to answer the question, "How do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of a military operation while keeping the American public informed through the news media?" Participants included four former newsmen with print and broadcast experience in wartime, a former dean of a journalism school, a former Chief Of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, representatives of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and all four of the DOD military services. At the outset a statement of principle was made: "...the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. News media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S.

²⁷³ LCDR Ralph W. Blanchard, USN, "The Newsman in Viet Nam: Responsible or Irresponsible?", *Naval War College Review* (Jun 1968), Vol XX No. 11, 14-42; LCDR R. W. Blanchard, USN, "The Newsman in Viet Nam", *U.S. N. I. Proceedings* (Feb 1969), Vol 95 No. 792, 51-57; George Arthur Bailey, "The Viet Nam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard, and Frank: A Content Analysis of Journalistic Performance by the Network Television Evening News Anchorman 1965-1970" (1973) Ph. D. The University of Wisconsin, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Major Michael C. Mitchell, USMC, "Television and the Vietnam War", *Naval War College Review* (May-Jun 1984), Vol XXXVII No. 3, 42-52, Mitchell raises the issue of the Twenty Two Minute laws, the Media Elite, and the problem of visuals taking priority over in-depth reporting; Daniel C. Hallin, *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Peter Braestrup, *Big Story, Vols. I and II* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977); Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). This last study, specifically, Chapters 5 and 6 build a case for Chomsky and Herman's thesis that the press is really a propaganda machine for the U. S. government, that an adversarial relationship does not truly exist, and that the Viet Nam war coverage taken as a whole reveals a definite slant in favor of the government. Their thesis continues to generate controversy as indicated in the *Humanist* article cited previously.

forces."²⁷⁴ The commission went on to debate such questions as: the public's right to know, the media's First Amendment rights, the issue of bias in the media, the sheer volume of press members (free lance or on assignment), and censorship. Their solution was the establishment of a national press pool.

The catalyst for the convening of such a panel was the decision to exclude the press from the Grenada Operation "Urgent Fury". The debate was underway almost immediately, with the press outraged over the military restrictions on journalists, the U.S. public not entirely sure it was a bad idea, and the military basking in the glow of a "successful" operation unhampered by journalists. The decision to restrict journalistic coverage is usually based on five arguments: 1) protect reporters from gunfire, or being taken hostage; 2) media cannot keep secrets since the commercial imperative is too great, therefore military lives could be at risk; 3) liberal bias among the media will prevent accurate reporting; 4) First Amendment rights do not necessarily apply in wartime, nor was it meant to be complete protection for all forms of speech; 5) the people's right to know must be balanced in times of crisis or danger with the people's right to be protected. The only two considerations which appear to have some validity are, the idea of limited censorship implied in number four, and protection idea outlined in number five. Journalists who accept an assignment to a war zone accept the risks inherent in that assignment, much as a military member does. Excluding them on the basis of potential death or becoming a hostage is not acceptable, as long as the public understands that the risk is there and the journalist's situation will not be allowed to control the military situation. Educating the press in terms of security will resolve the commercial imperative to some degree although, there will always be the unethical exception who releases

²⁷⁴ MAJGEN Winant Sidle, USA (RET.), "The Public's Right to Know", *U. S. N. I. Proceedings* (Jul 1985), Vol 11/2/989, 37.

information prematurely. This does not condone unlimited censorship. The liberal bias documented earlier is a reality, however, it should be understood that the same liberal bias extends to all areas of the news, not simply military operations. The Viet Nam studies indicated that, in fact, the liberal bias did not prevent fair and accurate reporting, but the crisis imperative, and the visual imperative did at times. ²⁷⁵

3. Media: Force Multiplier or Force Divider?

World War II war correspondents, as noted earlier, were a different breed than the journalists performing those duties today, or even twenty-five years ago during the Viet Nam War. Attitudes towards the war effort were carefully cultivated on the home front through the Office of War Information and sustained from the front by patriotic reporting designed to maintain morale. Reporters trained with the troops and were subjected to the same danger. There was a sense of oneness which permeated the reports from the field. This media, composed of radio broadcasts, newsreels, and print journalism, were force multipliers. Specifically, they acted as *watchmen* providing reports on an environment beyond the reach of the families back home. They became a *liberating force*, breaking the bonds of distance and isolation, and developing the quality of empathy, the sense of belonging with the other allies. They served to *focus attention* and by so doing, planted ideas which further helped to support the war effort. They were able to *raise aspirations*, to combat fatalism and a fear of failure, to challenge those "whose arms were too weary". Finally, they created both an *informational and intellectual climate* which stimulated

²⁷⁵ LT J. Morgan Smith, USN, "Wanted: A Responsible Free Press", *U.S.N. I. Proceedings*, (Jul 1984), Col 110/7/977, 77-85; MAJGEN Winant Sidle, U.S.A. (Ret.) "The Public's Right to Know", *U.S.N.I. Proceedings* (Jul 1985), Vol 11/7/989, 37-43; James F. Pontuso, "Combat and the Media: The Right to Know Versus the Right to Win", *Strategic Review* (Winter 1990), Vol XVIII NO. 1, 49-60; Richard M. Clurman, *Beyond Malice: The Media's Years of Reckoning* rev. ed. (New York: New American Library, 1990), 24-25; Major Mark Adkin, RA, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1989), 257-9.

people to alter their perspective and entertain the idea of alternate futures, i.e. one in which victory was a reality.²⁷⁶

If the press could do all of the above, thus employing themselves as a force multiplier, is the opposite not true? Reverse the equation, and do they not become a force divider? The criticisms presented in the previous section would seem to indicate that the answer is a resounding "yes". In the view from NATO, Robert Delaney indicates that communications and the media have introduced an indirect approach into warfare and its setting. Specifically, the lessons are that: public opinion can arrest as well as encourage war, and it is the press which mobilizes public opinion; the freedom of the press must be understood as a potent weapon in the political arsenal; the psychological factor in national security and how the press affects this has become an issue in military planning.²⁷⁷ Apparently, it is the slant, the bias, the angle of the journalistic endeavor which will determine if the overall press effort is to be a force multiplier or force divider. The more well-informed the press is, the more likely the reporting will be accurate, and the end result will be a force multiplier. This is not to imply that the purpose of the press is to become a cheerleader for the military and its operations. However, failure to provide the minimum accurate information to them at the outset, is a certain guarantee of "divide and conquer". The problem is that the military will be the entity so divided and conquered.

The next chapter will focus on the military negotiator and the dilemmas posed for him by the media, the negotiation process, and what options may be available to resolve this issue.

²⁷⁶ This is an adaptation of Wilbur Schramm's role of the media in developing countries, 127-32.

²⁷⁷ Robert F. Delaney, "Communications, Subversion and Public Diplomacy: The View from NATO", *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1977), Vol XXIX No. 3, 73-8.

VII. MEDIA DIPLOMACY: THE DILEMMAS FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATOR

U.S. military negotiators find themselves in the situation of presenting not only the U.S. point of view, but also the military point of view when engaged in negotiations. Although various studies have been conducted which focus on national styles of negotiation, there is a paucity of information on the military style of negotiation, if such a form is even in existence. Studies conducted by the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs have resulted in fifteen general guidelines which should be followed by the U.S. negotiator. They are as follows:

- 1) Know your substance and be well prepared because your interlocutor probably will be.
- 2) Have clear objectives and know your bottom line.
- 3) Understand the negotiating style of the country you are dealing with.
- 4) Do not negotiate with yourself.
- 5) Do not stake out extreme positions but be consistent.
- 6) Be patient and use time deadlines sparingly.
- 7) Develop personal relationships with your interlocutor, but be careful not to be manipulated.
- 8) Seek opportunities for informal sessions because they are where most agreements are made.
- 9) Use appropriate protocol because the other side will probably be status conscious.
- 10) Use media pressure carefully because it could backfire.
- 11) Understand the national sensitivities of your interlocutor and do not violate them unless it is unavoidable.
- 12) Assess your interlocutor's flexibility and the obstacles to his accepting your bottom line.
- 13) Know the decision-making process of your counterpart and assess when it may be necessary to circumvent the negotiators.
- 14) Be involved in your own decision-making process.

15) Pin down the details where possible, especially when the other nation has compliance problems.²⁷⁸

These are actually, standard negotiation techniques regardless of the country, profession, or nationality of the negotiator involved. Roger Fisher defines these same issues as the six categories of negotiating power, however he focuses on the early stage or pre-negotiation phase. He lists the six kinds of power as: 1) skill and knowledge; 2) good relationship; 3) good alternative to negotiating; 4) an elegant solution; 5) legitimacy; 6) commitment.²⁷⁹ Again, these six elements are important to the military negotiator as well. As both of these experts indicate, the personality of the negotiator is the key to successful negotiations. It is to be assumed that all good negotiators will conduct extensive background research, that they will have some experience in negotiations, but the base point before engaging in any of this is to have a sense of self.

In the Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown conducted a systematic exploration of individual differences in background, i.e. sex, race, age, status, etc., as well as individual differences in personality, i.e. inherent

²⁷⁸ Hans Binnendijk, ed., National Negotiating Styles (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), viii-ix.

²⁷⁹ Roger Fisher, "Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence", *American Behavioral Scientist* (Nov/Dec 1983), Vol 27 No. 2, 149-66. The powers are delineated as follows: 1) skill and knowledge - ability to listen, become aware of the emotions and psychological concerns of others, to empathize, to speak different languages, to communicate clearly and effectively, to become integrated so that one's words and nonverbal behavior reinforce each other. Analysis, logic, quantitative assessment, and the ability to organize ideas are also important. Knowledge pertains to the people involved, the interests involved, and the facts, i.e. history, geography, economics, scientific background of a problem, as well as its legal, social and political implications; good relationship - involves trust and the ability to communicate easily and effectively; a good alternative is to consider the alternatives to reaching an agreement with a particular negotiating partner, to select the most promising, and to improve it to the extent possible; the elegant solution is one which generates multiple options designed to meet as well as possible the legitimate interests of both sides; legitimacy is the result of research completed to find precedents, expert opinion, and other objective criteria, and to have worked on various theories of what ought to be done; commitment may be affirmative or negative. The former is the offer of what you are willing to agree to, or what you can do under certain conditions should agreement fail to be reached. The latter states that you are unwilling to make certain agreements even though it would be better to than to make no agreements. Additionally, it may be a threat that, failing agreement, you will engage in certain negative conduct. The earlier a negative commitment is made, the earlier a take-it-or-leave-it position has been announced, and the less likely the negotiator is to have maximized his position.

cooperativeness, authoritarianism, cognitive complexity, risk-taking propensity, etc. Reviewing approximately 200 relevant studies, they attempted to integrate those findings to Kurt Lewin's two-parametric model of an individual's behavior: E (environment) and P (person), focusing on the P variable. P, in this instance, consists of the individual's needs, beliefs, and values. Rubin and Brown posit the existence of a bargaining world comprised of two fundamentally different types of people, who reside at or near the two opposite poles of a dimension known as *interpersonal orientation or IO*. At the upper end of the continuum is the *high IO* who is *responsive to the interpersonal aspects of his relationship with the other. He is both interested in, and reactive to, variations in the other's behavior.* The *low IO* is characterized by a *nonresponsiveness to interpersonal aspects of his relationship with the other. His interest is neither in cooperating nor competing with the other, but rather in maximizing his own gain- regardless of how the other fares.*²⁸⁰

After reviewing the individual differences in background Rubin and Brown noted the following characteristics. The general finding about age was that young children tend to behave like low IOs, becoming more interpersonal in their orientation as they grow older; college students generally behave more like high IOs. The race variable indicates that individuals tend to bargain more cooperatively with an opponent of the same race than with one of another race; blacks tend to bargain more cooperatively than whites. Nationality or cross-cultural factors were indeterminate due to the discrepant pattern of findings and paucity of research in this area.²⁸¹ Intelligence (as measured by various tests of intellectual aptitude) was found to be unrelated to bargaining ability or behavior. Studies

²⁸⁰ Jeffrey Z. Rubin, and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 157-91.

²⁸¹ This is not to imply that national styles of negotiating do not exist. This fact is well-documented, but rather that one nationality negotiating with a wide variety of other nationalities may or may not exhibit different patterns of behavior.

using religious affiliation as the basis of bargaining behavior were too few in number to be statistically significant. The status factor was determined to have an effect in terms of compliance or exploitation. Negotiators display considerable deference toward high or higher status others by engaging in frequent compliance with their threats, and by submissive behavior. Low status individuals were routinely exploited. In terms of gender, females tend to bargain like high IOs, while males behave more like low IOs. The bottom line is that an individual's age, race, status, and gender will have an effect on the negotiating process.

After reviewing the individual differences in personality Rubin and Brown noted the following characteristics. Generally, high risk takers behave like low IOs and were found to yield less often than low risk takers but only under conditions of low information. The perceived locus of control factor as defined by Rubin and Brown is the subjective probability that rewards are determined by self-effort (internal control) or by an outside agency (external control). After examining 200 relevant studies Rubin and Brown noted that this factor showed that internals behave somewhat like high risk takers, or low IOs. Externals, however, behave like high IOs. Cognitive complexity as defined by Rubin and Brown refers to the processing of information, i.e. abstract processors are said to be high in cognitive complexity; concrete information processors are said to be low in cognitive complexity. Negotiators high in cognitive complexity behave like high IOs, while those low in cognitive complexity behave more like low IOs. Intolerance of ambiguity is defined as a tendency to prefer regularity to change, clarity to ambiguity, balance to imbalance, concreteness to abstraction, etc. Negotiators who are high in tolerance for ambiguity are more likely to behave cooperatively than those who are low. Interestingly enough, Rubin and Brown found that the self-concept variable had a direct correlation to the type of negative behavior displayed. Rubin and Brown concluded that a negative self-

concept will result in more competitively negotiating behavior than an individual with a positive self-concept. The relationship between a negotiator's motivational predisposition and subsequent behavior is usually measured in terms of three basic motives: the need for achievement, the need for affiliation, the need for power.²⁸² Achievement-oriented negotiators tend to behave like low IOs. In the Rubin and Brown studies affiliation and power-oriented negotiators tend to behave like high IOs. In terms of attitude, trusting negotiators behave more cooperatively than those who are less trusting. Cooperators, not surprisingly, behave more cooperatively, i.e. like high IOs, than competitors who behave like low IOs. Cooperators display an interesting twist, however, in that they will behave more like the others with whom they interact, i.e. tendency to engage in behavioral assimilation. Therefore, the cooperator will behave more cooperatively in the presence of another cooperative entity, and more competitively in the presence of a competitive entity. The competitor views the world as composed of others like himself. High authoritarianism is characterized by a power orientation, obedience to others in power, disposed to concrete thinking, and a generally suspicious and cynical attitude towards others. Overall, Rubin and Brown determined that the results were inconclusive when attempting to relate this attitude to negotiating behavior. Flexible ethicality was defined, for the purposes of their study, as displaying moderate and conventional endorsement of commonly accepted ethical principles. A negotiator low in flexible ethicality displays more extreme and moralistic (more authoritarian) endorsement of these principles. The negotiator who displays high ethical flexibility will behave more cooperatively than the individual who displays a low ethical flexibility.

²⁸² The need for achievement as defined by Rubin and Brown is the desire to attain a predetermined standard of excellence. The need for affiliation is the desire to have friendly relations with others. The need for power or dominance is the desire to exert control over others.

Summarizing Rubin and Brown's findings in terms of distinct personality types indicates the following. The individual who ranks high on the interpersonal orientation scale is characterized as: a low-risk taker, has an external locus of control, high cognitive complexity, trusting, cooperative, high tolerance for ambiguity, positive self-concept, motivational need for affiliation and power, and displays high ethical flexibility. The individual who ranks low on the interpersonal orientation scale is characterized as: a high-risk taker, has an internal locus of control, low cognitive complexity, suspicious, competitive, low tolerance for ambiguity, negative self-concept, motivational need for achievement, and displays low ethical flexibility. Obviously, this represents two extremes of the scale but it remains instructive in terms of providing a possible profile of the military negotiator. The military mind was presented in a previous chapter. Based on the Robinson study, military officers were found to share certain strengths: self-confidence, goal orientation, concern for the welfare of others, trust and even temper, and a strong willingness to accept responsibility in directing others in the accomplishment of an important goal. Phrased differently, the military negotiator appears to have a tendency to place on the high end of the interpersonal orientation continuum, as defined by Rubin and Brown.

A. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS - THE ART OF COMPROMISE

Negotiation may be defined as "...a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present,"²⁸³ or as "...a field of knowledge and endeavor that focuses on gaining the favor of people from whom we want things. It is the use of information and power to affect behavior within a 'web of

²⁸³ Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), 3-4.

tension."²⁸⁴ In either case, the possibility arises that the individual negotiator will be required to alter some aspect of his original negotiating position if he is serious about reaching an agreement. Compromise, as this alteration is commonly termed, is not to be confused with collaboration or capitulation. Both of these terms cast the act of compromising in a pejorative light. Compromise does, however, represent concessionary behavior on the part of the negotiator. It is also a common facet of Western negotiating behavior, particularly American negotiating behavior. On the IO continuum, this willingness to make concessions in the interest of the greater good is characteristic of the high IO personality. A negotiating tactic such as compromise may have unintended consequences, i.e. viewed as a sign of weakness by the other negotiating party, viewed as an opportunity to extract more and thus, manipulate the negotiations unfairly, etc.

The artful aspect of compromise is in recognizing when to offer a concession, what to offer as a concession, and how to make the concession benefit both parties without damaging the negotiator (and his own nation's interests) who made the initial proposal. Ikle, Fisher and Ury indicate that compromise does not have to occur in negotiations, that alternative solutions may be found. Ikle discusses the non-controversial solution or as Cohen would phrase it, a win-win situation. Fisher and Ury state that the positional bargaining game of "softball" or "hardball" should be changed to "negotiate on the merits", or separate the people from the problem.²⁸⁵ Concessions and compromise are not options in their framework.

1. Pre-Negotiation Phase

Prior to embarking on any negotiation, there are various phases that routinely are experienced. These phases may be identified as: 1) defining the problem; 2) gaining a

²⁸⁴ Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 15-6.

²⁸⁵ Ikle, 217-8; Cohen, 149-208; Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), 13.

commitment to negotiate from the other party; 3) arranging the negotiation; 4) the negotiation itself.²⁸⁶ Essentially, there must be a common issue in conflict and a common interest in resolving that conflict through peaceful means. If those two elements are not present, then negotiation will not occur. In order to define the problem and design potential acceptable resolutions to that problem, the negotiating party must determine what its objectives are in pursuing this course of action. The aims or objectives can be classified as five types: 1) extension agreements; 2) normalization agreements; 3) redistribution agreements; 4) innovation agreements; 5) effects not concerning agreements.²⁸⁷ Although military negotiators could be involved in any one of these either through design or by default, they are most likely to be involved in extension agreements, and normalization agreements.

2. Functions and Turning Points

Returning to the earlier discussion concerning suggestions for effective negotiating techniques, the base line consists of three elements: information, power, and time. The functions of the negotiation process are linked to these elements in the following ways. Information is the background research phase which permits *diagnosis* to occur. It answers such questions as: what is the problem?, what is likely to appeal to the other

²⁸⁶ Harold H. Saunders, "The Pre-Negotiation Phase", in International Negotiation: Art and Science ed. by Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr. (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, U. S. Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1984), 47-56; Cohen, 164-7.

²⁸⁷ *Ikle*, 26-42. Extension agreements maintain the "status quo" by prolonging existing arrangements. Examples of extension agreements are tariff agreements, renewal of rights in terms of military base leases, etc., Normalization agreements are used to terminate the abnormal, i.e. a war, or to formalize arrangements tacitly arrived at, i.e. cease-fire, reestablish diplomatic relations, etc. Redistribution agreements represent a demand by one side to the detriment of the other side. Examples include a new distribution of territory, political influence, etc. Redistribution arrangements are usually coercive in nature. Innovation agreements deal with setting up new relationships or obligations. In contrast to redistribution, innovation arrangements are considered to be mutually advantageous. Finally, effects not concerning agreements are the use of negotiations for such purposes as propaganda, intelligence, stalling, etc. The commitment to negotiate is actually non-existent and the negotiating atmosphere is used to manipulate the other side based on a hidden agenda.

negotiating party?, what are the mutual objectives?, what are the stated needs, and what are the real needs?, etc. If the negotiator has this kind of information about the other party, then he has power. The power may be used in a variety of ways. Viewed strictly from a functional aspect, the power of knowledge or information can be used to *formulate a solution* or workable principle which will be acceptable to both parties involved. Finally, this formula or principle may be *applied* to a specific problem, and the details worked out over time.²⁸⁸

Turning points may be considered as a significant change in the negotiation process. There are three such stages commonly recognized: 1) the moment of seriousness; 2) the crest; 3) the closing moment or deadline. Stage one is the moment when the negotiators come to the realization that a possible solution, mutually acceptable to both parties does exist. The second stage is the recognition that the agreement reached thus far is acceptable, and now it must be defended, instead of the opposing points of view. The third stage is the opportunity to close the deal. This is one of the most difficult to reach due to the tendency in human nature to continue discussing the deal, even though it has essentially been concluded. If this moment passes without an agreement, then the parties may find themselves arguing new points of contention not previously considered.²⁸⁹

3. Styles of Negotiation

National styles of negotiation do exist, however this section will be limited to an examination of the negotiator's objective, and how this affects the negotiating process. Simply stated, the negotiator may be characterized as one who pursues a: 1) Win-Lose strategy; 2) Win-Win strategy; or 3) Hedging strategy. Competition is the hallmark of the win-lose strategy, with the emphasis on the negotiator achieving his goals at the

²⁸⁸ I. William Zartman, "Negotiation: Theory and Reality", in *International Negotiation*, 1-8.

²⁸⁹ Zartman, 3-4.

expense of his adversary. Standard techniques include: extreme initial position, limited authority, emotional tactics, concessionary behavior viewed as a weakness therefore concessions will be infrequent and largely symbolic, and finally, time has no meaning as there is no deadline.²⁹⁰ During the height of the Cold War era, the win-lose strategy was also known as the Soviet method.

Cooperation is the hallmark of the win-win strategy, with the emphasis on the negotiators achieving a mutually beneficial solution to the problem. Standard techniques include: establishing trust, obtaining information, determining the other negotiator's needs and attempting to meet them, using his ideas, i.e. collaboration in the positive sense, taking moderate risks, and finally, soliciting his help in solving the problem. Although the two sides do not start out with the same objectives and priorities, through communication and active listening, a solution becomes increasingly possible. This win-win strategy is sometimes compared to the U.S. style of negotiating.

Hedging strategies in negotiations are the attempt to maintain the balance in favor of one negotiating team or the other. Although not quite as one-sided as the win-lose strategy, neither is it as open as the win-win strategy. The willingness to engage in a hedging strategy indicates that trust has not been established between the two teams of negotiators. Techniques are characterized by stalling, lack of authority to commit, and shifting objectives.

²⁹⁰ Cohen, 119-39; Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence Through Negotiation" in Binnendijk, 24, 28-34; Gerald I. Nierenberg, The Complete Negotiator (New York: Nierenberg and Zeif Publishers, 1986), 187-93; David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 155-7; Coral Bell, Negotiation From Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); Roy J. Lewicki and Joseph A. Litterer, Negotiation: Readings, Exercises, and Cases (Illinois: Irwin Press, 1985). The following articles from this volume outline the elements of the three strategies discussed above. Andrew Tobias, "Winning Through Negotiation", 6-18; Jack O. Vance, "Winning: A Leading Consultant Tells How", 64-8; Aric Press with Charles Glass and Donna Foote, "Winning by Negotiation", 123-5; Robert W. Johnston, "Negotiation Strategies: Different Strokes for Different Folks", 156-64; Frank L. Acuff and Maurice Villere, "Games Negotiators Play", 177-85.

Personal styles were alluded to earlier. According to Spector's focused studies, the dynamics of negotiation are dependent upon four factors: unique mixture of personality, perception, expectation, and persuasion.²⁹¹ These studies were conducted predominantly of the negotiator in contrast with his opposite number, as opposed to the other members of his specific negotiating team. Colosi expands on this theme in his studies of the intra-group dynamics of the negotiating team itself.²⁹² Three personality or negotiating styles are identified: the stabilizer, destabilizer, and the quasi-mediator. Stabilizers are cooperative to the point of assuming the other side's point of view just so that an agreement may be reached. Destabilizers are not sure that negotiation achieves anything, consequently they will counter all in-house proposals, as well as the adversary's proposals. Basically, they believe that adjudication or a contest of will is the only way to resolve problems. Admiral C. Turner Joy came to almost the same conclusion based on his experience at the Korean Armistice Conference. He stated that "...in negotiating with the Communists there is no substitute for the imperative logic of military pressure. In other words, we learned that progress in negotiating with them is in direct proportion to the degree of military pressure applied."²⁹³ Quasi-mediators spend the majority of their time mediating between the stabilizers and destabilizers within their own group, but also appear to have the ultimate responsibility for the success of the negotiating effort.

²⁹¹ Bertram I. Spector, "Negotiations as a Psychological Process", The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications ed. by I. William Zartman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), 55-66.

²⁹² Thomas Colosi, "A Model for Negotiation and Mediation", in International Negotiation, 15-34. See also I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 16-23; Chester L. Karrass, Give and Take: The Complete Guide to Negotiating Strategies and Tactics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Publishers, 1974), 86-7.

²⁹³ Allen E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 5.

Finally, in terms of the military negotiator there is the question of the "culture-generation" gap.²⁹⁴ The uniformed military remain an island of authority, conformity, and discipline in an increasingly permissive society. As previously noted, the art of negotiation is not one of rigidity and the possibility exists that the officer trained in the military environment will have a tendency to clash with certain democratic and egalitarian values of civilian society. However, it is equally true that the military emphasizes group interdependence and team coordination as the basis for survival, and that these qualities carry over quite well into the negotiating team environment.

B. NEGOTIATIONS: OPEN OR CLOSED?

Open negotiations imply that the public is part of the decision-making process, that their concerns are being addressed, and that pressure is applied to do what is morally right. Closed negotiations, hidden behind a veil of secrecy, are stigmatized by the stereotype of "dirty little deals" wherein the interests of the many are sacrificed for the interests of the few. Neither picture is quite accurate. Ikle notes the distinction between open and secret negotiations, formal and informal negotiations.²⁹⁵ The former may be open or secret, whereas the latter is usually secret. Informal negotiations are the "feeling out" phase whereby diplomats cautiously probe the issues, present tentative positions, and understand that partial agreements are not binding. Personal relationships among the negotiators will influence the proceedings at this juncture. Formal negotiations conducted in secret attempt to achieve one of two major effects; either to keep domestic groups ignorant, thus

²⁹⁴ Friedheim, "Strong Free Newspapers", 636-7; Rear Admiral Brent Baker, USN, "The War of Words", *U.S.N.J. Proceedings* (December 1989), Vol 115/10/1042, 35-9. Both of these writers emphasize this gap between the media and the military in terms of a generation-culture gap, but it is also applicable in the negotiating arena as well. The gap exists because reporters are younger, and have never seen military service, television has assumed the primary role in "getting the news out". Journalists, in contrast to the military, are seen as free-wheeling, irreverent, and highly skeptical of authority.

²⁹⁵ Ikle, 134-5.

preventing unnecessary pressure during successive phases of bargaining, or keep third parties in the dark, thus reducing their influence. Of course, either of these effects may be manipulated in a reprehensible manner²⁹⁶ which has resulted in secret diplomacy receiving such negative press in the twentieth century. Secrecy in governmental affairs has been an anathema to the United States since its founding.

1. The Legal Framework - The Case Against Secrecy

Previously, freedom of the press was discussed in some detail, therefore the arguments for and against will not be addressed in this section. Instead the focus will be on specific legal actions which were taken that, in fact, altered the interpretation of freedom of speech, access to government information, and the public's right to know.

a. The Constitution

The Constitution was defended by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, who wrote a series of articles to justify ratification for publication in the New York newspapers. *The Federalist Papers* are considered classics in the realm of political theory and commentary. Due to their efforts, the Constitution was adopted in 1789. The only flaw appeared to be the absence of proper representation of the mass of the American people. This anomaly was corrected by the First Congress, which proposed ten amendments known as the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. Ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights became the legal guardian and standard for the mass public. Article I clearly delineated the rights of freedom of speech, and the press. What was not so clearly delineated according to Justice Potter Stewart was "...the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed...[in its] battle against secrecy and deception in government. There is no

²⁹⁶ The previous division of the world as designed by the Congress of Vienna, and the later Concert of Europe, Hitler-Stalin pacts, etc.

Constitutional right to have access to particular government information..."²⁹⁷ The information which follows represents just such attempts by the press.

b. The Freedom of Information Act

In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Freedom of Information Act which established the "right to know" criterion for requesting specific types of information from the government. This superseded the previous standard of proving the "need to know." Should a citizen request information about a specific government body, that information was releasable unless it appeared in one of the nine exemption categories.²⁹⁸ The first category specifically deals with the question of national defense and foreign policy, but for years this issue remained untouched and unquestioned. In 1974, the "properly classified" caveat was inserted based on the Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink case. The Court ruled that it could only determine if the requested material was in fact classified, not on the appropriateness of the classification.²⁹⁹

c. The Pentagon Papers and the Amendments

At the same time Johnson was signing the Freedom of Information Act, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was organizing a task force to produce an "encyclopedia

²⁹⁷ Quoted in *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol 9 No. 1, p 37.

²⁹⁸ The nine categories are: 1) information established by executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, or information properly classified pursuant to such executive order; 2) information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 3) information that is specifically exempted by statutes; 4) information concerning trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential; 5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the first agency; 6) personnel and medical files or similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes under certain situations; 8) information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; 9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning oil and natural gas wells.

²⁹⁹ Morton H. Halperin and Daniel Hoffman, Freedom vs. National Security: Secrecy and Surveillance (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1977), 105-6; Also by Halperin and Hoffman, Top Secret: National Security and the Right to Know (Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1977), 47-8.

and objective" history of the war. This was the genesis of the Pentagon Papers. Leslie H. Gelb, head of the task force, examined the first volumes upon completion, and decided after consulting with his superiors that the entire study should be formally classified "top secret sensitive". In its final form, the study was comprised of a series of volumes summarizing American activities in Viet Nam prior to Kennedy's election, as well as particular episodes and programs, i.e. the Diem coup, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the South Vietnamese request for American troops, the decision to deploy U.S. forces and their subsequent buildup, the decision to begin and expand bombing operations against North Viet Nam, and the history of American negotiations with the North Vietnamese government. The U.S. intelligence community, which was conducting the research into this subject, began to question the wisdom of the Indochina policy and raised the issue within the pages of the study.

Daniel Ellsberg, who was writing a Rand study of the history of American involvement in Indochina, requested and received permission to view the documents. In 1970, Ellsberg delivered a copy of the document to Senator William Fulbright, who did not take action on them due to the unorthodox manner in which a government-classified document had come into his possession. In 1971, a set was delivered to the *New York Times* journalist Neil Sheehan, who produced a series of stories which appeared in print in the Sunday edition of the *Times*, June 13, 1971. An injunction against publication was filed by the government, but seventeen days later, the injunction was lifted. The Court had ruled that prior restraint was not permissible in this case. In reviewing his experience with the Pentagon Papers, Sheehan discussed how the press had, in truth, failed in Viet Nam. According to him, there were three lessons learned by the press as a result of the Pentagon Papers: 1) failed to raise in their reporting, the essential questions about American policy in Indochina. Questioning the details and failing to question the substance resulted in

simplistic analyses of events; 2) the press allowed themselves to be used by the power managers in the executive branch as tools to further policy (this is the Noam Chomsky argument); 3) suspicion of power, particularly in the executive branch.³⁰⁰ Unfortunately, the lessons drawn from this event serve to complicate the negotiator's assignment, since negotiators are viewed as a part of the executive branch. If they are too powerful, too reliant on secrecy, then there must be hidden agendas, which the public has a right to know about.

Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act were a residual fallout from the Pentagon Papers incident. By 1974, Congress had enacted major revisions, including a number of procedural changes. A request which "reasonably describes" a record in an agency's possession obliges the agency to review the record and determine if the information is, in fact, properly classified. Initial agency response must be within ten days. Finally, administrative sanctions are prescribed where the court determines the information was arbitrarily and capriciously withheld.

2. The Intelligence Imperative - The Case for Secrecy

Fundamentally, this nation recognizes that although freedom of speech and freedom of the press are inalienable rights, there is also the right of protection "from all enemies both foreign and domestic." Under those circumstances defined as in the national interest or threatening to national security, then secrecy must be considered a viable option.

a. National Security as Legitimate Concern

The government does have a need for secrecy. The puzzling aspect is to determine, the number of secrets, the content of those secrets, and the length of time needed to maintain the classified status. There are three operational areas which would

³⁰⁰ Neil Sheehan, "The Press and the Pentagon Papers", *Naval War College Review* (Feb 1972) Vol XXIV No. 6, 8-12.

appear to meet the criteria for maintenance of secrecy: 1) military; 2) intelligence; 3) diplomacy. It should be understood that not all aspects of these three should be classified but, rather specific areas which pertain to the concept of national security. Information leaks about military plans and strategies, the strength and deployment of forces provide invaluable intelligence to foreign adversaries. The possession of such information could result in the ultimate failure of military objectives and operations. Expanding this idea into the realm of weapons design and research exponentially multiplies the risk factor, by not only providing the enemy with the force multiplier equation, but also the ability to mount a counterforce, thus neutralizing the solution. Strategic advantages are reduced or affected each time inadvertent or deliberate technology transfer occurs.

Intelligence, by its nature, relies on the strict control of information, the sources of that information, and the methods of collection. Failure to safeguard any one of these areas is to risk the failure or prejudice the success of the intelligence effort, the compromise of an agent's identity, and possibly his life. It may engender the loss of faith on the part of allies in a nation's ability to preserve and protect knowledge for the greater good. "Discretion is not only the better part of valor", it is the seal of trust between two or more nations.

Finally, secrecy in diplomatic initiatives, as previously discussed, provides latitude and mobility in the exploration of options. Confidential meetings, "feeling out" sessions may open previously closed channels of communications, the opportunity to speak candidly with another government, and to investigate solutions which would not be acceptable should they be publicized. Meetings minus the media and the subsequent theater it entails, may provide the answer to the pressing international relations questions of the day.³⁰¹

³⁰¹ William T. Casey, "Our National Secrets: The Intelligence Community and the Press," *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Dec 1, 1986), Vol LIII No. 4, 98-100; William E. Colby, "Intelligence Secrecy and Security in a Free Society", *International Security* (Fall 1976), Vol 1 No. 2, 3-14; Martin L. C. Feldman, "Why the First Amendment Is Not Incompatible with National Security Interests", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Apr 15, 1987), Vol LIII No. 1, 394-8; Nick Kotz, "The Government's Need for Secrecy vs. the People's Right to Know", *Naval War College Review* (May-Jun 1984), Vol XXXVII

One solution to this issue of classification is offered by Halperin and Hoffman in their categorization system. Broadly speaking, they propose that information be assigned to one of three groupings: 1) automatically released; 2) presumptively classified; 3) requiring the exercise of discretion with explicit consideration of the information's value for enlightened public debate.³⁰² A review of the contents of their categories reveals the same issues addressed above with the possible exception of revealing the location of nuclear weapons abroad. This latter issue would probably be better left classified in view of the problems with terrorist organizations routinely burglarizing conventional weapons stores at military facilities in the past.

b. Surprise and Change in International Relations

Diplomacy may be characterized as routine or creative according to George Liska.³⁰³ Routine diplomacy maintains the status quo, thus allowing the diplomat to engage in extension or normalization agreements. Creative diplomacy (also termed surprise diplomacy) radically alters the existing arrangements between countries, thus allowing the instigating diplomat to engage in redistribution or innovation agreements. It should be noted that the creative diplomat may be operating in either an offensive or

No. 3, 36-41. These four articles represent three viewpoints: the intelligence community in the guise of the CIA, a U. S. District Judge, and a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter. Although they are not in complete agreement, each acknowledges the need for a certain amount of secrecy in the three areas cited above. Opinions abound on this issue but eventually, the concession is made that there are some aspects of governmental operations which require the protection of classification.

³⁰² Hoffman and Halperin, Top Secret, 57-68. Automatic release would include such information as: 1) Americans engaged in combat or in imminent prospect of combat; 2) American forces abroad; 3) nuclear weapons abroad; 4) financing of foreign operations or foreign military forces; 5) commitments to do any of the preceding, or commencement of negotiations contemplating such commitments; 6) intelligence organizations: existence, budgets, and functions; 7) weapons systems: concepts and costs; 8) actions in violation of the law. Presumptive classification would be applied in the case of: 1) weapons systems: details of advanced system design and operational characteristics; 2) details of plans for military operations; 3) details of ongoing diplomatic negotiations; 4) intelligence methods: codes, technology, and identity of agents. Information not clearly identifiable or categorizable in these two groupings would then be placed in the third grouping with the emphasis on release rather than the withholding of such information from the public sector.

³⁰³ George Liska, Beyond Kissinger: Ways of Conservative Statecraft (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) 25-6.

defensive mode. A *fait accompli*, either minor or major, is an example of just such a diplomatic surprise maneuver. The surprise aspect is limited to the element of timing, but it is impossible to achieve without secrecy.

The military also engage in surprise "diplomacy", only it is usually antagonistic in nature, and definitely of an offensive character. The complexity of surprise in the strategic realm is evident, as it may occur on several different levels simultaneously, and consist of a diverse array of elements. Handel offers the following variables: area or areas chosen for the attack; strategy and tactics employed; use of new military doctrines; technological surprise in the use of new weapons systems; surprise in terms of timing, etc.³⁰⁴ Media exposure of any of these elements could result in the failure of the specific operation, as well as the overall politico-military strategy.

c. Reagan and Information Control - The Pendulum Swings

The presidential approach to intelligence matters, particularly the classification of information, has exhibited a recurring pattern. Each time a sensitive issue has been leaked to the press which limited the presidential options and potential courses of action, there were attempts made to reform the entire system. Reagan inherited a media environment which worked well for him in terms of presenting a charismatic personality in a series of sound bites. The problem was that this same media environment also had the capability of both using and being used by government officials through the ignominious practice of "leakology".

Instituting an information control policy in an attempt to resolve this puzzle, the Reagan administration focused on the following areas: a revised classification policy, a pre-

³⁰⁴ Michael I. Handel, "Surprise and Change in International Politics", *International Security* (Spring 1980), Vol 4 No. 4, 57-85; See also Kenneth E. Roberts, "Lessons of Strategic Surprise: Pearl Harbor, Cuba, and the 1973 Middle East Crisis", in New Dynamics in National Strategy: The Paradox of Power (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1975), 69-89.

publication review requirement, and regulation of technical-scientific information exchange.³⁰⁵ The revised classification policy was embodied in Executive Order 12356 and included such elements as: the elimination of automatic declassification, the addition of derivative classification, the provision of category types for the protection for information, and the creation of special access programs. In 1982, the DOD instituted the non-disclosure agreement, which is executed by all employees with access to classified information. Basically, it is a contract between the employee and the government that no personal writings of a current or former security-cleared employee will be published until, and unless, the government has subjected the manuscript to a pre-publication review process. Lastly, in an effort to control the transfer of scientific-technical information which could have an effect on national security in the military arena, two existing statutes were invoked: the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the Export Administration Act of 1979.

Two other initiatives which failed were the Freedom of Information Improvement Act proposed in 1981, and the draft of an "Official Secrets Act", designed along the lines of the British model. The FOIA improvements were limited to adding the FBI's domestic surveillance files to the nine exemptions, and to cease routine granting of search fee waivers for journalists and scholars. Congress did not pass either of these initiatives.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 22-9; U. Lynn Jones, "See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Information Control Policy of the Reagan Administration", *Policy Studies Journal* (Winter 1988-89), Vol 17 No. 2, 243-60; Deborah Shapley, "The Media and National Security", *Daedalus* (Fall 1982), Vol III No. 4, 199-209; CAPT James E. Wentz, USN, "Should America Have a 'War Press Act'?", *Naval War College Review* (Nov/Dec 1983), Vol XXXVI No. 6, 65-7.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

C. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE NEGOTIATOR

Having explored the internal constraints affecting negotiators, it would be instructive to examine a few of the external constraints which routinely bedevil negotiators. Three examples have been selected: summiteering, public opinion, and information control. As the previous discussion concerning open or closed negotiations would indicate, these three are only representational, not all-inclusive.

1. Summiteering: The President as Chief Negotiator

Arguments for and against summitry may be distilled down to two issues: 1) personal meetings between heads of state are conducive to better understanding of intentions, and establishing the habit of communications; or 2) personal meetings between heads of state limit maneuverability in negotiations, and imply that the court of last resort is in session. Should this court fail, the repercussions would be devastating, or so some believe. Actually, the problem is miscast in these black and white terms. The reality is, that unless a head of state has been carefully briefed and devoted some time and attention to the problem, he may undo months of work previously conducted at the lower levels of the negotiating process. This is not entirely the president's fault, for he must contend with the propaganda and publicity effects his mere presence generates. Ikle likens the summit to a "huge megaphone for national programs on foreign policy."³⁰⁷ In the wake of the Geneva summit, the observation was:

And for diplomacy, it meant that summit meetings, and their surrounding sub-events, would no longer be confined to the quiet and unintruded negotiations between world leaders but rather could be made into political, indeed media, events of the first magnitude, whether deserving or not, that could impact upon global public opinion, and thus on world politics.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Ikle, 126.

³⁰⁸ Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior 1979-88, 332-33; Judith Miller, "King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hope", *New York Times* (Oct 19, 1990) A1, 8. In a recapitulation of his efforts to resolve the situation between Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, and George Bush in Washington, D. C., King Hussein comments that "A dialogue across the airwaves is not

So what are the constraints posed by public opinion? Is it, in fact, a media creation?

2. Public Opinion and Perception: Media Creation

Opinions are formed as a result of numerous stimuli which the brain constantly filters, sorts, encodes, rejects, and substitutes for previously known information, experiences, etc. There are two publics, the attentive and the masses. The attentive public recognizes the linkage between foreign and domestic affairs, are well informed, vote according to the issues, and actively participate in the political process. These are the "switchers in elections"³⁰⁹ or Chomsky's specialized class.

The mass public will vote according to family tradition, the clergy's or local newspaper's or union's opinion, past political association, etc. If they vote at all, it will usually be in accordance with anything but the issues. This is the group Nixon would say supported his policies, "the silent majority."³¹⁰ However, this is the same group who will turn against a public official perceived as a liar, or one endangering the national security. "The covenant between the people and their democratically elected government is a fragile one."³¹¹

What is a well-informed public? Presumably, it is those people who read such newspapers as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and watch the evening news in conjunction with the MacNeil/Lehrer Report, Meet the Press, Washington Week In Review, and so forth. However, if these news sources are:

- a) exhibiting a liberal bias, or
- b) espousing the government's propaganda slant, or
- c) simply selling newspapers and air time, then whose opinion is reflected in "Public

constructive", thus implying that only a face-to-face meeting will be productive, and not the verbal blasts carried by the Cable News Network.

³⁰⁹ Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 101.

³¹⁰ Ibid, 103.

³¹¹ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 106.

Opinion"? The answer varies with the critics. Michael Parenti takes the visual medium to task for being a "make-believe media; they make us believe",³¹² such that the viewer becomes an active accomplice in the indoctrination of the television's viewpoint, the so-called liberal bias. Giovanni Sartori details three characteristics, 1) salience acquired by protests but with only time to present one viewpoint; 2) false statistics or the casual interview whereby five on-the-spot interviews are presented as public opinion; 3) the poll trap which is actually a play-back of what the media has been presenting all along.³¹³ In his analysis, the news is a case of "narrowcasting", public opinion without public contents. This theme is repeated by other media watchers as well,³¹⁴ but as will be noted in the "External Benefits" section, not all critics are in consonance.

3. Control of Information is Power

There are several ways to control information: 1) restrict access to only a few individuals; 2) release it incrementally or selectively; 3) inundate the receiver to such a degree that the information cannot be properly processed due to overload; 4) restructure it to support an ideological viewpoint, etc. In the negotiating process, various "information-controllers" may be in effect at any time. The negotiator may not have the necessary information about his opposite number, the peripheral issues which may be affected by the

³¹² Michael Parenti, "The Make-Believe Media", *The Humanist* (Nov/Dec 1990), Vol 50 No. 6, 18-20.

³¹³ Giovanni Sartori, "Video-Power", *Government and Opposition* (Winter 1989), Vol 24 No. 1, 39-53.

³¹⁴ Russell Lee Williams, "American Public Opinion and Strategic Planning: Considerations and Case Studies", (M. A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA) June 1984, 10-14; Arlene Balkansky, "Through the Electronic Looking Glass: Television Programs in the Library of Congress", *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* (Summer-Fall 1980), Vol 37 No. 3-4, 458-75; Lyn Ragsdale, "Presidential Speechmaking and the Public Audience: Individual Presidents and Group Attitudes", *The Journal of Politics* (1987), Vol 49 No. 4, 704-36; Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1985); W. Russell Newman, *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Selma H. Fraiberg, "The Mass Media" *New Schoolhouse for Children* in *Violence in the Streets* ed. by Shalom Endleman (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968).

negotiating process, the options under consideration at the upper levels of decision-making, or third party factors which may intrude, i.e. the media and the public are two such examples.

If the negotiator is not in control of the information process, then the difficulty of coming to an acceptable agreement is intensified. Credibility may be sacrificed as the negotiator reads in the newspaper information which directly contradicts his publicly stated position. Details of the negotiations may be released which then damage his reputation and call into question his skills in the realm of discretion. "Leaks", as previously discussed, are not controllable even when the selective release of information was the goal.

D. EXTERNAL BENEFITS AND THE NEGOTIATOR

Interestingly enough some of the same issues which appear to be constraints to the negotiator, when viewed through a different lens may become benefits. This discussion will be limited to two: ethics of journalism, and public opinion and perception.

1. Ethics of Journalism

Professionals, whether they are doctors, lawyers, or members of the military, have established a code of ethics for themselves which has evolved over the years. When an officer receives his commission, he does so because special trust has been placed in his patriotism, valor, abilities, and fidelity. This latter is his commitment of faith to the nation and its principles, the U.S. Constitution which he has sworn to protect and defend. All military members, by virtue of their enlistment or commissioning oath, have accepted the military code of conduct. In essence, the code states that: an American fighter will maintain his honor despite the attacks made upon it; he will not quit the fight; he will never betray the trust through word or action; he will never disgrace his uniform and what it symbolizes; in captivity, he will join with other loyal Americans to aid them and then

himself. On the day-to-day level, the code of behavior stems both from the individual's background and the American principles embodied in such documents as the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, etc. Ideally, these principles include: 1) dedication to human rights' 2) respect for the dignity of the individual; 3) fair play to all and favoritism toward none; 4) active concern for all aspects of human welfare; 5) to deal with each person as if he were a blood relative. How else could a man be expected to volunteer to fight, and possibly die for another? Realistically, not all members of the Armed Forces may achieve these goals, but they serve as a guide which is the true function of an ethical code.

The profession of journalism too, has its code of ethics, its journalist's creed. Frank Luther Mott required his history of journalism students to memorize this creed and write it on the final exam.³¹⁵ This creed or oath states that the public journal is a public trust, therefore the workers are trustees for the public, and acceptance of lesser service than this is a betrayal of the public trust. Both the journalist and the military member then, have incurred an obligation to the American people by the mere selection of a specific profession. The Journalism Code of Ethics³¹⁶ lists twenty guidelines, however, this presentation will be limited to four which reinforce its most controversial and frequently vilified role, watchdog on the government in order to protect the people's right to know. Summing up, they include: 1) to seek truth and to enlighten; 2) to guard freedom of speech, including unpopular opinions and criticism of the government, as an inalienable right of people in a free democracy; 3) to embrace the common carrier concept of public discussion and information; 4) to actively censure and try to prevent violations of these

³¹⁵ Earl R. Hutchinson, Jr., "To Kill a Messenger: The Ethics of Journalism", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Jul 1, 1987), Vol LIII No. 18, 572-76; See also Frank L. Mott, American Journalism: A History.

³¹⁶ Code of Ethics, "1983 Journalism Ethics Report".

standards. Lofty ideals, not always attainable, nevertheless, passed from one generation of journalists to the next. Not all are capable who take up the pen, as not all who take up the sword may be, but the fact remains that both groups view themselves as answerable to the American people. Neither can betray that trust and maintain the public support and confidence so necessary to survival. In a four month study conducted of two major network news broadcasts, and two news magazines,³¹⁷ Herbert Gans identified eight enduring values portrayed in the American news. They are: 1) ethnocentrism - America first and foremost, international news always in second place; 2) altruistic democracy; 3) responsible capitalism; 4) small town pastoralism; 5) individualism; 6) moderatism; 7) desirability of social order; 8) need for national leadership in maintaining that order. A free press is critical by its nature, the U.S. press is critical of the country and its leaders, thus, these eight values in terms of stories are constantly dissected, held under the microscope, criticized or commended. The bottom line of the balance sheet reveals that this code of professional ethics, when followed, benefits the negotiator as well as the public. A public trust implies a public responsibility, and to violate that by publishing classified or sensitive information that serves only to provide a scoop and possibly endanger lives or negotiations in the national interest is a mockery.

2. Public Opinion and Perception

How does the public perceive the media? According to surveys conducted in 1979 and 1980 by the Public Agenda Foundation,³¹⁸ the U.S. public believes the following: 1) the press is too powerful; 2) credibility of the press' sources of information is

³¹⁷ Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); W. Charles Redding, "The Enemies of Responsible Communication: The Voices, The Silences", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Sep 1, 1988), Vol LIV No. 22, 702-4; Oliver C. Henkel, Jr., "The Press, The Process, and Gary Hart: We Cannot Be Intimidated by the Apparent Power of the Press", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Sep 1, 1987), Vol LIII No. 22, 697-700.

³¹⁸ Hannaford, 35-8; Servan-Schreiber, 117-120, 275-6.

questionable at best; 3) the press uses practices which are abusive, unfair, or unethical. These practices do not coincide with the liberal described earlier, but perhaps do with someone who is alienated from traditional norms and institutions. The base line is that although the media believe they are the spokesperson of the people, the people, are in fact, listening with their critical faculty engaged and at times, articulated in opposition to the media.³¹⁹

There are certain characteristics about "public opinion" which should be delineated. It may be defined as "the collective opinion around an issue of differences", "the voice of the people", or "views and attitudes on domestic or foreign actions and issues held by the people of a nation, community or group."³²⁰ Public opinion manifests itself at elections, in the choice of political party and candidate; through legislative bodies; through volunteer, special interest, and pressure groups or lobbies. However, public opinion is not "...total and determinant, static and all-inclusive. There is no 100% public opinion that includes every adult in the U.S. on any one issue."³²¹ There are majorities and minorities, strong, weak, or no interest in particular issues, latent or dormant opinions, etc. but there is no complete group consensus. Even Reagan's landslide election evidenced this phenomenon, as there were those, in the minority admittedly, who did not vote for him and his platform.

How is public opinion formed? Up to this point, the focus has been on the mass media, but that is not to undervalue the role of social institutions, ethnic backgrounds, personal influence of the leader, and significant actions taken by those in leadership positions. Propaganda is used to win converts through such techniques as name calling, the glittering

³¹⁹ John Tebbel, "From Rags to Riches: The Media in American Society", *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* (Winter 1981), Vol 38 No. 1, 42-50 briefly traces this on again/off again relationship between the U. S. public and the U. S. press from the colonial printing press to the satellite hookups.

³²⁰ Kenneth Minogue, "Journalism and the Public Mind", *Government and Opposition*, (Autumn 1989), Vol 24 No. 4, 473-88; Edward L. Bernays, "Public Relations - A Contemporary Concept", *Naval War College Review* (Jun 1962), Vol XIV No. 9, 1-16; Plano and Olton, 83-85.

³²¹ Bernays, 9.

generality, transfer association, testimonial, "plain folks" appeal, card stacking, and the band wagon. These are all attempts at persuasion or manipulation of an individual's opinions or beliefs. The mass media, in particular television, has been accused of being one of the "great persuaders." Studies, however, do not confirm this impression.³²²

The error one makes in granting television or the press such power lies in ignoring the personal element, the freedom of choice, and the tendency for a human being to read those newspapers and magazines or watch those news programs which appeal to his or her own personal beliefs. The average American will not read the daily newspaper cover to cover but will take the smorgasbord approach. In this era of television remote controls and multiple cable channels, the viewer will "click" past those stories which do not capture his or her interest. The press must vie with the personal filter of each member of its audience. An audience, which is not captive but has the capacity and the inclination to buy a different newspaper or change the channel if the news coverage does not match its pre-conceived idea of what it wants or needs. This independence of thought and action may or may not be extended to the military negotiator and his or her efforts, but it does augur well for the opportunity to at least receive balanced consideration.

³²² Robert M. Entman, "How the Media Affect What People Think: An Information Processing Approach", *Journal Of Politics* (May 1989), Vol 51 No. 2, 347-70 concludes that the media contribute but do not control the structure of publicly available information, and that the process itself is an interdependent one composed of political, social, and cultural elements; Scott C. Paine, "Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension", *Journal of Politics*, (February 1989), Vol 51 No. 1, 36-49 concludes that the existing beliefs of the "actors" themselves play an important role in the process of manipulation, i.e. must be convinced of the benefits of conversion; Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes", *Journal of Politics* (February 1990), Vol 52 No. 1, 3-28 find that when foreign policy "experts" disagree, the public will rely on prior beliefs to formulate opinions; Silvo Lenart and Kathleen M. McGraw, "America Watches 'Amerika': Television Docudrama and Political Attitudes", *Journal of Politics* (August 1989), Vol 51 No. 3, 697-712 conclude that some attitudinal changes occurred but that the impact of informal peer discussion on political attitudes tended to *counteract* the effects of direct media influence; Spitzer, Ch. 4 reviews several brain wave studies conducted while the test cases were viewing television and notes that the results are inconclusive, contradictory, and subject to alternative interpretations.

E. EASING THE TENSION: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS

If the dilemma for the military negotiator posed by media diplomacy is multi-faceted, then how is the problem to be addressed? Selected for consideration are four areas: 1) media reform; 2) military public affairs; 3) limited censorship; 4) information strategy. This is not all-inclusive but representative of different options to ease the tension which now exists between the military and the press, the negotiator and the newsman.

1. Media Reform: The Educational Care and Feeding of Journalists or Self-Criticism can be Enlightening

Quality control for journalism is an oft-debated subject both inside and outside journalistic circles. The discussion of public opinion above and the findings that the public does not have complete faith in the news organizations and their reporting would appear to indicate that a change is needed. Everette E. Dennis of the Gannett Center for Media Studies addresses this issue, stating "Quality control for journalism is unlikely to occur unless there is a commitment to high standards of news gathering, editing, and dissemination at the very top of an organization."³²³ He offers six suggestions for improvement: 1) increase the currently low salaries of journalists; 2) develop imaginative in-house training programs, support industry-wide training efforts, and help to develop new education and training facilities where needed; 3) support journalism education; 4) the industry should seek out the best and the brightest students, from all fields, and encourage them to join the journalism family; 5) genuine research and development activity is lacking on the part of people in the news media; 6) all news organizations should dedicate a portion of pre-tax profits to education, training, and research development. His idea is to attack the problem at the source. Examine how the

³²³ Everette E. Dennis, "Quality Control For The Media: Education Training and Research Development", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, (Nov 15, 1986), Vol LIII No. 3, 93-6.

journalist is educated, trained, and nurtured to discover why the news media appears to have lost its credibility, its direction, and its commitment to quality.

The second approach is to set a "watchdog" upon the "watchdog." Writing in 1965, William L. Rivers, journalist and Associate Professor of Communication at Stanford, stated that the press needed a critical apparatus that would encourage professionalism.³²⁴ Modeled after the British Press Council, it would receive complaints, place calls to the responsible editors for explanations, and then pronounce judgement. The Council has no ultimate authority, no means of imposing penalties, but it does have the power of publicity, and it is this weapon which the press would understand. He cites Barry Bingham, then editor and publisher of the *Louisville Courier-Journal* and his idea of local press councils. These councils would be composed of three to five community leaders who would receive complaints. Newspaper executives would appear to present "the journalist's case", and public reports of decisions would appear on television or in the newspaper periodically. Harold Lasswell proposes a rebirth of the Committee on Public Communication. Only this time, it should be composed entirely of representatives of the mass media - those who are "suspected of integrity."³²⁵

Former presidential press secretary Jody Powell notes a striking similarity between the problems that beset those in politics and those in journalism. Neither institution is held in particularly high regard by the American public; both are always making decisions based on woefully inadequate information; and both exhibit an oversensitivity to criticism.³²⁶ He mentions the *Columbia Journalism Review* and the *Washington Journalism Review* as attempts to censure one's peers but believes the problem deserves a multi-variate approach.

³²⁴ William L. Rivers, *The Opinion Makers* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965)194-200.

³²⁵ Harold Lasswell, *The Language of Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1965), 42.

³²⁶ Jody Powell, *The Other Side of the Story* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1984), 291-3.

Alternative scenarios offered to ease the tension include: 1) introduce real competition, i.e. if one news source prints or broadcasts inaccuracies, then another should confront them with it and challenge the veracity; 2) conflict of interest is a possibility whereby the reporter is covering a story in which he has a personal or financial interest. Why not impose mandatory financial disclosure statements?; 3) inaccuracies occur because there is no fear of retribution, consequently, establish limits and threaten adverse publicity or even fines. This is not to censor the press, but to censure them for sloppy practices.

Finally, thirty years after Rivers' recommendations, Richard Clurman laments the demise of the National News Council and the inability of the American system to make such an organization a success. Citing the media's special privileges, i.e. 1) news media's failure to report energetically on themselves and on each other; and 2) their reluctance to give the public adequate ways to reply after the press has spoken.³²⁷ As the culprit, his solution is to remedy this situation by altering the scenario admitting that neither of these would be easy to achieve, he commends the rise of the media reporters whose assignment is to report and criticize press practices. As of this writing only the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, *Newsday*, and the *Los Angeles Times* have such a position on the paper, however it does constitute a beginning.

2. Military Public Affairs: Preventive Maintenance

The military cannot reform the media, however the military can reform itself. In his argument against freedom of expression, Tannsjö outlines three important criterion for sound mass communication: 1) growth of knowledge in society; 2) pluralism of ideas; 3) equal opportunity for various social and cultural groups and strata in society to acquire access to the media.³²⁸ Criterion two and three are particularly important in the case of the

³²⁷ Clurman, 285.

³²⁸ Tannsjö, 553-5.

military, for without a pluralism of ideas, there is no basis for rational political decisions, and the military's continued existence depends upon just such decisions. This was the ultimate undoing of the Brazilian military dictatorships. Without equal access to the media, the U.S. military fails to promote knowledge about itself and perpetuates the "Viet Nam Syndrome" of alienation among military members towards the media. Co-education of both the press about military matters and the military's role in a democratic society, as well as the military about media matters and their role in a democratic society is at issue as well. In order to examine possible alternatives to the existing adversarial relationship between the military and the media, two viewpoints will be presented: 1) what the media perceives as corrective action for the military in terms of public relations; 2) what the military perceives as corrective action for itself in terms of public relations.

A fundamental misunderstanding in regard to the press is that it is part of a governmental or military team, equal partners in relaying only the good news, never the bad or embarrassing.³²⁹ Obviously, if the press has a responsibility to the public, and it is to communicate a variety of viewpoints, negative as well as positive, then the team concept is unworkable. Lecturing at the Naval War College in 1972, Barry Zorthian outlined a press relations doctrine for the military. His nine point plan included the following principles: 1) respecting the role of the press as a free channel of communication in a democratic society; 2) the press is the channel to the public and provides the means of creating an enlightened citizenry; 3) educate the press - avoidance of the press and refusal to provide information will jeopardize the goal which is an informed public; 4) distinguish between information and publicity. Information is provision of Detective Friday's "Just the facts", open to interpretation and commentary by the news media. Publicity is the

³²⁹ Sheehan, "The Role of the Press", 4-4; Zorthian, "The Role of the Communications Media in a Democratic Society, 1-7; White, "The Military and the Media", 47-51; Hannaford, 42-8.

originator's version directly transmitted to the public without an intermediary's examination and analysis; 5) need for candor in the act of communicating or how to eliminate the "credibility gap"; 6) keep the privilege of national security to an absolute minimum, i.e. its purpose should be to protect the lives of military personnel in situations of danger, or to protect national interests in situations of great sensitivity; 7) the military should take the initiative in communicating with the press, particularly in regard to negative events; 8) recognize that there is no compartmentalization of information, no room for interservice rivalries, or civilian-military rivalries. Coordination and consistency in press communications is paramount, particularly in the case of sensitive negotiations; 9) recognize that the world itself cannot be compartmentalized and the "global news village" is a reality.³³⁰ Interestingly enough, these same points were characterized as lessons learned by the Naval War College students who participated in the Military Media Symposiums conducted in 1973 and 1974.³³¹

The military's response to the problem of military-media relations has traditionally focused on two individuals, the commanding officer, and the public affairs officer. Commander Palmer, RN (Ret.) begins his argument for reform with the "top down" approach, i.e. the commanding officer.³³² This individual is the visible authority whose words, actions, and responses carry weight. Setting priorities in terms of public affairs management flows from the commanding officer, who will determine both the priority of effort and the priority of importance. The dilemma is that operational matters are always high priority items, while the media aspects are often neglected, but should an operational malfunction occur, the media aspect will become paramount. In order to examine the

³³⁰ Zorthian, 4-6; Additional comments provided by this author in regard to principles four, eight, and nine.

³³¹ White, 50-1.

³³² Palmer, "P. R. - '...As Others See Us'", 61-6.

effectiveness of any command public affairs program, Palmer recommends asking five questions. How much personal time is the commanding officer willing to give to public affairs?³³³ What size command warrants a trained public affairs officer or a collateral-duty public affairs officer?, i.e. What is the quality of the public affairs staff? Has the commanding officer received any training in public affairs methods?; Is there an adequate budget for public affairs, or is this consistently decreased due to operational necessity and congressionally-mandated budget reductions?; Is the public affairs aspect routinely included in all facets of command operations (excluding classified and sensitive areas)? Asking these questions may be the beginning of a preventive maintenance (PM) program for the military public affairs situation.

Writing in 1977, then LCDR Baker (later to become RADM Baker, Naval Chief of Information) carries this theme of PM further.³³⁴ Defensive public affairs is a command operating in the crisis-management mode, being forced to respond to a negative story or one which is potentially damaging in terms of national security. Reporters are viewed as a pack of hungry wolves waiting to devour the messenger regardless of which option is selected for rebuttal.³³⁵ Inadequate preparation and the failure to lay the proper groundwork in terms of an earlier working relationship with the local news media may result in serious repercussions. Establishing the dialogue and command credibility before a crisis situation has the potential to pay significant dividends. These dividends may be

³³³ Public affairs activities involving the commanding officer's time are defined as talking to the press; writing, broadcasting, and preparing for the press; discussing public affairs with his own team. The last is sometimes seen as a deficiency in the U. S. military's approach to public affairs, in that the public affairs officer is often the last to know and therefore unable to respond adequately to the media's questions.

³³⁴ Baker, "Leakology: The War of Words", 48-9.

³³⁵ As discussed in a previous chapter, these include: 1) refusal to confirm or deny, "No comment"; 2) demand a retraction or write a letter to the editor; 3) issue a statement or a press release; 4) call a news conference; 5) hold a "backgrounder"; 6) prepare an answer to a query.

realized in greater media access, balanced reporting, or a "heads up" news tip in the event of a negative story.

Offensive public affairs may be defined in two ways. It may be considered the daily and routine interactions between a command's public affairs office and the local news media. Public affairs activities such as a base open house, ship's tour, Blue Angels air show, or support for local community programs such as the Naval Postgraduate School 1989 Earthquake Relief efforts, the Marine Corps annual Toys for Tots campaign, the Washington, D.C. area Project Literacy military volunteers are all offensive strategies in the public affairs realm. Each type of activity presents a particular image of the military to the community. Although these "human interest" stories have a certain appeal, unfortunately, it is the "disaster" story which will prove the biggest drawing card. The crash of a Blue Angels aircraft, for example, may prove devastating not only due to the loss of life involved, but also the failure to provide timely and accurate information as to its cause. Speculative stories may appear in print linking pilot error to drug or alcohol abuse, an aircraft malfunction to faulty military procurement practices, etc. This is where the second definition of offensive public affairs may be applied, the strong public rebuttal. Journalists and the military both rely on credibility to "sell" their product. Repeated public exposure of a journalist's failure to check his or her facts sends three messages: 1) the military is literate, well-informed, and willing to take up the pen to correct a wrong; 2) the reporter fails to meet the basic standards of journalism, as does the newspaper, magazine, or radio/television station which continues to employ him or her; or 3) the public has the right to review both sides of the story, and then make an informed decision.

Another area in which the military could reform itself is in the realm of media education and training. Both Malloy and Hannaford³³⁶ discuss the rise of the image consultant and

³³⁶ Hannaford, Talking Back to the Media; Malloy, New Dress for Success.

the media consultant. With regard to the former, military personnel wear uniforms, thus an image consultant would be a classic example of overkill; however a sharply pressed uniform, military hair style, and on-camera poise will speak volumes about the military long before the individual has begun talking. The idea of a media consultant has been peripherally addressed by military authors writing in the U.S. Naval Institute publication *Proceedings*. Major Michael C. Mitchell, USMC recommends that the following proposals be reviewed as potential methods to co-educate the media and the military.³³⁷ First, offer a military public affairs officer to the major television networks to work in the editing room on a strictly advisory basis.³³⁸ Second, develop a Department of Defense-coordinated education program for members of the media in recognition of the fact that the military tends to be complex and confusing to outsiders unfamiliar with the language, the organization, and the difference between military and civilian operations.³³⁹ Third, provide a weekly, one-hour Department of Defense-sponsored television news broadcast during times of conflict, funded either by the government or by private grants, so as to provide a "second lens to correct visual distortions caused by the first lens."³⁴⁰ What is interesting about Mitchell's proposals is his attempt to reverse the role of the media consultant. Instead of hiring someone with civilian media experience, he recommends that the military provide a new kind of media consultant, the uniformed one to educate his or her civilian peers. Colonel Upchurch returns to the "top down" approach recommending

³³⁷ MAJ Michael C. Mitchell, USMC, "Televising War", *Proceedings* (April 1986), Vol 112/4/998, 52-6.

³³⁸ The drawback to this proposal is that networks deal with unions and a military person, although not being paid by the network, could be viewed as infringing upon the rights of an accredited "military specialist" journalist. Additionally, unless the situation were handled with discretion, the appearance of governmental control or military censorship could become the story instead.

³³⁹ The drawback to this proposal is that the education effort could be misconstrued as an indoctrination and propaganda effort in the negative sense of the word.

³⁴⁰ The drawback to this proposal is the same as the previous one, a tendency to be seen as governmental control of news, plus providing access to the media which the average individual or company does not have despite the "equal time" doctrine currently in existence.

that the commanding officer receive realistic training and become his own best media consultant.³⁴¹ His recommendations include: a media course or seminar at all levels of professional military education, particularly at the command and staff colleges; instructors should be experienced media representatives; a laboratory-oriented media seminar should be included; emphasize practical experience with news media representatives, including a series of no-notice interviews. The purpose of all this training is to acclimate commanders, to have them "emphasize the positive, clarify or correct the negative, and direct their answers through the reporter and out to their real target - the public...to suppress hostility and still project authority and self-confidence."³⁴² Operationally, military commanders constantly exercise the mettle of their troops through surprise inspections and drills, practice damage control, and perform preventive maintenance. COL Upchurch is simply recommending the same attitude be taken towards public affairs, train, drill, exercise, and train again, so that when the crisis occurs, the response becomes second nature. Training is not enough however. Two hard and fast principles must be remembered and consistently applied: 1) always tell the truth; 2) never say anything to a media person, anywhere, at any time, on any subject that is "off the record."³⁴³ Failure to abide by these two maxims will result in disaster every time.

3. Limited Censorship in the National Interest

The discussion of censorship is usually focused on the idea of complete censorship, a total news blackout such as occurred during the first forty-eight hours of the "Urgent Fury" operation in Grenada. Taken to the extreme, all information is of possible value to an adversary. Consequently, any attempt to categorize what kinds of information are

³⁴¹ COL Richard L. Upchurch, USMC, "Wanted: A Fair Press", *Proceedings* (July 1984) Vol 110/7/977, 68-74.

³⁴² *Ibid*, 73.

³⁴³ Matthew J. Culligan and Dolph Greene, Getting Back to the Basics of Public Relations and Publicity (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1982), 7.

releasable or not releasable becomes a Herculean task. The list will either be too broad or too narrow, with no median standard available.³⁴⁴ And yet, M. Tregaskis, an experienced reporter of wars in Asia comments that "Censorship in war is valid, and necessary to preserve objectivity."³⁴⁵ In her view, the havoc wrought in Viet Nam came about because there was no authorized press corps, no basic military assistance granted to the press to include military travel orders, in-country medical care, no billets, status, or mobility. The result was that for the price of a commercial airline ticket, a reporter or a recent journalism graduate could fly into a war zone, present a letter and receive a press card. Amateur hour was the result in many cases of wartime reporting. Grenada saw the same scenario replayed once again. Panama in 1989 saw a press pool activated when, in fact, there were numerous journalists in-country who could just as easily have covered the story without importing more players onto the scene. If censorship is necessary to preserve objectivity, then what type of censorship should it be?

Bill Moyers offers three observations about some factors that influence the President and his relations with the press.³⁴⁶ It is not difficult to see that these same factors may be applied to the military operational commander's situation or the military negotiator's situation. First, some issues cannot be molded to fit an inquisitive media's timetable. Crises over which the President or a military commander has little control, but for which he or she must assume great responsibility, are classic examples of this dilemma. Diplomatic maneuverings and potential military operations can be jeopardized if exposed too soon to the light of day. These are the instances whereby limited censorship may be imposed. Second, events and changing circumstances will alter previously articulated

³⁴⁴ Wise, 140.

³⁴⁵ Letter from Mrs. M. Tregaskis to Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.) dated July 19, 1977 cited in Hughes, "Guarding the First Amendment - For and From the Press", *Naval War College Review*, May/Jun 1984, 28-35.

³⁴⁶ Moyers, "The Press and the Government: Who's Telling the Truth?", 32-3.

strategy or promises. The reality is that policy is not carved in stone, it only appears that way as long as it is workable. Third, oftentimes conclusions and decisions must be made from inconclusive evidence. The Commanding Officer of the USS Vicennes in 1989 understood this simple yet profound, reality of life. Military personnel, especially those in positions of authority and responsibility, deal with this fact daily. The press does not. The decision made by the editor is to cover or not cover a story, to put it on the front page or not, to support the status quo or not. The life or death decisions made by the media have to do with the continued existence of itself, the newspaper, magazine, or station, not with the flesh and blood of human beings unless irresponsible reporting occurs.

What should be the limits imposed on those who would engage in irresponsible journalism? William W. Van Alstyne³⁴⁷ offers the counterargument that the press should have lesser rights than private individuals to withhold information about its sources, because the public needs to judge the credibility of a story, greater liability for damaging and false reports so that the measure of redress matches the magnitude of the harm, etc. In other words, there are times when censorship of the press may be in order, and in some cases, self-censorship is encouraged. Should classified material be leaked to the media, one author recommends that the following actions be taken in the interests of national security and self-censorship: 1) read it through and copy those parts, if any, that are marked "Unclassified"; 2) return the document, in person, to its office of origin and obtain a receipt; 3) write and publish a story describing the general nature, but not the classified contents, of the document and the reasons given by the source for bringing it to press attention, if those have been made known; 4) protect the source's identity; 5) request a meeting with the chair(s) of the congressional committees responsible for the

³⁴⁷ William W. Van Alstyne, Interpretations of the First Amendment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984), 62-5.

area in question and discuss the matter in full; 6) write and publish a report of the meeting with the congressional chair(s); 7) aggressively follow up to assure correction of abuses or other problems that have surfaced.³⁴⁸

One of the most feasible recommendations to date, in terms of limited censorship is offered by James Pontuso.³⁴⁹ Simply stated, the government can allow the print media free access to the battlefield but disallow the presence of television cameras. Print media will give the public the opportunity to engage in abstract thinking, to examine the reasons behind the war, and not merely the powerful images of war which may be used to slant and distort. The presence of print media ensures the freedom of the press but removes the problem of visuals unaccompanied by thoughtful, insightful analysis. Print and still photography could replace the canned footage repeatedly shown as if it were a different day, time, and place. War correspondents could, once again, become correspondents and not merely actors in a drama. It is a possibility, but not likely to become a popular alternative for, "disaster" sells, even when it is our own.

4. Information Strategy

One of the problems to date with the military in terms of public affairs has been its failure to adequately design and implement an effective information strategy. There may be a variety of ways to approach this issue but in this discussion, it will be limited to two: 1) the Engineering of Consent,³⁵⁰ and 2) Managing the Crisis: Avoiding the Diplomatic Nightmare. The first method sounds Orwellian in nature but, it is, in actuality, a practical approach to an impractical problem, i.e. tinkering with how a human being

³⁴⁸ Colonel William V. Kennedy, USAR (Ret.), "Telling It Like It Isn't", 50.

³⁴⁹ Pontuso, "Combat and the Media: The Right to Know Versus the Right to Win", 58.

³⁵⁰ This phrase was coined by Edward L. Bernays. The discussion about this topic draws heavily from his following works - The Engineering of Consent, Take Your Place at the Peace Table, Propaganda, Crystallizing Public Opinion, and his 1962 lecture at the Naval War College entitled "Public Relations- A Contemporary Concept" published in the *Naval War College Review* as previously cited.

thinks about an issue. The second approach sounds more pragmatic, especially since it appears to mesh well with the military maxim of the Six Ps, i.e. "proper prior planning prevents poor performance." According to Pickard, any information strategy in this era of globalization and instant communications is reducible to two elements: 1) Information - knowing the international context of the in's and out's of each country in which the company (or military) does business; and 2) Coordination - being able to formulate and implement a plan based on this information.³⁵¹

The Engineering of Consent approaches any public relations problem from an hexagonal viewpoint. The angles include: 1) defining the objectives; 2) researching public opinion; 3) deciding on the strategy to govern the public relations activities; 4) isolating the themes and appeals meaningful to the target audience; 5) determining the organization to supervise and direct the activity; 6) planning both timing and tactics. Bernays expands on each of these points. First, the objectives may be defined in terms of time, i.e. immediate, intermediate, long-term. Obviously the nature of the problem will dictate the amount of time available to effectively cope with it and find a workable solution. Other objectives may involve modification of attitudes and/or actions of the intended target audience. Second, it is imperative to study the existing public opinion in relation to the specific objectives outlined. By doing this, potential courses of action may suggest themselves. Two ways to discover the existing public opinion include hiring an outside public opinion analyst, or in the military's case where budget considerations are always a priority, assign such a project to students at one of the various military institutions of higher learning. Libraries contain the appropriate reference material to aid in the design of the project. After the research has been completed, the original objectives may need to be redefined. One

³⁵¹ Geoffrey L. Pickard, "Bridging the Gap in Joint Venture Communications: Global Public Affairs", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, (Dec. 15, 1986), Vol LIII No. 5, 145-8.

reminder is that public opinion is not static, so it would be best to define core opinions and not those easily swayed by the latest Hollywood movie effort or military *faux pas* . Bluntly stated, the research should not be reactive in nature, but comprehensive and broad-based.

After studying the raw material of the research, it is time to devise a strategy which is the third step. Bernays offers three basic ones: 1) *intensification* - you strengthen the belief system of those who already believe; 2) *conversion* - winning over people to your point of view; 3) *negation* - blanketing or counteracting the opposing viewpoint.³⁵² The fourth stage is to select themes which the research has indicated will be acceptable to the target audience. Presentation of these themes may assume six different forms: 1) by factual evidence to support the validity of the hypothesis; 2) by reason and persuasion; 3) by authority, i.e. the viewpoint of a dispassionate expert, or the leader of the military organization; 4) by tradition, i.e. the continuity of the American way; 5) by emotion. The fifth stage is engineering the consent of the entire organization, as well as integrating and coordinating everyone's activities. In military parlance, and in support of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, this is the attempt to produce a "purple suit mentality" whereby all the services work together by setting aside interservice rivalries. The final stage is planning, timing, and tactics. Overt acts are the key here, and so the media is the method of choice to channel the information to the target audience.

Managing the Crisis or Avoiding the Diplomatic Nightmare is the approach recommended by those whose target audience is big business, particularly transnational corporations.³⁵³ However, one writer/researcher, James E. Lukaszewski examines both

³⁵² As previously addressed in the sections on "Public Opinion and Perception: Media Creation" and "Public Opinion and Perception", the most effective means appears to be intensification whereby the individual's existing beliefs about a particular topic are reinforced.

³⁵³ For an interesting assortment of complementary methods, see Culligan and Greene, "Public Relations in an Emergency", in Getting Back to the Basics; F. D. Buchstein, "Public Relations - Contacts with Editors and Reporters"; Pickard, "Bridging the Gap"; James E. Lukaszewski,

the private sector and the governmental response to a crisis and how the public perception is altered by asking the simple question, who is in charge? He outlines five public expectations facing an American business in a crisis: perfection in performance; automatic inference of liability; image of deep pockets; regulation by government to prevent disastrous errors; anthropomorphism of corporations. Public perceptions and expectations of the government during disasters tend to be more focused. They include: the government will manage and resolve the situation somehow; the government is unbiased, trustworthy, though perhaps a less efficient, source of information and action; the government is not ordinarily perceived as a source of recovery for damages, suffering, or fear. If this is true, then the military has a head start in the realm of public relations and the disasters which sometimes occur.

According to Lukaszewski, there are four phases which managers pass through in order to internalize the tasks to accommodate, cope with, and resolve the disaster situation. He categorizes these phases as recognition, definition, planning, and reaction, and then further subdivides them. *Recognition* consists of four elements, surprise, concentration, containment, and control. The goal of this first phase is to achieve process credibility. *Definition* has three elements, fear or healthy recognition that matters are extremely serious, facts or need for information, focus or accomplishment of specific tasks. The goal of this second phase is to achieve process frankness. *Planning* is actually identifying the proper reaction strategies in three areas: focus on a goal to resolve the emergency or disaster situation with minimum disruption; use appropriate internal and external resources to maintain credibility and the organization's reputation; adopt a strategic posture, i.e. prepare for opposition or adverse reception of messages. As discussed in the Public Affairs

"Corporate and Private Sector Communications Responsibility: Transborder Disaster Situations", *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Mar 1, 1987), Vol LIII NO. 10, 305-10. This section on managing the crisis draws heavily from the plan outlined by Mr. Lukaszewski.

Preventive Maintenance section, the strategic approaches may involve forecasting, facilitating, and follow-up. Finally, *Reaction* involves the selection of response strategies, i.e. stoicism, steadiness or total concentration, stamina or going the distance, and sensitivity to the politics of the situation. Lukaszewski concludes that the communications responses generated by an organization in a crisis must be able to pass five tests. The messages should be: candid about actions, compassionate but tough, targeted directly to the priority audiences (regardless of external pressures, particularly the media), positive and consistently persuasive, delivered quickly and accessibly. Defining and focusing perceptions, establishing realistic expectations on the part of the public remains the goal in a crisis situation, and according to Lukaszewski the above outlined strategy is one viable means to achieve this goal.

Finally, the military needs to keep the media in perspective. Both Leider and Zubkoff³⁵⁴ give the reader lessons in how to read the newspaper or view the television news with a critical eye and ear, and how to fill in the news holes for oneself. The underlying recommendation by both authors is that the reader should look for the patterns and the trends, much as an intelligence analyst does, and then interpret the information accordingly. Although this may be an heretical suggestion, perhaps it would behoove the military to treat the media as an adversary. At least when one has an adversary, one mounts an intelligence effort and develops strategies to counter effectively the negative or outright inaccurate image being portrayed. This is not to suggest a reincarnation of J. Edgar Hoover's infamous FBI files, but rather a realistic assessment of the situation. The media is not a team player and never will be, however, if they are viewed as an adversary, then the military will not simply disregard them as an insignificant irritation in the daily routine.

³⁵⁴ Colonel Robert Leider, USA, "The Press: A Matter of Perspective", *U. S. N. I. Proceedings* (Jun 1973), Vol 99/6/844, 35-41; Harry M. Zubkoff, "News - Or Views?", *Strategic Review*, (Summer 1976), Vol IV No. 3, 104-10.

The media will become an issue, and how to handle them will achieve a status when setting operational priorities.

VIII. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF MEDIA DIPLOMACY FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATOR

Both official and unofficial diplomacy is now in the process of being conducted through the medium of the media. Negotiations as part of the diplomatic effort and the military's contribution to it are increasingly conducted in the public eye through the glare of the television camera, and amplified by the reporter's microphone. What are the implications and ramifications of this method? The technological revolution, as previously discussed, has altered both the form and substance of international relations. Specifically, it increased the influence of public opinion in world affairs, added the cultivation of public opinion to the principal tasks of statecraft, and redirected some countries' energies and economies to compete more on the "influence" level rather than in the military, economic, or cultural domains. This phenomenon was apparent in the earlier examinations of the Soviet Union and its transition to a *glasnost* environment, as well as the media reform and reform efforts conducted during the military-controlled government era in Brazil. Public diplomacy has altered the classic style of foreign policy conducted in secret among elites.

This volume of communications and instantaneously available information does not guarantee better communication in the negotiation process. Instead it has the potential of becoming "infopollution", a force multiplier of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Foreign opinion, as articulated by foreign journalists is heavily influenced by their reading of U.S. papers and the impressions received via U.S. news broadcasts. However, it is then filtered through their particular cultural lens which will alter the meaning even further. This foreign opinion is, to a certain extent, a reflection or product of the U.S. national mood. For all intents and purposes, it is derived from what the U.S. says, writes, and shows about

itself. At the official level, U.S. embassies and the USIA produce one type of propaganda, while the unofficial media present another through the offices of AP, UPI, and the free lance foreign correspondent. The U.S. military, through its efforts at gunboat diplomacy and community relations presents yet another image of the U.S., and the military's rightful role and place in it.

Media diplomacy creates the dilemma of an audience for whom the determining factor is no longer what actually happened, but the perception of what happened, or what s/he believes happened. Arbitrary determination of what's newsworthy, aggravated by economic pressures (circulation/rating points = advertising dollars), personal agendas (advocacy journalism), and the reality that negativism sells may fail to present "the truth and nothing but the truth" to the consumer. Images without substance, created news, subjectivity presented as balanced information, become not diplomatic efforts but diplomatic deceit. The media is another political tool, but in order for it to be effective at both the official and unofficial levels, certain realities should be taken under consideration. These include, but are not limited to the following.

1. Images and words are powerful. Both must have standards governing their quality and accuracy.
2. Practitioners of media diplomacy should take responsibility for their creative role in shaping the news.
3. Standards of conduct can only add to the overall credibility of the product.
4. Free access to the media will contribute to sustaining the quality of the product by ensuring the presentation of widely differing viewpoints.
5. The media speaks to the citizen and the world. What is being said?
6. National security and freedom of the press are not incompatible, although the tension between the two has yet to be successfully resolved.
7. The military is a political tool as well. Does the military recognize its own shortcomings in the realm of media diplomacy?
8. Negotiators, increasingly, have lost the luxury of secrecy. Do negotiation methods reflect this change? Has the educational preparation been altered as well?

The military negotiator must take all these factors into consideration when determining his or her information strategy. The first key, though, is self-knowledge. There is a military mindset, not a militarist mindset, which is brought to bear on negotiation issues. It is a mind conditioned to recognize, categorize, and formalize the military implications which are inherent in any given national security problem. However, it behooves the military negotiator to be aware of the self-same tendency to combine politics with strategy, by viewing the world in terms of ally and enemy. Neutral players or third party entities are often disregarded and yet, can prove useful to the negotiator if, first one recognizes their potential contribution, and second, one understands how to use these to his or her advantage.

Focusing on one branch of service, the U.S. Navy, demonstrated the existence of an historical diplomatic tradition. Selection for command of a ship or foreign duty ashore implies a recognized aptitude for public relations, a complete knowledge of protocol and courtesies to be executed while in a foreign country, and the diplomatic skills of tact, firmness, and decisiveness in a potentially volatile or embarrassing situation. Military advancement and promotion results in a pyramidal structure whereby individuals are constantly evaluated against their peers and those who have gone before them, in an effort to select the "best and the brightest". Increasingly, the trend has been to ensure that those selected to flag rank demonstrate the characteristics of the Renaissance Man or Woman, i.e. possessing an operational speciality, the ability to transition from one's own service requirements to the joint arena and back again, to speak with authority, intelligence, and candor when needed both at home and abroad, to function as a military diplomat as needed, etc. Naval officers no longer have the power to negotiate treaties with foreign powers, to conclude alliances, nor to engage in a potential act of war, or to negotiate a peace settlement as they were able to do in the early part of this century, but this does not mean

that they have ceased to engage in certain diplomatic activities. Delegation of authority is a fact of life in the military, and as is evidenced in daily military operations, the commanding officer does not do it all, neither does the flag officer. Consequently, those public relations qualities so necessary to those in the most visible military positions, are equally important at the lower levels. The naval "diplomat" today may be any rank or rating, may be engaged in gunboat diplomacy or coercive diplomacy, may be on a friendly port visit or a host for a ship's tour. Although the options of diplomatic behavior have decreased, those remaining are apt to generate a tremendous amount of media attention.

Critics or proponents of naval diplomacy have been unable to argue away the reality that a ship remains a Great Communicator. Media coverage of a routine ship's visit or the deployment of a ship to a potential trouble spot have the potential to rally international approbation or censure. Commentators will provide an instant analysis of capabilities and intentions, whether accurate or not, and this too, will contribute to the overall "military communications/diplomatic effort". Ships bristling with communications gear and armament, aircraft soaring, a tank rolling off a ship or suspended from a heavy lift helicopter all have the potential to engage in dramatic acts, and create a dramatic picture, and where there is drama, a camera will not be far behind.

At times, the military will find itself actually negotiating with the media, particularly in those situations whereby the media is viewed as an encumbrance to the operational effort or a risk to security. War correspondents during the second world war were viewed as force multipliers, watchmen who provided a liberating force, focused attention, raised aspirations, and created an informational and intellectual climate which appeared to fully support the war effort at home and abroad. The Viet Nam experience altered this image of the media indelibly. Viewed as force dividers by the military, these were the individuals who used the crisis imperative and the visual imperative to slant the news, to bias the

presentation, and to reverse the angle in such a way, that the story did not resemble what the military viewed as what should be the truth. In reality, the more well-informed the press is, the more likely the reporting will be accurate, and the end result will be a force multiplier. Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada resulted in a press blackout for the first forty-eight hours of the mission. The backlash from this resulted in the military and the media reexamining their roles in the public information process yet again. Although a firm solution was not forthcoming, the dialogue was reopened, and the lesson learned and relearned that the military has an obligation to keep the American people informed, and the press has the responsibility to ensure that its efforts do not jeopardize lives nor national security.

Should a military negotiator find him or herself in a war termination situation and part of the peace settlement team, or simply part of a routine effort to secure basing rights, certain guidelines are equally applicable to the military as well as the civilian negotiator. Know your substance, your objectives, and your bottom line. Understand the negotiating style of your opposite number. Do not negotiate with yourself. Be patient. Develop personal relationships but avoid manipulation. Seek opportunities for informal sessions. Always use appropriate protocol. Use media pressure carefully because it could backfire. Avoid "information leaks", and never speak "off the record" to the media. Be involved in the decision-making process. Pin down the details. Military negotiators represent not only the military point of view at the negotiating table, but the U.S. point of view as well. Books abound which discuss national negotiating styles, however, such information in regard to the military negotiator or sub-specialist in this field is not as accessible. Any professional negotiator will conduct extensive background research on the problem, have a series of possible solutions in mind, and some previous experience not only in the negotiating process itself, but the attendant features, i.e. diplomatic protocol, and the media

aspects as well. The military negotiator may not have all of these qualities. However, bargaining and negotiating behavior studies when juxtaposed with military mindset studies indicate that the military officers who have attended one of the war or staff colleges have certain strengths which may prove useful at the negotiating table.

The existence of a "culture-generation" gap between military personnel and media personnel does exist. When defining the military, such descriptors as authority, conformity, discipline, group interdependence, and team coordination tend to come to mind. When defining the media, such descriptors as free-wheeling, irreverent, highly skeptical of authority, independent, and basically opposed to institutions are the images produced. Since the advent of the all-volunteer force, the young journalist of today has little or no experience of the military, and yet is expected to report about something of which s/he has minimal knowledge. There is one reassuring factor in all this, both the military and the journalist abide by a code of ethics, and part of that code reiterates that they are, in fact, granted their powers in order to act for the public good. It is a public trust which implies a public responsibility. On the grand scale, both groups are composed of professionals who have a reputation to maintain, and a credibility factor to protect. There are always a few who evince less than sterling qualities, but this problem is to be expected when confronted with any diverse, yet large group of people. Additionally, there will be some journalists who will take the time to become self-educated about their opposite numbers in the Department of Defense, but the military should face the reality that if they don't educate the media (and do so in a manner that does not seem propagandistic in nature), then no one will, and the coverage will continue to be less than adequate. Military public affairs programs, unfortunately, are often run by individuals with little or no formal training themselves, and with only a manual or official DOD or branch of service instruction to rely upon, the result could be catastrophic.

An examination of possible options was explored in attempting to resolve the military negotiator's dilemma with the media, and the concept of public diplomacy. These were outlined as reforming the media through education and self-criticism, performing preventive maintenance on the military public affairs program, acknowledging that limited censorship in the national interest is necessary at times, and designing an information strategy. What do these mean for the military negotiator? First, the military has no control over the self-criticism of the media, however it can provide constructive criticism in the form of rebuttals to grossly inaccurate stories which appear in print or on broadcast presentations. It is imperative that the military negotiator continue to monitor the media's coverage of the ongoing negotiations for two reasons: 1) information may be "leaked" from a third party or from within the negotiating process itself which may damage the effort; 2) inaccuracies may be printed which may not jeopardize the overall effort but could damage the credibility of the negotiating team(s). A response should then be forthcoming in a timely fashion otherwise, the impression will remain a negative one, and the media will not have been taken to task for their inability to report the news in a professional manner.

Public relations is as much a part of the negotiation process as any other command activity. If a negotiator has not been trained in the public relations aspects of his or her job, then self-education may be the key. The military does not always have the luxury or the budget to provide specialized training to all its members for all their collateral or alternate duties. At times, the individual will simply have to take the initiative to learn more about the problem, and how to effectively counter it. "Forewarned is forearmed", however, developing such an information strategy should become an imperative. There are two angles from which to approach this problem, the engineering of consent, which is what public relations is all about, and managing the crisis or avoiding the diplomatic nightmare.

Both require two basic elements, information and coordination. The first refers to the military's operations and methods in dealing with a particular country or community. The second refers to the military's ability to formulate and implement a plan based on the information currently in one's possession. Both also require a previously well-thought out approach, a certain amount of research or intelligence gathering, and if possible, a specific tailoring to the various types of crises which may arise. Obviously, it is not simply a crisis-management response or reactive process if the aim is to be successful. Specifically, the engineering of consent must include such elements as: identifying objectives, determining the target audience, selecting a strategy, i.e. intensification, conversion, or negation, isolating themes most likely to appeal to the target audience, determining and/or designing the organization to implement the strategy, and planning both timing and tactics. The ability to respond rapidly and correctly to a crisis or emergency is ingrained in the military. What has not been ingrained and trained into the military is the ability to remain calm, cool, and collected with a multitude of microphones waving in one's face, journalists swarming around like so many insects, and minicams providing the glare of publicity. True, there is no education quite like experience, but there is no opportunity as apt to damage command credibility, the military reputation, and the operational mission as that provided by the novice spokesperson, inadequately prepared, and minimally trained. A standard has to be set, and it is in the military's best interest to set it.

Military negotiators, commanding officers, and official governmental spokespersons will each find themselves in the same quandary one day. The specter of classified information will be raised in a non-secure setting by a member of the media, and it will require a response. There are some instances when "no comment" is the only possible one based on the sensitivity of the subject matter, but it cannot become the catch-all phrase. "No comment" is an open invitation to a journalist to do even more investigative digging.

Unfortunately, this digging may uncover the wrong answers to the question or worse, yet, compromise additional sensitive information. Now is the time to set the ground rules with the media in regard to classified material. Some information is easily releasable, i.e. Americans currently engaged in combat, U.S. forces abroad, financing of foreign operations or foreign military forces, commitments to do any of the preceding or negotiations contemplating such a commitment, the fact of intelligence organizations, the costs and concepts of proposed/existing weapons systems. Some information would require presumptive classification, i.e. details of advanced weapons systems designs and operational characteristics, details of plans for military operations, details of ongoing negotiations, intelligence methods. Any information which was not clearly identifiable or categorizable as either automatically releasable or presumptively classified, should then be placed in a category with the emphasis on release rather than withholding such information from the public sector. Control of information is power but restricting access to only a few individuals is not always feasible, releasing it incrementally or selectively may be. Public affairs officers will tend to release it in a restructured format so as to support an ideological viewpoint, or command-mission orientation. The media finds that, in some respects, it may be inundated with so much information that not all of it can be properly processed due to overload. With the proper information strategy already designed, the military can ensure that the media receives just what it needs without clouding the issue.

In the final analysis the military must keep the media in perspective. It is neither as all-powerful nor as all-knowing as they would have you believe. They are not omnipotent and they certainly aren't infallible, but they have given themselves such "great press" over the years that they have become a threat in the eyes of those who don't routinely deal with them. Know your enemy, exploit his or her weaknesses, and learn to work with them.

Team players they will never be, but a healthy respect for their capabilities and intentions could result in a strengthening of the military's media diplomacy efforts.

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